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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with verbs and the relation between verbs and their 
complements. Syntactic evidence is presented which shows that the distinction 
between arguments and adjuncts reflects the optionality of adjuncts, but that 
adjuncts, once introduced, behave as arguments of the verb. An analysis is 
proposed which reflects this observation by assum ing that verbal 
subcategorization is underspecified, so that optional constituents can be 
introduced into the verb phrase. The analysis is developed within a formal 
model of utterance interpretation, Labelled Deductive Systems for Natural 
Language (LDSNL), proposed in Kempson, Meyer-Viol & Gabbay (1999), which 
models the structural aspect of utterance interpretation as a dynamic process of 
tree growth during which lexical information is combined into more complex 
structures which provide vehicles for interpretation, propositional forms. The 
contribution of this thesis from the perspective of utterance interpretation is 
that it explores the notion of structural underspecification with respect to 
predicate-argum ent structu re . A fter providing a form alization of 
underspecified verbal subcategorization, the thesis explores the consequences 
this analysis of verbs and verb phrases has for the process of tree growth, and 
how underspecified verbs are interpreted. The main argument developed is 
that verbs syntactically encode the possibilty for pragmatic enrichment; verbs 
address mental concepts only indirectly, so that the establishment of their 
eventual meaning, and, therefore, their eventual arity is mediated by the 
cognitive process of concept formation. Additional support for this view is 
provided by an analysis of applied verbs in Swahili which, from the 
perspective adopted here, can be seen to encode an explicit instruction for 
concept strengthening, an instruction to the hearer to derive additional 
inferential effects. The analysis presented in this thesis thus supports the view 
that natural language interpretation is a process in which structural properties 
and inferential activity are thoroughly intertwined.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1. Introduction
This thesis is concerned with aspects of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 
of the verb phrase, as seen, in particular, from the perspective of the formal 
model of utterance interpretation Labelled Deductive Systems for Natural 
Language (LDSNL), developed in Kempson, Meyer-Viol & Gabbay (1999). The 
central question investigated is how nominal constituents of the verb phrase, 
taken here to include noun phrases and prepositional phrases, are licensed and 
interpreted, and how they interact with information provided by the verb. The 
discussion thus turns around the question of verbal subcategorization, 
optional and obligatory constituents, and the function of prepositions, as 
illustrated in the following examples:
(la) Fran was baking a cake for Mary in the oven.
(lb) Sally put the flowers on the table with a vengeance.
(lc) The McDonalds live in a house by the seaside.
What all these examples have in common is that the verb is combined with 
more constituents than seem to be required. The sentences also show that 
although PPs are most often optional, some PPs are required by the verb’s 
subcategorization information, e.g. on the table in (lb). The analysis of 
sentences like those in (1) is the main topic of this work.
The theoretical perspective adopted is that of LDSNL, a formal model of 
utterance interpretation which provides an explicit characterization of the
process by which hearers access natural language words in the order in which
they appear in the utterance and use the information provided to build 
structured semantic representations in a step-by-step fashion. This dynamic 
perspective on structure building places certain restrictions on the analysis of 
how verbs and their complements combine, since the process has to be 
modelled as proceeding strictly incrementally. Furthermore, the process is 
goal-driven, guided by the overall requirement that hearers establish 
propositional structures to derive inferential effects from the words 
encountered. This also implies that tree structures interact directly with
1
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pragmatic reasoning. The approach developed in this thesis is that the 
pragmatic process of enrichment, which enables hearers to construct occasion 
specific conceptual representations, plays a central role in the interpretation of 
natural language verbs and verb phrases. The overall achievement of the 
thesis is thus that it provides a unified analysis of verb phrase adjunction for 
LDSNL which integrates the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of the 
interpretation process.
In the next two sections, I introduce the LDSNL model in more detail. 
The final section provides an overview of the thesis.
2. LDSNL: Conceptual Assumptions
In this section I discuss the conceptual assumptions underlying the LDSNL 
model. One of the central assumptions of LDSNL is that knowledge of 
language can at least partly be characterized as the ability to assign mental 
representations of meaning to incoming lexical information in the process of 
utterance interpretation. I discuss briefly how this view relates to the notions 
of competence and performance. I then introduce the Government Phonology 
view that the cognitive role of phonology is to assign phonological structure to 
incoming physical signals, and to provide access to lexical information (Kaye 
1989). After this discussion I provide an introduction to Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995), which characterizes inferential aspects of 
com m unication as resulting from general cognitive constraints on 
information processing. I discuss how the structure building process modelled 
in LDSNL relates to the Relevance theoretic conception of the role of the 
hearer in the establishment of representational structure. I finally provide a 
brief summary of the overall model of utterance interpretation which results 
from the preceding discussion.
2.1. A Model of Utterance Interpretation
The main concern of LDSNL is to model the syntactic aspects of the process of 
utterance interpretation. In the broadest sense, utterance interpretation 
involves an incoming signal, prototypically a continuous undivided input 
stream of sound, on the one end, and a completely interpretable enriched 
mental representation on the other end. A preliminary sketch might look as 
(2):
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(2) Utterance Interpretation (first version)
sound ->  (phonology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics) ->  interpretation
The sketch in (2) shows that the mapping from sound to meaning involves as 
intermediate steps the application of phonological, syntactic, semantic, and 
pragmatic knowledge, in that all of them contribute to the processing of some 
input. However, from the perspective of utterance interpretation, the 
interesting question with respect to this knowledge is not so much the 
independent characterization of each kind of knowledge, but the contribution 
to deriving an interpretation for the signal; a dynamic perspective highlights 
the relationship between different kinds of linguistic knowledge in fulfilling 
an overall task. If, and to what extent, different kinds of knowledge can be 
characterized as being distinct components or modules can then be 
characterized with reference to their particular contribution to the building of 
interpretations.
Before looking further at the components, I discuss in the next section 
the underlying claim in the sketch in (2) that it is possible to study linguistic 
knowledge from the point of view of the hearer, w ithout looking at 
production, or competence.
2.2. Competence and Performance
The study of utterance interpretation concerns to some extent performance, 
since it is concerned with how language is used and thus puts language into a 
functional perspective. On the other hand, the question of what enables 
hearers to perform the task of deriving interpretations is a question about 
knowledge, or competence. Competence and performance are concepts most 
closely associated with Chomsky (1957, 1964, and elsewhere). Chomsky’s 
original idea is embedded in a more general conception of linguistics, 
involving the two idealizations that language is used in a homogeneous 
speech community, and that there is an ideal speaker-hearer relation. Against 
this background, competence is characterized by the ability to produce and 
understand a potentially infinite number of novel sentences, and is contrasted 
with performance, which involves competence plus a num ber of non- 
linguistic factors such as limitations of memory, distortion in the speech 
channel, bad sentence planning and others. In order to find out about linguistic 
knowledge on which speakers draw, the linguist has to abstract away from 
performance factors, and postulates a body of mental principles or rules which
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determ ine the set of all possible ('well-formed') sentences. The well- 
formedness of sentences is checked against gram matically judgements of 
speakers. In addition, Chomsky assumes that syntactic knowledge is 
encapsulated, that is to say, it constitutes a distinct mental module which 
operates independently of other modules. In recent writings, Chomsky (1995) 
points out that the analysis of syntactic competence should only postulate 
components which are 'virtually conceptually necessary’, namely 1) an 
interface with the auditory-perceptual system, 2) an interface with the 
conceptual-intentional level, and 3) an interface with the lexicon.
Competence in the Chomskian sense, then, is the innate, abstract 
knowledge, e.g. a body of principles and fixed parameters, of speakers of a given 
language, which enables them to understand and produce an infinite number 
of novel sentences. This knowledge is autonomous, that is, is not determined 
by, or similar to, any other mental facilities, but its design is constrained by the 
virtual conceptual necessities of three interfaces; sound, meaning, and the 
lexicon. This conception gives rise to the T-model', which has in its basic form 
(that is, with or without 'deep' and 'surface’ structure) been assumed at all 
phases in generative linguistics. The interface to the conceptual-intentional 
system is the level of logical form (LF), the interface to the auditory-perceptual 
module is the level of phonetic form (PF) and the interface to the lexicon is at 
the bottom, without its own level:
(3) T-model
LF PF 
I /
1/
I
(lexicon)
The point where the paths to PF and LF branch corresponds traditionally to 
surface structure (S-structure), but in the more recent Minimalist Program to 
spell out, since no level of representation is assumed at this point.
Compared to the interpretation model (2) above, it seems that both PF 
and LF are part of interpretation. The interface levels could thus be just taken 
over and connected with, say, a line:
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(4) Utterance Interpretation (rejected version)
sound->  phonology->  PF -  LF ->  (semantics, pragmatics) ->  interpretation
In (4) 'syntax' is replaced with 'PF -  LF’. However, the immediate problem is 
that there would be no words in the interpretations derived -  there is no 
interface to the lexicon1. This is not a mere technical problem. Rather, it 
follows from the competence-performance distinction: the T-model represents 
competence only, it is not intended to be related, or even relatable to language 
use2. The relation between competence and performance is achieved by 
different, additional knowledge, for example parsers. A parser might make use 
of competence, but functions independently of it. However, there is no need 
under the Chomskian conception to have the (theoretical) characterization of 
knowledge of language be influenced by (psycholinguistic) evidence of 
language use3. There is also no need to incorporate the model of grammar into 
'the model of the mind'; that is, since grammar, and syntax in particular, is 
encapsulated, the relation of these systems to other cognitive systems (e.g. 
vision, general reasoning) is irrelevant, except for the rather weak 
characterization of the interface levels4.
Of course, there is nothing wrong per se in assuming that humans have 
linguistic competence in the sense that we can classify sentences as right or 
wrong (as grammatical and ungrammatical), but it is not something which we 
do often, nor something which is a (functionally, evolutionarily, ...) sensible 
activity. It is, in this sense, not a virtual conceptual necessity for our cognitive 
make-up. On the other hand, we do use language to communicate, we act as 
speakers and hearers, and in order to do so, we employ knowledge. The shift in 
perspective advocated in LDSNL is to devise a theory which starts from the fact 
that in utterance interpretation, a physical structure (sound) is mapped onto a 
mental structure (a representation of meaning), so that the explanation can, or 
at least could, be measured against psycholinguistic data and is embedded, or at
1 There is also no room for 'movement', or purely syntactic derivations, that is from deep structure 
to surface structure, or from a 'numeration' to spell-out. Note, however, despite the importance of 
movement in most analyses within Chomskian linguistics, it is not, according to Chomsky (and 
presumably most non-Chomskian linguists) virtually conceptually necessary. That is, the ’PF -  
LF' notation might work even if most of Chomsky’s assumptions are maintained, by shifting from 
derivation to representation, and from movement to chains (as proposed e.g. by Brody 1995). 
However, my reasons for rejecting the Chomskian conception are ultimately conceptual rather 
than technical.
2 Cf. e.g. Jackendoff (1998:8).
3 See e.g. Jackendoff (1998) for discussion. Models of grammar which incoporate psycholinguistic 
evidence tend to depart from the respective classic generative model (e.g. Bresnan 1978, Berwick 
& Weinberg 1984, Gorrell 1995).
4 This is one of the main problems identified and discussed by Jackendoff (1998).
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least potentially embeddable, into a larger theory of cognition. But from this 
perspective, utterance interpretation is not performance, at least not in the 
sense of limitations resulting from (lack of) concentration, or memory 
limitations. Rather, competence can be viewed, in contrast to the Chomskian 
conception, as the underlying ability of two distinct activities -  speaking and 
hearing. Since these are two distinct activities, the respective underlying 
knowledge might in fact be different, although, of course, it would be 
somewhat surprising if it turned out to be two completely distinct systems of 
knowledge. Competence in the Chomskian sense can probably be reconstructed 
from the conception(s) of competence assumed here, but it is, cognitively, 
epiphenomenal. Throughout this thesis, I will thus assume that the 
knowledge modelled by linguistic theory is the knowledge which mediates 
between sound and meaning, in particular as used in building interpretations. 
In the next section, I turn more closely to the difference between interpretation 
and production, and try to show why it makes sense to restrict attention to 
interpretation.
2.3. Interpretation and Production
In the beginning of this section, I have introduced the LDSNL assumption that 
a theory of linguistic knowledge should start from the fact that language is 
used in communication, and that it involves, in utterance interpretation, a 
process, possibly involving several sub-systems, of mapping sound structures 
to interpretation. There are reasons for assuming that understanding is 
cognitively prior to production, and thus for focussing on utterance 
interpretation, rather than utterance production. First, there are the (pre- 
theoretic) considerations that in language acquisition, perception appears to 
precede production, and that in language impairment, perception is more 
robust than production. In language acquisition, children universally undergo 
a number of stages in production, using increasingly more complex structures. 
However, it seems plausible to assume that children are able to understand at 
any given stage utterances which are at least as complex as the ones they 
produce. This is also implied in most (all?) theories of language acquisition -  
whether one says that structures are bootstrapped from recurrent patterns, or 
that parameters are set from appropriate input, one is thereby committed to 
saying that children are able to parse some relevant input before it is acquired. 
In language impairment, on the other hand, there seems to be, in addition to 
the asymmetry between impairment of ’functional’ and ’conceptual' systems 
(Broca's and Wernicke’s areas), a less well-observed asymmetry between
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impairment of production and interpretation systems. And it appears that it is 
the latter, which is less often affected by impairment5.
A second set of reasons for assuming the primacy of interpretation comes 
from theoretical work in phonology and in pragmatics.
2.4. Goverment Phonology
The role of phonology in cognitive linguistic theory in a way most compatible 
with the LDSNL view has been described by Kaye (1989, 1997). Kaye rejects the 
idea that phonology is based on articulatory phonetics, that is on an analysis of 
how humans produce speech sounds. In addition to phonological evidence, 
Kaye points out that the speech organs have no obvious parallel in our 
perceptual apparatus, so that a phonetics based model of phonology is 
essentially speaker based. As an alternative to a phonetics based model, Kaye 
proposes a model in which phonology is seen as a parsing device. Under this 
view, phonological knowledge serves to divide an incoming continuous input 
stream into phonological units which provide access to lexical entries. This is 
the view underlying Government Phonology, (GP) (cf. amongst others, Kaye 
1989, 1995, Kaye, Lowenstamm & Vergnaud 1990, Charette 1991), so that the 
following discussion is largely based on work within this framework.
The view that the purpose of phonology is to parse an input stream as 
proposed in GP implies a particular view of morphology and the lexicon (Kaye 
1995). Phonological information provided in the signal serves to identify 
phonological domains, which are representational units stored in the lexicon. 
Kaye (1995: 301-318), discussing the phonology-morphology interface, argues 
that there is in fact very little interplay between phonology and morphology, 
and that there are only two basic notions of morphological structure: analytic 
morphology presents the hearer with more than one phonological domain, 
while non-analytic morphology treats morphologically complex forms as only 
one phonological domain. An example of (one type of)6 analytic morphology is 
provided by a compound like blackboard (5):
(5) [[black][board]]
The brackets in (5) serve to indicate domainhood, that is here, to indicate that 
all black, board, and blackboard, are treated as phonological domains. That
5 Pointed out to me by Marie-Ann Kemp in personal communication.
6 A second type of analytic morphology is discussed in Chapter 6.
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means that the two parts of the compound, as well as the whole compound 
initiate a lexical search. Phonologically, domainhood in (5) follows from GP 
assumptions about the licensing and interpretation of phonological positions, 
which serve to provide the hearer with parsing cues as to the lexical search 
requirement when hearing compounds like blackboard.
An example of non-analytic morphology is given in (6):
(6) [parental]
The claim here is that there is only one phonological domain for parental. The 
form cannot be computed and has to be looked up in the lexicon. It is identical 
in this respect to words like agenda or advantage. This, of course, leaves the 
question about the relation between a word like parental and its ’source’ 
parent. The answer Kaye provides has to do with the organization of the 
lexicon. Following Kaye & Vergnaud (1990), Kaye (1995: 321) proposes:
... phonological representations do not form part of lexical 
representations as such but are rather the addressing system for 
lexical access. A phonological representation is the address of a 
lexical entry. [...] Lexical items that are phonologically similar are 
physically proximate in the psychological lexicon.
That is, forms like parent and parental, as well as irregular morphology like 
keep  -  kept, are not phonologically derived from one underlying 
representation. They constitute different, simplex phonological domains and 
hence address separate lexical entries. However, since the lexicon is (partly) 
organized according to phonological similarity, a provision such as 'proximate 
lexical entries are easily accessible' ensures that the information of both 
parental and parent is accessed at low cost.
Since phonology in this view accesses lexical information, the different 
types of morphology can be seen as different routes to the lexicon. Non-analytic 
morphology is an instruction to address the lexical entry directly, and 
morphological complexity, if any, has to be stored under this entry. Analytic 
morphology allows the hearer to compute the meaning contributed by several 
domains.
As has been argued in GP, many phonological processes can be viewed as 
providing the hearer with parsing clues about lexical access, for example 
domain final empty nuclei in English, or final obstruent devoicing in 
languages such as German or Russian.
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For a model of utterance interpretation as developed here, the GP view of 
phonology offers two interesting points. First, to characterize phonology as a 
tool for parsing and lexical access entails, in line with the argument presented 
in this section, that interpretation is cognitively prior to utterance production. 
The nature of phonology is such that it enables hearers to decode information, 
so that a speaker, in order to encode, has to be able to decode.
Secondly, this view is highly compatible with the interpretation analysis 
of linguistic knowledge. The view of phonology developed in GP can be 
expressed as in the following sketch:
(7) Utterance Interpretation (second version)
sound ->  phonology ->  lexicon (syntax, semantics, pragmatics) ->  interpretation
That is, phonology is a mapping from incoming sound to the lexicon; 
phonological knowledge under this view provides access to lexical 
information. As can be seen from (7), the view overcomes the problem with 
the T-model noted above, since it is the interface to the lexicon which makes 
the T-model difficult to be integrated into the model of utterance 
interpretation proposed in LDSNL. In (7), the lexical entries identified by 
phonological domains can be seen as input to further processing. It is this 
process of structure building from the lexicon which is modelled in LDSNL. 
Before turning to LDSNL, however, I discuss how the primacy of 
interpretation (as opposed to production) is motivated from Relevance Theory.
2.5. Relevance Theory
The LDSNL model is closely linked to Relevance Theory (RT), (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986/1995), in that it provides a model of syntactic knowledge based on 
the Relevance theoretic assumption that utterance interpretation is a goal 
directed process. I will make extensive reference to work in RT below, 
particularly for the discussion of concepts and concept formation in Chapter 5. 
In the section here, I am mainly concerned with the overall cognitive model 
proposed in RT, and how it relates to the LDSNL perspective.
Relevance Theory is a cognitive theory, where pragmatic aspects of 
natural language interpretation are explained by principles of cognition. RT 
takes the work of Grice (1967, 1989) as its historic antecedent. In particular, 
Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) argue, following Grice, that commmunication 
involves inference on the part of the hearer, who has to work out the speaker's
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intended meaning. Simple decoding, on its own, is not enough to recover 
meaning. However, RT differs from Grice’s conception in important respects. I 
outline Grice’s position first, and then discuss how RT departs from it.
Grice proposes that some aspects of communication involve inference on 
the part of the hearer, so that, in addition to decoding the meaning of 
sentences, hearers derive implicatures in interpretation to establish the full 
meaning of an utterance. The inferential aspects of interpretation follow, 
according to Grice, from the assumption that certain conversational rules are 
being obeyed by speakers and hearers. In particular Grice proposes that 
communication is governed by a co-operative principle, which instructs 
speakers as follows: "Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1989: 26). The principle can 
be further specified by a number of rules, grouped under four ’maxims’. Grice 
proposes the following rules (Grice 1989, quoted from Sperber & Wilson 1995: 
33/34):
(8) Grice's Maxims of Conversation
Maxims of quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purpose of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required.
Maxims of quality
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Maxim of Relation
Be relevant.
Maxims of manner
Supermaxim: Be perspicuous.
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.
While Sperber & Wilson agree with Grice that communication involves 
inference, they do not adopt the co-operative principle and maxims, for three 
reasons. First, it is not clear which status they have in linguistic or cognitive
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theory -  are they learned or innate, universal or culture-specific, part of our 
linguistic or of our social knowledge? While the maxims of quality, for 
example, have an almost moral flavour, the maxims of manner sound rather 
more stylistic. Secondly, the maxims are comparatively vague. Thus, it is not 
clear how, for example, the maxims of manner can be made more precise. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a certain amount of overlap -  the maxim of 
relation, 'be relevant’, for example, probably involves some consideration of 
the quality in relation to the quantity of the utterance -  but these aspects are 
expressed by different maxims. Lastly, and most importantly, Sperber & W ilson 
argue that inference not only plays a role in finding out what has been implied, 
but also in establishing what has been said in the first place, that is to say, 
inference is required even for the establishment of linguistic meaning, in 
addition to the establishment of inferences drawn from it. The role of non­
demonstrative inferential reasoning in the establishment of what has been 
said, as opposed to what has been implied, includes cases of ambiguity 
resolution, reference assignment, where pronominal elements crucially 
underdetermine their encoded, truth-theoretic content, and the enrichment of 
encoded meaning, a process which will be discussed more extensively in 
Chapter 5.
The consideration of these questions leads Sperber & Wilson to propose a 
radically different view of pragmatics -  they argue that inferential activities are 
all pervasive not only in communication, but also in the way we interact with 
our environment in general. The inferential abilities hearers use in  
establishing meaning in communication result, according to Sperber & 
Wilson, from the general cognitive abilities which are operative in 
information processing. Thus Sperber & Wilson propose that the inferential 
aspects of communication can be regarded as a reflex of principles of cognition. 
The argument is summarized below.
Humans are information processing animals. Input-modules (in the 
Fodorian (1981) sense) constantly extract information from the environment, 
largely automatically -  we don’t choose to see the things in front of us (unless 
we close our eyes), to smell a smell in the air, and we don't choose to process 
incoming natural language. This processing of incoming information results 
in a situation where at any given moment there is more sensory information 
than can be processed by central reasoning processes, where incoming 
information is projected. One of the central challenges for the human 
cognitive architecture is to make relatively fast and relatively reliable choices 
as to which incoming information is worth attending to, to distribute cognitive 
resources so as to improve our information state as efficiently as possible. In
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other words, we process maximally relevant information, our reasoning is goal 
directed (Sperber & Wilson 1986/95: 49):
Our claim is that all human beings automatically aim at the most 
efficient information processing possible. This is so whether they 
are conscious of it or not; in fact, the very diverse and shifting 
conscious interests of individuals result from the pursuit of this 
perm anent aim in changing conditions. In other words, an 
individual's particular cognitive goal at a given moment is always 
an instance of a more general goal: maximising the relevance of the 
information processed. [...]
With this observation in mind, Sperber & Wilson propose the Cognitive 
Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 260):
(9) Cognitive Principle of Relevance
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of 
relevance.
The relevance of a particular piece of information, where information can be 
characterized as a set of contextual assumptions, can be measured against the 
information state of the processor without these assumptions, i.e. before they 
are processed. If nothing changes, the gain in information is zero, hence 
processing the information is not relevant. On the other hand, if the new 
information changes the initial information state drastically, the information 
is very relevant. This change of information state can have a number of 
instantiations, depending on how exactly the new information interacts with 
old information -  beliefs might be strengthened or contradicted, the new 
information might provide a premise to derive a conclusion which would not 
have followed from the initial information state. That is, relevance involves 
the maximization of contextual effects. But maximization on its own cannot 
explain how choices about which information to attend to can be made. 
Somehow or other, most information probably interacts with what we believe 
already in some way or other, so that it is inefficient to process all incoming 
information and check for potential contextual effects. Sperber & Wilson 
propose that maximization of contextual effects is counter balanced by 
processing cost. Mental activity involves 'cost' -  thinking, information 
retrieval from long term memory, deriving conclusions are activities which 
need cognitive resources. These resources have to be allocated so as to derive 
maximally relevant information (in the maximal effect sense) with justified
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cognitive effort. This is expressed in the definition of relevance (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986/95: 125):
(10) Relevance
Extent Condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the 
extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.
Extent Condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the 
extent that the effort required to process it in this context is 
small.
The definition in (10) includes the two conditions on relevant information in 
a given context in two clauses: relevant information derives maximal 
contextual effects with minimal cognitive effort. The cognitive principle of 
relevance governs the relation between incoming data from the perceptual 
system (the input modules) and the central reasoning system. Note that the 
activity regulated by relevance is inferential, that is, contextual effects can be 
characterized as inferential potential of an assumption, cognitive effort is the 
cost associated with inferential activity. From this characterization of cognitive 
activity, Sperber & Wilson then develop a characterization of communication.
Communication involves cognitive activity. Sperber & W ilson’s 
approach to characterize cognition as a basis for communication makes this 
relation more precise. In particular, since communication involves the 
processing of information, and since processing of information in general is 
geared towards maximization of relevance, as expressed in the cognitive 
principle of relevance, the very same principle can serve to explain the 
inferential-cognitive processes in communication. This approach answers 
those questions which were left open by Grice -  what for Grice are a number of 
rather loose co-operative conventions is for Relevance theory cognitively 
mandatory. Our ability to handle communication (more or less successfully) 
results from our ability to handle information (more or less successfully). Both 
abilities result from our cognitive make up, not from social convention; both 
abilities are ultimately grounded in general reasoning, they are not part of 
linguistic knowledge or knowledge about language use.
One of Sperber & Wilson’s basic assumptions about cognition is that 
there is always more information coming from the perceptual modules which 
could be processed than the amount of information which can actually be 
processed by the central reasoning system. Since incoming utterances are part 
of the incoming information, they compete with other data for the attention of 
the processor -  the specialized, 'narrow' linguistic module is, after all, only
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another input module. However, there is a difference between just 
information and information communicated (or, more precisely, ostensively 
communicated); by addressing someone, we claim their attention. For the 
hearer this means that an ostensively communicated message (linguistic or 
otherwise) not only carries the content of that message, but also, and 'prior' to 
that content, it expresses the informative intention of the speaker. The hearer 
is justified to assume that the speaker, by addressing the hearer, implicitly 
claims that the content of the message will be relevant to the hearer (of course, 
it might turn out to be not as relevant to the hearer as the speaker had thought, 
but that is a different problem). This is expressed in the Communicative 
Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 260):
(11) Communicative Principle of Relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the
presumption of its own optimal relevance.
The phrase 'presumption of optimal relevance' is defined as follows (1995: 
270):
(12)' Presumption of optimal relevance
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant for it to be worth the 
addressee's effort to process it.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible 
with the communicator's abilities and preferences.
That is, the hearer is justified to spend cognitive effort on processing a 
communicated message because she can assume that there are enough 
contextual effects to be derived to make the processing worthwhile. By the 
presumption of optimal relevance hearers can expect to derive maximally 
relevant inferential effects with no more than necessary cognitive cost since 
they can expect that the ostensive stimulus (i.e. in verbal communication, the 
utterance) used is the most relevant one possible in the given situation. The 
two principles of relevance thus highlight the relation between cognition and 
communication, since inferential reasoning in communication can be seen as 
a subcase of the more general cognitive constraint to process information 
efficiently.
Although the outline of relevance theory given so far is very brief, one 
important point for the present discussion can be noted, namely that in RT
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inferential abilities in communication are explained as resulting from 
cognitive abilities relevant for processing information, that is, from 
interpretation rather than from production. Sperber & Wilson derive 
communicative behaviour -  as expressed in the communicative principle of 
relevance in (11) -  from general cognitive behaviour, namely from our 
relevance-driven processing as embodied in the cognitive principle of 
relevance and definition of relevance. In other words, our ability to assess and 
choose information in linguistic communication is a reflex of our ability to 
handle information in general, but this latter ability does not presuppose 
ostensive stimuli -  understanding is prior to informing.
There is another point which I would like to raise here, although the 
details will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 5, namely the relation 
between linguistic knowledge and pragmatics which is advocated in Relevance 
theory. In their formulation of relevance, Sperber & Wilson are very careful to 
retain the Gricean conception of the role of inference in utterance 
interpretation. The pragmatic aspects of utterance interpretation are inferential 
and involve the central reasoning system. However, other aspects of utterance 
interpretation are handled in the specialized linguistic module. These are 
automatic, algorithmic processes which crucially do not involve general 
reasoning, but the decoding of an arbitrarily defined code. The specialized 
linguistic module then provides input to the general cognitive system. Sperber 
& Wilson propose that the distinction between general reasoning and the 
linguistic system involves the distinction between non-demonstrative 
inference, the working mode of the general reasoning system, and decoding in 
the linguistic module. In view of the boundary between the two systems, 
Sperber & Wilson (1986/95: 185) argue that there are three aspects of utterance 
interpretation which require general reasoning, but which need to be resolved 
before a proposition can be established (where a proposition is a structure 
which can be evaluated for its truth value against a semantic model): 
disambiguation, reference assignment, and enrichment. That is, in contrast to 
Grice, Sperber & Wilson argue that non-demonstrative inference plays a role 
not only for recovering what has been implied by an utterance, but also to 
discover what has been said. The output of the linguistic module is a semantic 
representation, but "... semantic representations are incomplete logical forms, 
i.e. at best fragmentary representations of thought." (1986/95:193). The first task 
of the central reasoning system is thus to derive a propositional form, to which 
(model-theoretic) content can be assigned, and only after that any implied 
meaning. On the other hand, the output of the linguistic system is not a
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proposition, but an underspecified logical form (LF), in need of 
disambiguation, reference assignment, and enrichment.
For utterance interpretation, this conception means that there is no full 
semantic representation for linguistic expressions without the contribution of 
pragmatic inferencing:
(13) Utterance Interpretation (third version)
sound -> phonology ->  lexicon (syntax, pragmatics) ->  {interpretation, semantics}
The sketch of information flow in (13) shows that the establishment of 
semantic representations is part of the interpretation process, to which all 
components before this process contribute.
2.6. Dynamic Syntax
Against this background, the LDSNL model is designed to provide an explicit 
characterization of the structure building processes required to use lexical 
information for the derivation of inferential effects. Hearers take information 
provided by lexical entries and use this information to build interpretations. 
This process is modelled as the incremental building of structured 
representations, reflecting the step-by-step contribution of lexical items to the 
establishment of the eventual representation. In accordance with Relevance 
theoretic assumptions about the nature of pragmatic inference, LDSNL 
structures do not represent a direct mapping from linguistic form to model 
theoretic interpretation. However, in contrast to Relevance theory, LDSNL 
does not employ a notion of interface level such as LF. Rather, the assumption 
is that pragmatic inferencing may apply to lexical items directly, as well as at 
each step of the process of structure building. This view implies that syntax and 
pragmatics derive propositibnal forms in tandem, so that pragmatic inference 
may determine the well-formedness of an LDSNL tree. These points are taken 
up in detail below in Chapter 5. For the moment, I assume that this 
assumption is correct7.
The sketch of the information flow in utterance interpretation can thus 
be completed as given in (14):
7 As argued more extensively below, the motivation for a level of LF is more syntactic than 
pragmatic, so the real issue is to show that it is not possible, or at least not necessary to have it 
from the point of view of syntax. In contrast, the issue does not seem to be essential for Relevance 
Theory, so that in this chapter, where the emphasis is on providing a general picture of 
utterance interpretation, I do not discuss the issue in detail.
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(14) Utterance Interpretation (final version)
sound ->  phonology ->  lexicon ->  syntax/ ->  {interpretation, semantics}
pragmatics
The final diagram in (14) is meant to describe the process of utterance 
interpretation as follows: Hearers receive a physical signal, a continuous input 
stream of sound, which provides the input to phonology. Phonology can be 
characterized as a body of knowledge which enables hearers to divide the input 
stream into phonological domains which provide lexical access. Lexical 
information provides the input to the building of the propositional form. The 
propositional form is established by using information from the lexicon and 
syntactically defined transition rules on the one hand, and non-demonstrative 
inference on the other. Model theoretic semantic interpretation is assigned to 
the propositional form, which is part of the interpretation of the utterance.
The syntactic aspect of utterance interpretation is modelled in LDSNL as 
an incremental increase of information about the eventual propositional form. 
The syntactic vehicle for interpretation are tree structures for which a 
(operational) semantics is given in the form of a modal logic, the logic of finite 
trees (LOFT). The growth of inform ation in the process of utterance 
interpretation can be characterized as an increase in the information about the 
tree structure established at a given stage in the process. The formal tools of 
LDSNL introduced in the next section thus make reference to trees and tree 
descriptions, and characterize the increase of information about a given tree, 
corresponding to the process of tree growth. Transitions from one partial tree 
structure to another, up to the establishment of the eventual tree representing 
the propositional form, are licensed by lexically encoded instructions and by 
syntactically defined, optional transition rules. Before discussing the formal 
details of this process in the next section, I conclude this section by reviewing 
the basic conceptual assumptions underlying the LDSNL model.
The model of utterance interpretation discussed in this section reflects 
basic LDSNL assumptions about linguistic structure and knowledge of 
language, which are summarized here, serving as a conclusion to this section.
LDSNL shares w ith Relevance theory the com m itm ent to a 
representational theory of m ind. The tree descriptions w ith their 
corresponding tree structures built in LDSNL are structured representations of 
content, discrete from the natural language itself, and it is those 
representations over which the eventual semantic evaluation associated with 
the utterance are stated.
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Furthermore, LDSNL places emphasis on the dynamic process of how the 
representation of linguistic structure is established. The process of structure 
building is defined as a goal-driven incremental process, during which the 
information provided from lexical items is used to build increasingly more 
articulated structures. In this sense, the building of tree structure is dynamic, so 
that syntax can be characterized as a set of transitions, rather than (or in 
addition to) a set of constraints on well-formed structures.
The model assigns a central role to the hearer in the process of utterance 
interpretation. This means that linguistic competence can be partly defined as 
the ability to assign structural representations to incoming linguistic 
information. This view is compatible with the conceptions proposed in 
Government Phonology and Relevance Theory and provides a conceptual link 
between knowledge of language and the function to which it is put.
In summary, LDSNL is a formal model of utterance interpretation in 
which linguistic competence is analysed as the ability to dynamically build 
structured representations of content. In the next section, I introduce the 
formal tools employed in LDSNL to articulate this view.
3. LDSNL: Formal Tools
In this section I introduce the formal tools employed in LDSNL and provide a 
sample derivation to show how the process of tree growth is modelled. I 
introduce the tree logic employed and the notion of declarative units, which 
annotate tree nodes. The dynamics of the system are characterized by the 
notions of task state and requirement, which are discussed before a set of 
transition rules and lexical actions are introduced, both of which drive the 
process of tree growth. A detailed sample derivation is given at that stage. I 
then introduce the analysis of dislocated constituents as underspecified tree 
location and the LINK operation, employed inter alia in the analysis of relative 
clauses.
3.1. Tree Logic
The dynamic unfolding of structure is modelled in LDSNL as tree growth, 
employing the logic of finite trees (LOFT) (Blackburn & Meyer-Viol 1994, 
Kempson et al. 1999). This is a modal logic which describes binary branching 
tree structures, reflecting the mode of semantic combination in function- 
application. Nodes in the tree may be identified by a numerical index ranging 
over 0 and 1:
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(15) •0
/ \
•  00 •  01
/ \
•  010 • O il
By convention, the left daughter node of a node n is assigned the index nO and 
the right daughter is assigned the index n l. Information holding at a given 
node may be described by a node description, or declarative unit (DU). The 
location of a node, i.e. its index, may be expressed by the predicate Tn 
(Treenode)8:
(16) •{Tn(0),Q}
/ \
• {Tn(00), P} • {Tn(01), P ->  Q}
The DUs in (16) specify the tree location and information holding at that node. 
A left daughter is defined as an argument node, a right daughter as a functor 
node.
An alternative way to express the location of a DU is by using a subscript:
( 17) ( o Q U o o P M o iP - > Q }
The DUs in (17) describe the tree in (16).
The relation between tree nodes can be described by modal statements. 
This provides a means to state that some information holds at a daughter or at 
a mother node:
(18) lo Qj> <d0> P, <di> P ->  Q}
The DU in (17) states that at Tn(0), Q holds, and that from the perspective of 
Tn(0), at the left daughter P holds, and at the right daughter P ->  Q holds. The 
DU in (18) describes, again, the tree in (16). There are two basic modalities, one 
corresponding to the daughter relation (<d>, ’down’), and one corresponding 
to the mother relation (<u>, 'up'). These can be used with and without the 
numerical subscript, depending on whether it is important to distinguish
8 Note that in earlier versions of LDSNL the bullet C*') was used to distinguish between facts 
and requirements in Declarative Units. In this thesis, the bullet is a graphic representation of a 
tree node; it is not part of the DU. Requirements are, as explained below, identified by a question 
mark, following more recent LDSNL usage.
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between left and right branches. Furthermore, modality operators can be 
iterated, e.g. < d x d > , < d x u > , etc.
The system further allows for a weaker characterization of tree node 
relations, namely for saying that P holds somewhere down (or up), without 
specifying where exactly ('how deep down', or 'how high up') P holds. This is 
formally expressed by the 'Kleene star' operator, the reflexive transitive closure 
over the modalities <d> or <u>:
(19) <d>*P =def (P) or <dxd>*(P)
This recursive definition (and the analogous definition with the <u> operator) 
provides a means to express the underspecification of tree locations:
(20) • (Tn(0), Q, <d>* R}
/ \
• {Tn(00), P) • {Tn(01), P ->  Q}
{Tn(0*), R}
There are four DUs in (20), but only three of them are in fixed locations. The 
fourth DU is described as holding at Tn(0*) which is the numerical index 
indicating an unfixed daughter node of Tn(0). Correspondingly, the modal 
statement at Tn(0) indicates that at some unfixed daughter node R holds. This 
definition of underspecified tree location is the tool employed in LDSNL for 
the analysis of preposed constituents such as w h-pronouns or left dislocated 
topics. The analysis of verbal underspecification developed in this thesis 
equally makes use of underspecified locations.
3.2. Declarative Units
As pointed out in the last section, information holding at, or annotating, a tree 
node can be stated as declarative units9, or tree node descriptions. Next to the 
treenode predicate, DUs most commonly include a formula (Fo) and a type (Ty) 
value:
9 The terminology Declarative Unit follows traditional LDSNL usage. Technically, tree node 
description (ND) is more appropriate.
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(21) • {Tn(0), FoO(a)),Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Fo(a), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ol), Fo(p), Ty(e ->  t)}
The tree in (21) shows how information from the functor node combined with 
information from the argument node results in the complex formula value at 
the mother node. Similar to Categorial Grammar, application of modus 
ponens over type values is paralleled by function-application over formula 
values. Note, however, that LDSNL types are conditional types without an 
implication for the order of natural language expressions.
A tree like the one in (21) could be, for example, a simplified 
representation of an intransitive sentence:
Formula values are representations of the meaning of words. The notational 
convention seen in (22) indicates an instruction to access a mental concept, for 
example, in the case of Fo(eve'), the mental concept the hearer has of Eve. Not 
all words encode instructions to access a named concept. Formula values of, for 
example, pronominal expressions include a meta-variable Fo(u), indicating an 
underspecified concept which encodes an instruction to the hearer to supply 
the formula value from the (cognitive) context, guided by Relevance 
considerations10. This search might be restricted, such as for the second person 
singular pronoun you , which encodes Fo(uaddressee)/ but the basic encoded 
meaning is here, as in the unrestricted case, an instruction for a search for a 
suitable conceptual representation. An example of a non-conceptual formula 
value, is the encoded meaning of question pronouns, which encode a meta 
variable Fo(WH) possibly with a suitable restriction, e.g. +person, +thing, 
which is required to remain open in the eventual representation.
Type values consist of the elements {e, cn, t} and conditional types 
formed from these elements. The basic types stand for common noun, entity, 
and truth-value (i.e. a proposition) respectively. Conditional types are for 
example Ty(e ->  t), as in the example above, or Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)) for transitive 
verbs.
10 One of the arguments against LF in LDSNL is that in VP ellipsis a suitable representation for 
pronominal expressions has to be established before the tree structure is completed (Kempson et 
al. 1999).
(22) • {Tn(0), Fo(sing’(eve,))/ Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(eve'), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), Fo(sing’), Ty(e ->  t)}
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Other predicates found in DUs include Category (Cat) which indicates 
mood, for example in questions; Cat(+Q). This predicate is always associated at 
the mother node. Similarly, the representation of tense is expressed as values 
of predicates11.
3.3. Requirements and Tasks States
The dynamics of the LDSNL system result from characterizing how trees grow. 
This means that LDSNL derivations, or parses, start from only minimal trees 
and proceed through stages of partial trees until the tree is fully developed. The 
minimal initial tree of a derivation is a tree with only a root node.
(23) • {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
The information holding at the root node at the outset of a derivation is, apart 
from the location, a requirement to derive an expression of Ty(t). This means 
that not only information already established can be stated in a DU, but also 
information which needs to be established. In this case, the requirement to 
derive an expression of Ty(t) reflects the justified expectation of a hearer that 
the tree building process will result in a (the) propositional form. Formally, the 
first step in a derivation can be expressed as an Axiom. At any stage in a 
derivation, some information might have been established, and some other 
information might still be required. Outstanding information is indicated by 
writing a question mark (?) in front of it. In the running text, a requirement 
can be identified by writing TODO, thus in the example above, there is a 
requirement TODO Ty(t) holding at Tn(0). The derivation is completed if, after 
all information from the lexicon has been incorporated into the tree, all 
requirements have been fulfilled.
For any stage in a derivation, a current node can be identified. The 
requirements holding at that node constitute the current task state:
(24) • (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(eve’), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• [Tn(OlO), ?Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(see’),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
11 An LDSNL treatment of tense and temporal dependencies is developed in Perrett (1996, fcmg.).
Chapter 1: Introduction 23
The parse state in (24) holds after the tree structure for Eve saw ... has been 
built. At this stage, there are three requirements, TODO Ty(t) at Tn(0), TODO 
Ty(e ->  t) at Tn(01), and TODO Ty(e) at Tn(010). The pointer symbol 0 indicates 
that the current node is Tn(010), so that the current task state is TODO Ty(e). If, 
in this situation, information from the lexicon provides an expression of Ty(e), 
it can be introduced into the tree at Tn(010), since it matches the current 
requirement. However, if the next word is sing, it cannot be introduced into 
the tree even though its type Ty(e ->  t) matches the requirement holding at 
Tn(01). This is because the pointer is not at Tn(01).
3.4. Transition Rules
The development of tree structure involves the step from one parse state to 
another. This transition from one tree description to another can be licensed in 
two ways; either by a general transition rule, or by lexical instruction. I discuss 
transition rules first, and lexical instructions in the next section.
3.4.1. Introduction and Prediction
A transition rule specifies the input tree, that is at which state in a derivation it 
may apply, and an output tree, that is, what the resulting state is. Transition 
rules are stated as tree descriptions, where the input tree is described above the 
line and the output tree below the line:
(25) Introduction
______________ f...?Tv(Y)...01_______________
{... ?Ty(Y), ? <d0>Ty(X), ?<d!>Ty(X-> Y),... 0}
Introduction licenses the introduction of modal requirements. If the current 
task is TODO Ty(X) (where X and Y are any well-formed type values), 
Introduction licenses the introduction of two modal statements to the effect 
that at the daughter nodes two subtasks are required which together result in 
Ty(Y). The rule licenses for example the introduction of the requirement for a 
subject when the variables are instantiated as follows:
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(26) Introduction (Subject)
______________ l-?Tv(t)...0[_____________
(... 7Ty(t), ?<d0> Ty(e), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t) ,... 0)
The input tree in (26) corresponds to the minimal tree at the outset of a 
derivation:
(27) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t) 0}
In this situation, Introduction results in:
(28) • {Tn(0) 7Ty(t), ?<do> Ty(e), ?<di> Ty(e -> t) 0}
The effect of this transition is that it introduces the statement that an 
expression of Ty(t) can be derived if there is an expression of Ty(e) at the 
argument daughter, and an expression of Ty(e ->  t) at the functor daughter.
Modal requirements, such as those being introduced by Introduction in
(28) result in the building of tree structure by the application of Prediction12:
(29) Prediction
(n ?<dz,xt), 0}______
{n ... ?<d><t>--.},(im - ?<|), 0}
where x -  0, or x = 1.
By Prediction, a new node is built. In a situation where at the current node a 
modal requirement holds, a new node can be built where this requirement 
minus the modal operator holds. This new node will then be the current node. 
By an application of Prediction, the tree in (28) can be developed into (30):
(30) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<do> Ty(e), ?< d ^  Ty(e ->  t)}
/
• (Tn(00), ?Ty(e) 0}
12 This is a slightly simplified version of the rule given in Kempson et al. (1999: 80), since I do 
not define Prediction for LINK relations (discussed below). The rule as given here is sufficient for 
the purposes of this thesis.
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The new node Tn(00) is licensed since TODO <do> Ty(e) holds at Tn(0). Since 
transition rules are in general optional, an alternative development of (28) 
would be (31):
(31) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<d0> Ty(e), ?<d!> Ty(e ->  t)}
\
• (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t) 0}
Here Tn(01) is licensed since at Tn(0) the requirement TODO <di> Ty(e ->  t) 
holds. However, Prediction cannot apply to (28) twice, since after the first 
application, Tn(0) is no longer the current node.
3.4.2. Thinning, Elimination and Completion
While the rules discussed in the preceding section are concerned with 
unfolding of tree structure, the rules discussed in this chapter are concerned 
with the accumulation of established information.
The first rule provides a means for stating that requirements have been 
fulfilled:
(32) Thinning
{... 4»... 0}
The rule simplifies DUs. If at a current node a DU holds which includes both a 
fact and the requirement to fulfill this fact, the requirement can be omitted. 
The node is still the current node.
The rule of Elimination can be regarded as the opposite of Introduction:
(33) Elimination
(... <dn> (Fo(«), TvOQ). < d i>  (Fo(B),Tv(X-> Y))... 0 1
{... Fo®(a», Ty(Y), <do> (Fo(a), Ty(X)), <dx> (Fo(f»,Ty(X->  Y))... 0 }
Elimination does not introduce a new node, but only changes annotations 
holding at one node. The rule states that if at a given node two modal 
statements hold, which state that both the argument daughter and the functor 
daughter are annotated with a formula and a type value, and the two type 
values can combine by Modus Ponens, then the resulting type and the
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corresponding expression derived by function-application over the formula 
values hold at that node. For example, for a tree describing Eve sings, 
Elimination would license the following transition:
(34) Elimination (Fo(sing’(eve’)))
{... <dn> (Fo(eve,)/ Ty(e)), <dL> (Fo(sing’), Ty(e->  t) ) ... 0 )
{... Fo(sing'(eve')), Ty(t), <d0> (Fo(eve’), Ty(e)),
<di> (Fo(sing'), Ty(e ->  t» ... 0 }
Elimination licenses the combination of information present as modal 
requirements. Elimination is similar to Introduction in that both rules specify 
transitions involving modal statements holding at a given node, without any 
direct effect on tree structure (as opposed to tree descriptions).
The rule of Completion can be regarded as the inverse of Prediction:
(35) Completion
I n  • • ♦ 1 / l i n r  •»•<!>/ 0 1 _________
{n ... <dxj>, 0}, Inn; • • • ^ } 
where it = 0 or k = 1.
Completion states that if at a daughter node some information holds, and the 
daughter is the current node, then that (i.e. mother) node may be annotated 
with the corresponding modal statement and becomes the current node. An 
example is given in (36):
(36) (n... ?Ty(t), <dn> (Fo(eve'), Ty(e)L.(m Fo(sing’)/ Ty(e ->  t)) 0}
(o... ?Ty(t), <d0> (Fo(eve’), Ty(e), <di> (Fo(sing’), Ty(e ->  t) 0},
(oi ... Fo(sing'),Ty(e->  t))}
The input state in the example in (36) is a tree discription where at Tn(0) with 
the requirement TODO Ty(t) a modal statement holds to the effect that at the 
argument node Fo(eve’) of Ty(e) holds (which in fact presupposes a previous 
application of Completion), and that at the (current) functor daughter Tn(01) 
Fo(sing') of Ty(e-> t) holds. The transition licensed by Completion is then that 
the presence of the information at Tn(01) is recorded at Tn(0) as a modal 
statement, and that the pointer moves to Tn(0), making it the current node. 
This new description is then in turn suitable input to Elimination.
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The rules Elimination and Completion provide the means to pass 
established information up the tree so that eventually an expression of Ty(t) 
can be derived. Although the rules are optional, in practice they apply as late as 
possible, (ideally) when all terminal nodes are filled13.
The rules introduced so far result, in conjunction with lexical 
instructions, in a complete parse. Modal requirements are introduced by 
Introduction, and the corresponding daughter nodes are built by Prediction. If 
lexical input fulfills a requirement, Thinning removes the requirement. After 
requirements have been fulfilled, Completion introduces modal statements at 
the mother nodes, and Elimination licenses the combination of formula 
values.
The next section introduces two more rules which are needed for more 
complex derivations.
3.4.3. Star Adjunction and Merge
The rules so far do not introduce unfixed nodes into the tree, or assign an 
unfixed node its place in the tree. The last two rules discussed in this section do 
this.
Star Adjunction licenses the introduction of an unfixed node at the 
outset of the parse:
(37) Star Adjunction
_______ fTn(a), ?Ty(t), 01___________
(Tn(a), rry(t)), (<u*>Tn(a), ?Ty(e), 0)
At a given parse where the current node Tn(a) has a requirement TODO Ty(t), 
the introduction of an unfixed node lower than Tn(a) is licensed, which 
becomes the new current node. The Star Adjunction rule is more specific than 
the rules discussed so far. It can only apply at the beginning of the parse, and it 
specifies that the new node be of Ty(e). This rule is needed to introduce fronted 
constituents such as question words into an unfixed node. Star Adjunction and 
unfixed nodes in general will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
13 More precisely, Elimination may apply after the tree is complete; the application of 
Completion is necessary at intermediate steps. This is shown in the sample derivation below, 
although in the remainder of the thesis, I generally assume that both Completion and 
Elimination provide the final steps in a derivation.
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The last rule introduced here licenses the resolution of the 
underspecified node and assigns it to a fixed position. Merge licenses the 
merging of two node descriptions, i.e. DUs:
(38) Merge
1... ND, ND,...l 
{... NDUND’ ...}
The Merge rule is completely general. It simply states that two node 
descriptions can be combined into one. Although the rule overgenerates, it 
does ensure that an unfixed node can be merged with a fixed one, so that it is 
integrated into the tree.
The Merge rule concludes the discussion of transition rules in this 
section. The next section describes the structure of lexical entries.
3.5. Lexical Entries
The structure of lexical entries interacts with the general format of tree 
description introduced so far. Lexical information provides annotations on 
nodes and specifies how a particular lexical item contributes to the process of 
structure building. Lexical information interacts with the transition rules 
introduced in the last section in the process of tree building.
The general format for lexical information is as follows:
(39) Format of Lexical Entries
IF Ty(X)
THEN make(...), 
put(...), 
go(...),
ELSE abort
Lexical entries consist minimally of three statements. The IF clause gives the 
condition under which the information provided by lexical entries can be 
introduced into the tree. For example, an expression of Ty(e) generally requires 
that there be a current requirement TODO Ty(e) at the stage at which the lexical 
entry is scanned. The THEN statement lists the particular actions which are 
performed if the condition in the IF statement is met. THEN statements consist 
usually of three predicates. The predicate make is an instruction to built a new 
node, which is further specified in the value of the predicate; for example
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make(<di>) builds a new functor node. The predicate put is an instruction to 
annotate an existing node, for example with a formula and a type value. 
Finally, go is an instruction for pointer movement, it changes the current task 
state. Two details are important. First, make implies go, that is, the instruction 
to make a node implies that the pointer goes there. Second, the order of the 
predicates is important, for example put before make means put(...) at current 
node, then build a new node', while make before put means 'build a new node 
and put(...) there'. The ELSE clause specifies the actions to be performed if the IF 
condition is not met. Often this is abort, i.e. the end of the derivation, but the 
clause may be used otherwise. Finally, the clauses can be nested to result in 
more complex entries14.
This characterization of lexical entries is a minimal characterization in 
the sense that all lexical entries which contribute to tree building contain at 
least the three clauses discussed. However, the actual actions performed may be 
more complex than outlined here, since more idiosyncratic information may 
be associated with individual words in the lexicon. This point is further 
discussed in relation to the analysis presented in Chapter 3.
A sample lexical entry for love  is given below:
(40) Lexical Entry for love
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN put(?<d0> Ty(e)),
make(<di>), put(Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))
ELSE abort
The condition for the introduction of the information from love  is that the 
current task state is TODO Ty(e ->  t). If this condition is met, the current node 
is annotated with a modal requirement. Then a new functor node is built and 
annotated with the formula and type values specified. If love  is scanned at a 
stage in the derivation when the current task does not include the requirement 
TODOTy(e-> t), the derivation ends. The entry for love  is seen in use in the 
sample derivation in the next section.
14 The treatment of the lexicon here is compatible with arguments presented in Construction 
Grammar (cf. i.a. Fillmore 1988, Kay 1995) since lexical information includes (instructions to 
build) subtrees. In Construction Grammar, lexical entries may include larger syntactic structures 
(i.e. constructions) in which the lexical item is embedded.
Chapter 1: Introduction 30
3.6. Sample Derivation
In this section, I present a sample derivation of a simple sentence to show how 
the step-by-step process of tree growth is expressed in the LDSNL system. I 
display and comment on every step in the derivation, although I will give up 
this practice in the remainder of the thesis. The derivation here is merely 
meant to shows how the rules discussed above work.
The example to be discussed is given in (41):
(41) Sally loves chocolate.
The derivation begins with the introduction of the root node by Axiom:
(42a)
• fln(0), ?Ty(t) 0}
At this stage, two rules may apply, Introduction and Star Adjunction. This is a 
situation which often arises, since transitions rules may apply optionally, and 
more than one rule might be applicable at any given stage of the parse15. In 
practice, I use the rules sensibly, so that in this case, Introduction applies:
(42b) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<do> Ty(e), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t) 0}
By Prediction, the argument daughter can be built:
(42c) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<do> Ty(e), ?<d!> Ty(e ->  t)}
/
• {Tn(00), ?Ty(e) 0}
At this stage the first word is scanned, namely Sally, for which I assume the 
following lexical entry:
(43) Lexical Entry for Sally
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put(Fo(sally’), Ty(e))
ELSE abort
15 However, application of 'wrong' rules leads to a situation where the derivation cannot be 
completed. Recall that LDSNL does not model real time parsing, but characterizes the body of 
knowledge required for incrementally building interpretations.
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The current task state matches the condition in the IF clause, so the formula 
value Fo(sally') and the type value Ty(e) can be introduced.
(42d) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<d0> Ty(e), ?<d!> Ty(e ->  t)}
/
• {Tn(00), ?Ty(e), Fo(sally’), Ty(e) 0}
At this stage, Thinning can apply to Tn(00) to remove the requirement:
(42e) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<do> Ty(e), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t)}
/
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally'), Ty(e) 0}
The DU at Tn(00) now matches the tree description which licenses the 
application of Completion:
(42f) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<d0> Ty(e), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t),
<d0> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e)) 0}
/
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally'), Ty(e)}
At this stage, two rules could apply at Tn(0) -  Thinning, since one requirement 
holding at Tn(0) has been fulfilled, and Prediction, since there is still the modal 
requirement of the functor node. However, while Prediction could apply after 
Thinning, which does not move the pointer, Thinning could not apply after 
Prediction, which does move the pointer. Thus for clarity of display, Thinning 
applies first16:
(42g) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t), <d0> (Fo(sally'), Ty(e)) 0}
/
• {Tn(00), Fo(sally'), Ty(e)}
Now Prediction applies and builds the functor node:
(42h) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<dx> Ty(e ->  t), <do> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t) 0}
Ty(e)}
16 Alternatively, Thinning would apply after Completion.
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The next step is the scanning of the word love  which accesses the following 
information17 (repeated here):
(40) Lexical Entry for love
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN put(?<do>Ty(e)),
make(<di>)/ put(Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))
ELSE abort
The condition on the introduction of the lexical information from love  is met 
since the current node has a requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t). The first put 
statement annotates Tn(01) with a modal requirement, after which the make 
statement results in the building of a new functor node which is annotated 
with the information specified in the second put predicate:
(42i) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t), <d0> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<do>Ty(e)}
Ty(e)} \
• (Tn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)) 0}
In this situation, Completion can apply to annotate Tn(01) with a modal 
statement registering the fulfilled requirement at Tn(Oll):
(42k) • {Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t), <d0> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(saUy’), • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<d0>Ty(e),
Ty(e)} <di> (Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))) 0}
\
• fTn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
At this stage, Prediction applies at Tn(01) since there is a new modal statement, 
resulting from the lexical action from love. Thus Tn(010) can be built:
(421) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<dT> Ty(e -> t), <d0> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<do>Ty(e),
Ty(e)} <di> (Foflove’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))}
/ \
fTn(010), ?Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
171 omit tense and agreement throughout.
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The next step is again scanning of lexical input, this time from chocolate. I 
assume here that mass nouns have at least one reading under which they are 
of Ty(e), so that the lexical information can be introduced into the tree:
(44) Lexical Entry for chocolate
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put(Fo(chocolate’), Ty(e))
ELSE abort
Since the current node requires a Ty(e) expression, the put statement can be 
applied:
(42m) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<dx> Ty(e ->  t), <do> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<d0> Ty(e),
Ty(e)} <di> (Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))}
i \
{Tn(010), ?Ty(e), • (Tn(Oll), Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
Fo(chocolate'), Ty(e) 0}
At this stage, all lexical information has been scanned and the verb’s lexical 
requirements are fulfilled. All nodes have been built, so that the remaining 
steps serve only to combine the accumulated information. The only rules 
applying are thus Thinning, Completion and Elimination. The first step is the 
application of Thinning at Tn(010), followed by the application of Completion 
to Tn(010) and Tn(01). This results in an increase in modal statements at 
Tn(01):
(42n) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<di> Ty(e ->  t), <do> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<d0> Ty(e),
Ty(e)} <di> (Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))),
<do> (Fo(chocolate’), Ty(e)) 0}
/ \
{Tn(010), Ty(e), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e -> t))} 
Fo(chocolate')}
Next, Thinning applies at Tn(01). I only reproduce Tn(01), since the rest of the 
tree remains unchanged:
(42o) • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<d0>Ty(e),
<di> (Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
<do> (Fo(chocolate'), Ty(e)) 0}
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The Ty(e) expression at the argument node fulfills the requirement TODO 
<do> Ty(e), which is removed. Elimination then applies to the values of the 
two daughter nodes:
(42p) • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t), (Fo(love’(chocolate'))/ Ty(e ->  t)),
<dj> (Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))),
<do> (Fo(chocolate'), Ty(e)) 0}
The derived fact Ty(e ->  t) fulfills the requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t), which is 
removed:
(42q) • fTn(O) ?Ty(t), ?<di> Ty(e -> t), <d0> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e))}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • {Tn(01),
Ty(e)} (Fo(love’(chocolate')), Ty(e ->  t)),
<dj> (Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))),
<do> (Fo(chocolate’), Ty(e)) 0}
/ \
{Tn(010), Ty(e), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
Fo(chocolate')}
Completion applied to Tn(0) and Tn(01) annotates Tn(0) with a modal 
statement. I represent only Tn(0):
(42r) • (Tn(0) ?Ty(t), ?<dx> Ty(e -> t), <d0> (Fo(sally'), Ty(e)),
<dx> ((Fo(love'(chocolate')), Ty(e ->  t)) 0}
By Thinning «md Elimination the derivation ends with the final tree in (42s):
(42s) • (Tn(0), Ty(t), Fo(love'(chocolate')(sally')),
<dx> (Fo(love,(chocolate’)), Ty(e ->  t)), <do> (Fo(sally’), Ty(e)) 0}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally'), • (Tn(01),
Ty(e)} (Fo(love'(chocolate')), Ty(e ->  t)),
<dx> (Fo(love’), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))),
<do> (Fo(chocolate'), Ty(e)) 0}
/ \
{Tn(OlO), Ty(e), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
Fo(chocolate’)}
In the final tree, the last oustanding requirement, TODO Ty(t) at the root node 
has been fulfilled by the derivation of the corresponding formula value 
FoOoveXchocolate’^ sally')). The derivation shows that structure building is
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achieved by the rules Introduction and Prediction in conjunction with lexical 
information, while the combination of information in the tree is achieved by 
the rules Thinning, Completion and Elimination.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will display derivations in much less 
detail, and concentrate on the growth of tree structure, as opposed to the 
combination of information. I will also in general omit modal statements and 
pointer movement, unless necessary.
3.7. Displacement Structures
As already indicated, displaced constituents such as question words and 
dislocated topics, are analysed by employing the Kleene star operation over tree 
modalities and the corresponding unfixed nodes. In this section I present the 
relevant steps in a derivation of (45):
(45) What does Sally love?
I ignore the contribution of the auxiliary and just concentrate on basic 
predicate-argument structure. I also ignore irrelevant details.
The initial step is as always derived by Axiom:
(46a) • (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
In contrast to the derivation above, the first step is here not Introduction, but 
Star Adjunction:
(46b) • (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
(Tn(0*), ?Ty(e)}
The relevant (abbreviated) lexical entry for what is given below:
(47) Lexical Entry for what
IF {n* ?Ty(e)}
THEN put(Fo(WH), Ty(e) 
go(<u*>), put(+Q)
ELSE abort
The IF clause requires a TODO Ty(e) task to hold at an unfixed node. Since this 
condition is met, the node is annotated with the formula and type values
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given. The pointer then moves to the root node and puts a +Q feature to 
indicate that the proposition is a question:
(46c) • (Tn(0), Cat(+Q) ?Ty(t) 0}
(Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
At this stage, Introduction can apply at Tn(0) and the derivation proceeds as in 
the sample derivation above, plus the presence of the unfixed node, until the 
information from love  has been incorporated into the tree:
(46d) • (Tn(0), Cat(+Q), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(sally'), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
Ty(e)} / \
fTn(010), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love’), Ty(e -> (e ->  t))} 
?Ty(e) 0}
|Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
At this stage, there is no further lexical input, but there is still a requirement 
TODO Ty(e) outstanding, namely at Tn(010), and there is an unfixed node. A 
derivation is not completed unless all nodes have a fixed position in the tree. 
In this case, the underspecified node can be identified with the fixed node at 
Tn(010) by Merge, where the requirement TODO Ty(e) can be fulfilled by the 
type value of the pronoun. The underspecified location can thus be resolved as 
Tn(0*) = Tn(010), and the eventual tree results:
(46e) • (Tn(0), Cat(+Q), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sally'), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)} / \
{Tn(010), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(love'), Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
In this tree, all nodes are fixed, so that Completion and Elimination can apply.
The analysis of displaced constituents thus exploits the possibility to have 
underspecified tree node locations, which results in an unfixed node during 
the derivation, which only eventually is assigned a fixed place in the tree, 
before Completion and Elimination apply.
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3.8. LINKed Structures
The LINK relation constitutes an extension of the LDSNL system as discussed 
so far. A LINK relation can be established between two trees whose nodes then 
do not stand in a daughter or unfixed daughter relation. A LINK analysis is 
employed in LDSNL for relative clause:
(48) Sally, who I admire, is leaving tomorrow.
The relative clause is in a LINK relation to the head noun, which means that it 
is an island for extraction (it is not a daughter relation -  an unfixed node in the 
matrix clause cannot be fixed into a LINKed structure), but yet part of the tree 
in the sense that a copy of the formula value of the head noun has to be 
incorporated into the LINKed tree. The LINK relation is established as follows:
(49) LINK Induction
______________ In - Fo(ot),Tv(e)... 0 1_____________________
{„... Fo(a),Ty(e) ...},{nL0... 7Ty(t)... 0 },(„lo- -  Fo(a),Ty(e)...}
The rule states that from a Ty(e) expression with some formula value, a 
transition is licensed in which two new LINKed nodes are built; a new root 
node with TODO Ty(t), and new unfixed node below the new LINKed root 
node with the type and formula value being identical to those of the head 
noun. The corresponding tree structure is as follows:
(50) • {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sally’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
Ty(e)}
\
LINK
\
• (Tn(OOLO), ?Ty(t) 0}
(o o l o * Fo(sally'), Ty(e)}
From this tree, the derivation proceeds standardly with the building of the 
relative clause. The unfixed node behaves like the question pronoun discussed 
in the last section. After the due steps, subcategorization information from the 
verb admire leads to the building of a node with a requirement TODO Ty(e), at
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which the unfixed node can be fixed. The derivation then continues with the 
development of the matrix clause18.
The LINK relation has been developed further by Swinburne (1999) in an 
analysis of secondary predication. In this thesis, I do not discuss relative 
clauses, but secondary predication is briefly discussed in Chapter 3.
4. Conclusion and Outline of the Thesis
In this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical background for the analysis 
being developed in this thesis. In the first half of the chapter, I have discussed 
the conceptual assumptions of LDSNL, and introduced a model of utterance 
interpretation in which the LDSNL model is embedded. I have discussed work 
in Government Phonology and Relevance Theory which supports the view 
that knowledge of language can at least partly be characterized as the 
underlying ability of hearers to assign representations of meaning to an 
incoming physical speech signal. W ithin this overall outline, I have 
characterized the LDSNL approach to natural language syntax and syntactic 
knowledge. From the perspective of LDSNL, words provide the hearer with 
instructions to incrementally develop a structured representation of the 
propositional form of the utterance. This representation is built from lexical 
and syntactic information on the one hand, and non-demonstrative pragmatic 
inference on the other. Model-theoretic semantic interpretation is only 
assigned to the propositional form.
In the second half of the chapter, I have introduced the formal tools 
employed in LDSNL to model a process of tree building by which the 
conceptual claims are formally articulated. I have introduced basic LOFT tree 
structures and declarative units which annotate trees, as well as the formal 
definitions which characterize the dynamic aspect of tree building, that is, task 
states and requirements, transition rules and lexical actions. Finally, I have 
briefly introduced the LDSNL analyses of displaced constituents involving 
unfixed tree nodes, and of relative clauses involving the LINK relation. In the 
remainder of this section, I give an outline of the thesis.
The following Chapter 2 introduces the empirical problem discussed in 
the thesis, namely the problem of verb phrase adjunction. A range of cross- 
linguistic data as found in the literature is introduced which shows that the 
distinction between arguments and adjuncts is not clear-cut, indicating that at
18 The relevant pointer movement has to be added to the LINK rule above. Cf. the full treatment 
in Kempson et al. (1999: Chapter 4), and Swinburne (1999).
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some level of analysis, obligatory and optional nominal constituents of the 
verb phrase have to be assigned identical structural relations to the verb. The 
main syntactic evidence for this claim comes from extraction patterns, where 
arguments and adjuncts can be shown to behave alike. The view is further 
supported by semantic and morphological considerations. The chapter delimits 
the data to be discussed in the thesis, which include NPs and PPs, but only 
marginally lexical adverbs, and furthermore only those PPs and NPs which 
function as, possibly optional, arguments of the verb, to the exclusion of 
sentence and NP adverbials. In light of the evidence presented, problems for an 
LDSNL analysis of adjuncts are discussed and possible solutions are offered.
With both theoretical background and empirical range determined, I 
come to the main proposal made in the thesis in Chapter 3. I propose that verb 
phrase adjunction in LDSNL can best be analysed by introducing an 
underspecified semantic type for verbs which licenses the optional 
introduction of Ty(e) expressions (i.e. NPs and PPs) as arguments of the verb. 
The type specification employs the Kleene star operation, so that verbal 
underspecification can be explicitly encoded. This analysis of adjunction -  
which I call the e* analysis following the definition of the underspecified type 
-  is developed as an alternative to a putative adjunction analysis which locates 
the underspecification inherent in verb phrase interpretation in the adjunct 
rather than in the verb. I show that the e* analysis has a number of advantages 
over underspecified adjuncts. The main part of the chapter then shows how 
the underspecified type is integrated into the LDSNL system, and how verb 
phrase structures are built with it. All necessary formal specifications are given 
in this chapter, including transition rules and relevant lexical entries. The e* 
analysis entails an analysis of PPs as being of Ty(e) expressions, and the 
necessary formal analyses of PPs and of prepositions are developed. The 
chapter is concluded by discussing a number of implications and consequences 
of the e* analysis.
Chapter 4 turns to the question of the semantic interpretation of 
underspecified verbs. Three main approaches to the semantics of adjuncts 
proposed in the literature are discussed -  an analysis under which adjuncts are 
functors taking VPs as arguments (Dowty 1979), an analysis which treats 
adjuncts as arguments to the verb (McConnell-Ginet 1982), and an analysis 
which introduces underspecified semantic relations (Minimal Recursion 
Semantics, Copestake et al. 1997). After some discussion, I show that the 
approach developed by McConnell-Ginet is the most suitable one for the 
interpretation of e* verbs, and I develop an incremental extensional semantics 
for underspecified verbs based on this work. The chapter thus also serves to
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illustrate how the proposal developed in this thesis relates to previous work 
on adjunction. A concluding discussion is offered, which provides the 
transition to the next chapter.
The semantic characterization of e* verbs is based on the tacit assumption 
that model-theoretic semantic interpretation is assigned to the natural 
language string directly, an assumption inherited from the analysis proposed 
by McConnell-Ginet. However, LDSNL assumes, following Relevance Theory, 
that propositional content to which a model-theoretic interpretation can be 
assigned is only arrived at by processes of pragmatic inference. Chapter 5 
explores the role of pragmatic reasoning in the interpretation of underspecified 
verbs. It is argued that in particular the Relevance theoretic analysis of mental 
concepts and processes of concept formation (e.g. Carston 1996, Sperber & 
Wilson 1997) can be employed for e*. The basic assumption of this analysis is 
that words encode only incomplete concepts, which are in need of pragmatic 
enrichment in order to play a role in the derivation of inferential effects. From 
this perspective, the underspecification of verbs as developed in the e* analysis 
can be viewed as being simply an overt syntactic reflex of this much more 
general process. Verbs encode their incomplete conceptual meaning by being 
syntactically underspecified with respect to the number of Ty(e) expressions 
with which they combine on a given occasion. Complementarily, optional 
Ty(e) expressions can be regarded as an aid in concept formation. This analysis 
confirms the view that natural language understanding is subject to pragmatic 
inferencing throughout. Some further implications of this analysis are 
discussed.
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of applied verbs in Swahili. Applied verbs 
have often been characterized as being related to a corresponding base verb by 
an operation of valency changing, so that, for example, a transitive verb 
becomes di-transitive. In this chapter I develop an alternative hypothesis 
which assumes that applied verbs encode an instruction for concept formation, 
so that the hearer is entitled to derive additional contextual effects. I present 
evidence to support this view, and show how change in valency follows from 
the unified analysis presented.
In Chapter 7 I explore the possibility of how the analysis of underspecified 
verbs developed here could be used in a computational implementation of 
LDSNL. I introduce two approaches which model context-sensitive reasoning 
with natural language input, Generative Lexicon Theory (Pustejovsky 1995), 
which employs typed feature structures, and the logic based approach described 
in Hunter & Marten (1999), and I show that the second approach is more 
suitable for modelling reasoning with underspecified verbs. At this stage, no
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fully worked out analysis is available, so that the discussion in this chapter is 
only a preliminary exploration of possibilities.
The final Chapter 8 provides the conclusion of the thesis, summarizes its 
results and offers a brief evaluation.
Chapter 2
Arguments and Adjuncts
1. Introduction
In this chapter I introduce the main topic of the thesis, namely the relation 
between verbs and their complements in the verb phrase. I start by discussing 
the notions of verb phrase and subcategorization and give an LDSNL 
characterization of these terms (Section 2). Section 3 presents a range of 
examples which show that the distinction between arguments and adjuncts, 
which is implied by the notion of strict subcategorization, mainly reflects the 
difference between obligatory and optional constituents of the verb phrase, but 
that the distinction is not clearly supported by morphological, semantic, or 
syntactic facts. In Section 4, I discuss how, in the light of the evidence 
presented, an LDSNL analysis of adjunction can be developed. The section 
serves as a preparatory discussion of the analysis developed in the following 
chapters and introduces the particular problems for tree grow th and 
subcategorization raised by adjuncts. Section 5 summarizes the findings of this 
chapter.
2. Verb Phrase and Subcategorization
In this section I provide an LDSNL characterization of the notion of verb 
phrase and subcategorization. Since in particular subcategorization plays an 
im portant role in the following chapters, this section includes a brief 
discussion of several approaches to model subcategorization requirements, 
against which the LDSNL analysis will be contrasted. An important point for 
the following sections is that strict subcategorization implies a distinction 
between obligatory and optional constituents of the verb phrase, i.e. between 
arguments and adjuncts.
2.1. Verb Phrase
There is no primitive notion of verb phrase in the LDSNL system, i.e. there is 
no rule, as for example found in phrase structure grammars, which specifies 
how a VP is built, nor is there a primitive notion of verb. Similar to Categorial
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Grammar, verbs are analysed as predicates, which specify the num ber of 
nominal expressions with which they combine to yield a proposition. For 
example, a transitive verb may be associated lexically with a type specification 
such as (1):
(1) Type Specification for a Transitive Verb 
Ty(e -> (e ->  t))
The type in (1) indicates that two Ty(e) expressions are required by the predicate 
to result in an expression of Ty(t). However, there is one important difference 
between LDSNL and Categorial Grammar with respect to typing, namely that 
LDSNL has no general rules of type inference such as type shifting or function- 
composition19. This means that an LDSNL derivation with a transitive verb 
always proceeds by first combining the verb with the object, and then 
combining the verb plus object with the subject. If type shifting were allowed as 
one of a number of type inference rules, the subject could be assigned a higher 
type such as (2):
(2) Potential Type for Type-Shifted Subject 
Ty((e ->  t) ->  t)
The type in (2) would by function composition license a derivation where the 
subject acts as a functor which takes a transitive verb as an argument, and 
where the subject plus verb then combines with the object to yield an 
expression of Ty(t). But this means that there is no means to structurally define 
a VP, i.e. an expression which includes the verb and its object(s), but not the 
subject.' It is because there are no type inference rules in LDSNL that the notion 
of verb phrase can be defined structurally, namely as an expression of Ty(e ->  
t), where, as in (2), the Ty(e) expression is the subject. The corresponding 
notion of subject can thus be defined as that Ty(e) expression which combines 
with a predicate to result (immediately) in an expression of Ty(t). The 
corresponding tree relations are as follows:
19 See e.g. Lambek (1958), McGee Wood (1993), Morrill (1994).
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(3)
• (Tn(0), Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OO), Ty(e)} * {Tn(Ol), Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
In the tree in (3), the expression at Tn(OO) corresponds to the subject. A verb 
phrase is an expression holding at Tn(01). Constituents of the verb phrase can 
thus be characterized as Ty(e) expressions holding below Tn(01). It is in the 
sense of this characterization that I employ the term verb phrase in this thesis.
2.2. Subcategorization
Type information such as in (1), above, is used to specify the valency, or 
transitivity of verbs. That is, LDSNL assumes, following traditional grammar, 
that verbs specify in the lexicon how many nominal expressions can be 
associated with it in a clause, from which classifications of verbs into, for 
example, intransitive, transitive, and di-transitive verbs can be derived. Typing 
information is also used to distinguish between arguments and adjuncts: the 
former are the subcategorized NPs, while the latter are not, or at least not 
directly, licensed by the verb, so that their presence in a well-formed clause is 
regulated by some other principle of the grammar. For example, (4) shows that 
a putative lexical entry for kiss includes a statement to the effect that kiss both 
licenses and requires a subject NP and an object NP:
(4) kiss, Ty(e -> (e -> t))
The subcategorization information associated with the verb accounts for the 
fact that only (5a) is grammatical, while in (5b) the object is missing, and in (5c), 
there is one NP too many, so that both these sentences are ungrammatical:
(5a) Jill kissed Robert.
(5b) *Jill kissed.
(5c) *Jill kissed Robert John.
It also follows from (4) that the PP in the garden shed in (6) is an adjunct, and 
thus not directly licensed by the verb:
(6) Jill kissed Robert in the garden shed.
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In the following section, I briefly give a more general overview of how 
subcategorization information can be expressed, and then show in more detail 
how subcategorization information is expressed in LDSNL.
2.2.1. Means of Expressing Subcategorization
In addition to the syntactic aspects of subcategorization information, there are 
semantic considerations. Thus, for example, in Categorial Grammar syntax and 
model theoretic semantics are defined in tandem in analogy to the syntax and 
semantics of logical languages. From a Categorial Grammar perspective, the 
fact that kiss syntactically categorizes for two NPs follows from the fact that 
k i s s  is a binary predicate in some model in which it receives its interpretation. 
That is, in addition to syntactic subcategorization, there is, in Categorial 
Grammar, semantic subcategorization. Thus, for example, a statement about 
syntactic subcategorization such as in (4), above, corresponds to the statement 
(7) in the semantics:
(7) kxXykiss(y,x)
As stated in (7), the predicate k is s  combines with two expressions which are 
substituted for the variables to result in a proposition such as, for example, 
shown in (8):
(8) kiss(jill, robert)
Accordingly, ungrammatical sentences like (5b) and (5c) above are incomplete 
or ill-formed in the semantics, since they do not result in an expression of 
Ty(t).
Frameworks not, or less, based on logic often employ the term 
participants for the semantic corrrelate to subcategorization. The idea here is 
that verbs have the valency they have because they refer to some semantic 
entity, like for example a frame, event, or scenario which involves the number 
of participants which are identified as subcategorized NPs by the verb. Despite 
considerable differences between more formal and more functional approaches 
to natural language analysis, in this particular respect, both are fairly similar -  
the syntactic restriction on NPs encoded by the verb is, at least partly, explained 
with reference to the meaning the verb expresses, however this meaning is 
represented.
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There is a third alternative to characterize the relation between syntactic 
transitivity and semantic arity or participants, namely to employ thematic roles 
(or, theta(0)-roles, deep cases). Thematic roles can be viewed as expressions in  
an intermediate vocabulary expressing generalizations over both conceptual 
(and/or semantic) structure and syntax. The major motivation for thematic 
roles is that they make it possible to characterize discrepancies between syntax 
and semantics, as well as cross-linguistic variation as to which semantic 
argument is expressed by which syntactic argument. For example, in GB theory 
(Chomsky 1981), both theta-theory and case-theory regulate the occurrence of 
nominal expressions; correspondingly, verbal lexical entries include 
information about both thematic roles and case. LDSNL, following the 
Categorial Grammar tradition, does not recognize this intermediate level and 
does not employ thematic roles. I therefore offer only a short discussion here, 
without attempting to review the considerable literature on thematic structure 
even in outline20.
The main reason for rejecting thematic roles as part of the analytical 
apparatus is the vagueness of that concept. Specifically, there is, first, no set of 
well-defined theta-roles, and, secondly, their status as syntactic or semantic 
primitives is unclear. The first point, that there is no well-defined set of 
thematic roles, has often been made. While most frameworks or analyses 
would include roles like agent and patient, other potential members like for 
example source, path, goal, location, or direction are less firmly established. 
Furthermore, it is not clear what the exact distinction between the (or some) 
members of a given set of thematic roles is, nor is it always clear which role to 
assign to a given noun phrase in a given natural language expression. The 
more technical reason for excluding thematic roles on these grounds is that all 
expressions in the LDSNL model have an operational semantics, which might, 
however, be difficult to formulate for thematic roles. At present, thematic roles 
are thus not part of the LDSNL system.
The second point, the unclear status of thematic roles with respect to 
syntax or semantics is apparent in the following two quotes: "... in GB the focus 
is on the semantic relations holding between heads and their syntactic 
complements. These relations, called thematic roles, are stored in the lexical 
entries of potential heads ..." (Ravin 1990: 3, emphasis in the original), and "... 
the notion ’0-grid' is no more a semantic notion than 0-theory is a semantic 
theory" (Tomaselli 1997: 144). That is, on the one hand, thematic roles can be
20 Cf. Campe (1994) for references. The following discussion is based a.o. on Ravin (1990), 
Ladusaw & Dowty (1988), and the papers in Butt & Geuder (1998).
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viewed as syntactic primitives, purely technical tools to determine syntactic 
well-formedness, while on the other hand, names like agent or experiencer 
seem to imply that these roles refer to something more semantic or conceptual. 
Assuming that this indeterminate status is undesirable, one can divide the 
question of thematic roles into two parts; syntactically, they are not part of the 
LDSNL system due to the difficulty in defining them, while semantically, they 
may be regarded as generalizations over mental representations, or concepts, 
but not as primitives (cf. Ladusaw & Dowty 1988). I thus assume that thematic 
roles play no role in the specification of verbal subcategorization in LDSNL.
2.2.2. Subcategorization in LDSNL
The analysis of subcategorization in LDSNL is similar to the Categorial 
Grammar approach, in that there is no notion of participants, or thematic 
roles, and in that typing information is taken to reflect semantic arity. LDSNL 
types can thus be defined in correspondence with lambda expressions as in 
Categorial Grammar, as for example in (9):
(9) kiss: {Fo(kxXykiss(x)(y)), Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
In (9) the conditional type corresponds to two steps of lambda reduction which 
are needed to derive a proposition.
There is however an important conceptual difference between Categorial 
Grammar and LDSNL with respect to the relation between syntactic structure 
and semantic interpretation. In LDSNL, there is considerable independence of 
the building of semantic trees and eventual model-theoretic evaluation, 
whereas in categorial grammar every operation in the syntax corresponds to an 
operation in the semantics. Since in LDSNL the process of tree growth is 
defined syntactically, independent of the eventual semantic evaluation, there 
is no (model-theoretic) semantic correlate for tree-underspecification, or any 
model-theoretic semantic interpretation for procedural aspects of lexical items 
such as w fr-pronouns. For the same reason, subcategorization statements in 
LDSNL are not so much concerned with how eventual semantic evaluation in 
a model is reflected, but rather with the contribution of lexical items to the 
process of structure building. In addition to type information, lexical entries for 
verbs may thus include explicit instructions about the transitions licensed by 
the verb. As shown in Chapter 1, a transitive verb like kiss may lexically specify 
the following actions:
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(10) Lexical Entry for kiss
IF ?Ty (e -> t)
THEN put(?<d0> Ty(e)),
make(<di>), put(Fo(kiss'), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))
ELSE abort
The lexical entry does not only specify the type and formula value of the verb, 
but rather consists of a set of actions which are licensed by the lexical entry. In 
this case, the information from the verb results not only in the building of the 
verb's own node (the functor daughter), but also in the annotation of the VP 
node with a modal requirement, which effectively, given the availabilty of 
Prediction, licences the building of the argument node as well. Lexical entries 
in LDSNL do not only include the subcategorization requirements of a given 
verb, but in addition include instructions for the establishm ent of 
corresponding tree structure. Subcategorization plays thus an important part in 
the building of tree structure.
In view of this characterization, the relation between type information 
and eventual model theoretic interpretation can be regarded as being mediated 
by the process of structure building, as well as possibly other processes relevant 
for the establishment of interpretation. The exact relation between the type 
information provided by verbs and their eventual semantic interpretation 
constitutes one of the main topics of the thesis, fully developed in the 
following chapters. In particular, I argue that verbal subcategorization 
determines only partly the arity of a given predicate, but that quite generally, 
information from words is subject to pragmatic enrichment, so that the 
eventual semantic representation of a verb is only determined in context. In 
order to express the possibility of structural and contextual contribution to the 
establishment of meaning in utterance interpretation, I follow the LDSNL 
convention to represent formula values not as lambda expressions, but by 
writing, for example, Fo(kiss'), which indicates that the word kiss provides an 
instruction to the hearer to access the concept kiss. It is this concept, rather than 
the instruction to access it, which can be characterized as being of a particular 
arity. Thus, in practice, the number of Ty(e) expressions with which a given 
verb can combine is stated in the type value, but not explicitly in the formula 
value, at least not unless necessary.
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2.3. Summary
The basic LDSNL notions introduced in this section are thus verb phrase, 
which can be characterized as tree structure holding below a node with a 
Ty(e -> t) predicate, and subcategorization, which can be seen as involving type 
and formula values, but more importantly includes instructions for building 
of tree structure, since lexical entries may include sets of actions which are 
performed when the verb is introduced into the tree. In the following sections 
I discuss the relation between subcategorization and verb phrases, that is, the 
distinction between obligatory and optional constituents of the VP. The 
discussion serves to introduce the empirical range of the analysis of verbal 
subcategorization proposed in this thesis.
3. Arguments and Adjuncts
One of the implications of a traditional view of subcategorization is that there 
is a clear distinction between arguments and adjuncts. The former are 
subcategorized, necessarily expressed nominal expressions, while the latter are 
optional, not always nominal expressions in a more loose relationship to the 
verb. This distinction correlates to some extent with a difference in semantic 
function and morphological marking. Semantically, arguments introduce the 
main participants of the event or action denoted by the verb, while adjuncts 
add further information which is not strictly speaking necessary -  about place, 
time, purpose, instruments used, or other people involed. Morphologically, 
arguments are marked with nominative (or ergative) and accusative case, or 
simply unmarked, while adjuncts are marked with a non-core case, introduced 
by a preposition, or marked as adverbs. However, as has been discussed by inter 
alia McConnell-Ginet (1982) and Fillmore (1994), this correlation is not perfect, 
and the distinction between arguments and adjuncts might therefore not be as 
dear as implied by strict subcategorization.
3.1. Morphological Marking
Leaving the semantics to one side for the moment, the argument-adjunct 
distinction is imperfect in the sense that a num ber of verbs require 
morphological adverbs as obligatory, rather than optional complements. 
Consider the following examples:
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(11a) John behaved rudely to his mother in law.
(lib) The chancellor worded the bill carefully.
(11c) The secretary phrased the submission badly.
The adverbs in (11) are clearly morphologically marked as such, but seem to be 
obligatorily required:
(12a) ?John behaved to his mother in law.
(12b) ?The chancellor worded the bill.
(12c) ?The secretary phrased the submission.
The sentences in (11) without the adverb are less well-formed than the 
corresponding sentences with adverbs, so that the adverbs appear to be 
subcategorized for by the verb.
Similarly, in (13) the prepositional phrases cannot be omitted:
(13a) Fran put the kettle on the stove.
(13b) Alex lay the book on the table.
(13c) Judy lives with her sister.
(13d) Donavan resides in Oyster Bay.
(14a) *Fran put the kettle
(14b) *Alex lay the book
(14c) ?Judy lives
(14d) ?*Donavan resides
As these examples show, the PPs in (13) behave as arguments rather than as 
adjuncts with respect to obligatoriness.
Finally, the examples in (15) show obligatory verb phrase constituents in 
German which are not accusative marked:
(15a) Axel half dem Jungen
A  helped the.DAT boy.DAT 
’Axel helped the boy'
(15b) Sie gedachten der alten Freunde
they remembered the.GEN old.GEN friends.GEN 
'They remembered the old friends’
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The object in (15a) is dative case marked, while the one in (15b) is genitive 
marked. Although the canonical object case in German is accusative, the NPs 
in (15) cannot be omitted:
(16a) ?Axel half
(16b) *Sie gedachten
As in the preceding examples, the NPs here appear to be arguments, despite the 
fact that they are not marked with canonical argument case.
All the preceding examples show that the distinction between arguments 
and adjuncts is not co-extensive with any morphological distinction, so that 
neither the notion of argument, nor the notion of adjunct can simply be 
defined in terms of morphological coding.
3.2. Semantic Function
From the point of view of subcategorization, adjuncts provide additional, or 
circumstantial information, as opposed to core information provided by 
arguments of the predicate. For adverbial modification in general, a distinction 
is often made between sentence adverbs, verb phrase adverbs and verb adverbs:
(17a) He will probably be late.
(17b) Jill put down the ring reluctantly.
(17c) He covered himself completely.
The sentence adverb in (17a) adds information about the likelihood of the 
proposition expressed by the sentence. In (17b), the adverb appears to modify 
the verb phrase, while the adverb in (17c) seems to modify the verb. In 
addition, PPs functioning as adverbials can, in contrast to adverbs, modify a 
nominal expression:
(18a) I always liked to talk to the boys from South Dakota.
(18b) The man with the paper has just left.
In (18a) the PP from South Dakota modifies the NP the boys, and in (18b) the 
PP with the paper modifies the NP the man. The difference between PPs which 
modify NPs and those which function as complements to verbs will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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On the other hand, PPs often resist a sentence adverbial reading available 
to an adverb, as shown in (19) and the parallel German example in (20):
(19a) Carefully, David had cut all the bagels.
(19b) With care, David had cut all the bagels.
(20a) Julia stellte die Blumen sorgfaltigerweise auf den Tisch
Julia put the flowers carefully on the table 
'Julia put the flowers carefully on the table'
(20b) Julia stellte die Blumen mit grofier Sorgfalt auf den Tisch
Julia put the flowers with great care on the table 
'Julia put the flowers with great care on the table’
While (19a) may have a reading 'it was careful of David ...’, (19b) can only 
mean that the act of cutting was done with care. Similarly, (20a) may mean that 
it was careful of Julia to put the flowers on the table, while (20b) can only mean 
that she did it carefully.
In this thesis I am mainly concerned with PPs which appear to be part of 
the verb phrase, as opposed to those functioning as sentence adverbial.
When modifying verbs or verb phrases, PPs express a variety of semantic 
'functions’, some of which are parallel to the semantic function of arguments 
as illustrated below:
Locative
(21a) Jane was singing in the bathroom.
(21b) Judy lives in Notting Hill.
Directional
(22a) Olli is leaving for Tokyo tomorrow.
(22b) Sara put the pizza into the oven.
Temporal
(23a) I have to leave before midnight.
(23b) The meeting lasted six hours.
C om m itative  
(24a) Sally.went to the movies with James.
(24b) I am staying with my parents.
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The list could be expanded or refined, but it shows that the common 
characteristic of all these examples is that the PPs in the (a) sentences modify 
the action denoted by the verb, rather than the proposition expressed by the 
sentence, in a manner similar to the subcategorized objects in the (b) sentences, 
so that there does not seem to be any obvious well-defined distinction between 
arguments and adjuncts on semantic lines.
Another semantic parallel between arguments and adjuncts has been 
noted by Tenny (1994), namely that both arguments and adjuncts may change 
the aspectual information of the verb:
(25a) Sally painted for/*in an hour.
(25b) Sally painted the picture *?for/in an hour
(26a) Rob pushed the table for/*in an hour.
(26b) Rob pushed the table to the window *?for/in an hour.
Both the object the picture in (25) and the PP to the window in (26) change the 
aspectual status of the predicate from non-telic to telic, as is indicated by the 
temporal adverbial. I do not discuss aspect in detail here, but just note that 
arguments and adjuncts can have identical semantic functions with respect to 
aspectual information.
It is examples like those in (21 -  26) with which I am mainly concerned in  
the thesis, i.e. PPs which modify the action denoted by the verb. The relation 
between the analysis developed here and VP modification by adverbs and 
nominal adverbials (e.g. yesterday) is only discussed briefly at relevant 
junctures, whereas PPs modifying NPs are discussed in some more detail in 
the next chapter. I am, however, not discussing sentence adverbials. The 
semantic aspect of VP modification by PPs is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
whereas Chapter 3 is concerned with more syntactic aspects. The following 
section discusses relevant syntactic evidence, which shows that there is in fact 
no difference between arguments and adjuncts of this kind with respect to 
extraction.
3.3. Extraction
Hukari & Levine (1994, 1995) discuss constructions in a number of languages 
which exhibit particular morpho-syntactic behaviour to mark extraction, or 
displacement structures ('Unbounded Dependency Constructions', UDC, cf. 
also Zaenen 1983). They then point out that in these constructions extraction is
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marked irrespective of whether the displaced element is an argument or an 
adjunct. I present here the evidence adduced by Hukari & Levine21.
3.3.1. French Stylistic Inverison
French permits optional subject-verb inversion in the context of extraction 
structures (discussed i.a. in Kayne & Pollock 1978), a process called 'Stylistic 
Inversion’, and illustrated in (27), (Kayne & Pollock 1978, quoted from Hukari 
& Levine 1994: 285):
(27) Ou esperaient diner tes amis?
where hope.3PL dine your friends 
'Where did your friends hope to dine?’
The subject tes amis follows the agreeing verbal complex, in contrast to the 
basic SVO order in French. Stylistic inversion is not triggered by the immediate 
presence of an interrogative pronoun (as in this case o u), but is sensitive to the 
displacement context, as can be seen from (28), (Kayne & Pollock 1978, quoted 
from Hukari & Levine 1994: 285):
(28) Avec qui croit-elle qu'a soupe Marie?
with who think-she that-has dine Marie 
'Who does she think that Marie has dined with?'
In (28) the subject Marie follows the verb soupe in the subordinate clause. 
However, the interrogative pronoun (avec qui) is in the matrix clause. Thus, 
Hukari & Levine conclude that stylistic inversion is licensed in the UDC, that 
is, between the antecedent and its unification site (i.e. extraction site), and not 
by the presence of a w ft-word. The examples in (27) and (28) already show that 
stylistic inversion is not restricted to arguments, but is also licensed by 
extracted adjuncts. Further examples provided by Hukari & Levine show the 
contrast in interpretation between non-inverted and inverted structures 
(Kayne & Pollock 1978, quoted from Hukari & Levine 1994: 285 (transcription 
as in the original)):
(29a) Ou/Quand Marie a-t-elle declare que Paul etait mort?
Where/When M 3.sg.aux-2.sg.cl.3.sg.fem.cl declared that P was dead 
'Where/when did Marie declare that Paul had died?
21 The data are also discussed in Bouma, Malouf & Sag (1997).
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(29b) Ou/Quand Marie a-t-elle declare que etait mort Paul?
W here/W hen M 3.sg.aux-2.sg.cl.3.sg.fem.cl dedared that was dead P 
'Where/when did Marie dedare that Paul had died?
The difference between these two sentences is that (29a) has the non-inverted 
order subject-verb in the lower clause (... Paul etait mort), while (29b) has the 
inverted order verb-subject (... etait mort Paul). The difference in 
interpretation follows from what has been said so far: (29a) is ambiguous 
between a reading where the wh -phrase is interpreted in the main clause and a 
reading where it is interpreted in the subordinate clause. (29b), on the other 
hand is not ambiguous; the w h -phrase has to be interpreted in the lower 
clause, since the lower clause is marked as lying within the UDC. Hukari & 
Levine conclude (1994: 285/86):
These examples show quite clearly that French SI [Stylistic 
Inversion, LM] -  a construction which registers UDC paths -  is 
quite sensitive to both argum ent and adjunct unbounded 
dependencies constructions, thus providing unequivocal evidence 
that the latter are bona fide instances of syntactic extraction.
3.3.2. Downstep Suppression in Kikuyu
The Kenyan Bantu language Kikuyu provides further evidence for the 
identical behaviour of arguments and adjuncts in displacement contexts. The 
evidence concerns the tonal behaviour of sentence final words in a tensed verb 
phrase. In sentences without extraction, words like moanake, 'boy', and 
kdYoko, 'chicken', retain their final high tone in sentence final position. 
However, this rule does not apply within a displacement construction (data 
from Clements et al. 1983, quoted from Hukari & Levine 1995: 212)22:
(30) ne kdYoko kareko mondo lahe{- re moanake t
FP chicken which person gave boy
’Which chicken did someone give to the boy?’
(31) ne re mondo '■ahei1 re moanake kdYoko t
FP when person gave boy chicken
'When did someone give the boy a chicken?’
In (30), the sentence final moanake does not retain its high tone since it is 
within a displacement context -  kaYoko has been extracted. As (32) shows,
22 Transcribed as in Hukari & Levine, but without the distinction between open and close vowels.
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kaYoko  does not retain its high tone either, that is (31) behaves exactly as (30), 
although the fronted phrase in (30) is an argument, while the fronted phrase 
in (31) is an adjunct.
3.3.3. Agreement in Chamorro and Palauan
The next set of data Hukari & Levine present comes from the Austronesian 
languages Chamorro and Palauan. The relevant reflex of displacement 
constructions in these two languages is morphological: verbal agreement 
registers UCD paths. In Chamorro, verbs in displacement structures are 
marked by a nominalizer as in (32), (from Chung 1982, quoted from Hukari & 
Levine 1994: 286) and (33), (from Chung & Georgopoulos 1988, quoted from 
Hukari & Levine 1994: 287)23:
(32) Ha/a puno'-mu ni lalu'? 
what? kill+Nmlz-your Obi fly 
’What did you kill the fly with?
(33) Taimdnu sagan-ha si Juan   ?
how? say+Nmlz-his Unm 
'How did Juan say it?
Both (32) and (33) involve non-argument extraction, the former example an 
'instrumental', and the second a manner phrase.
In Palauan, displacement structures are marked by a difference in verbal 
mood. The verb is realis when the displaced phrase is nominative, irrealis for 
all other displaced phrases. (34a -  b), (from Georgopoulos 1985, quoted from 
Hukari & Levine 1994: 287) show nominative extraction, where the verb in 
irrealis (34b) is ungrammatical:
(34a) ng-te'ai [a kileld-ii a su b  ,-J
CL who R-PF-heat-3s soup 
'Who heated up the soup?
(34b) * ng-te'ai [a le-kileld-ii a su b  ,]
CL who IR-heat-3s soup
23 All examples in this section are represented as found in Hukari & Levine (1994) except for the 
use o f ' to denote a glottal stop.
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Correspondingly, with an extracted object, irrealis mood is required and realis 
is ungrammatical (35a -  b), (from Georgopoulos 1985, quoted from Hukari & 
Levine 1994: 287):
(35a) ng-ngerai [a le-silseb-ii__ i a se?el-il ]
CL what IR-3 PF-bum-3s friend 3s 
’What did his friend bum?'
(35b) * ng-ngerai  la silseb-ii i a se?el-il ]
CL what R-3 PF-bum-3s friend 3s 
Int.: 'What did his friend burn?’
Finally, (36), (from Georgopoulos 1985, quoted from Hukari & Levine 1994: 287) 
shows that adjuncts behave like objects:
(36) ng- kerj [a le- bilsk -au a buk er ngiii a Ruth ]
CL where IR-3 gave 2s book P it
'Where did Ruth give you the book?
Thus, the data from both Chamorro and Palauan confirm Hukari & Levine's 
observation.
3.3.4. Irish Complementizers
A further set of relevant data is the distribution of two different forms of the 
complementizer in Irish, discussed by McCloskey (1979) Hukari & Levine 
(1995), and Bouma, Malouf & Sag (1997). Irish has two different 
complementizers, goN  and aL, where the former is found in non-displacement 
structures, while the latter registers extraction. The following examples 
illustrate that pattern (from McCloskey 1979, quoted from Hukari & Levine 
1995:205/206)24:
(37) Shil m e  goN  mbeadh se ann
thought I COMP would-be he there 
'I thought that he would be there.’
(38) an fear aL shil m e  aL bheadh _ ann
[the man]j COMP thought I COMP would-be ej there 
'the m an that I thought would be there'
24 All data in this section are presented as found in Hukari & Levine (1995). In goN,  N indicates 
nasal mutation and in aL,  L indicates lenition.
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(39) an fear aL shil _ goN  mbeadh se ann
[the man]j COMP thought ej COMP would-be he there 
’the man that thought he would be there’
The examples in (37-39) show the difference between the two Irish 
complementizers. In (37), goN  is used, since the sentence does not involve a 
fronted phrase. In contrast, the example in (38) requires the complementizer 
aL, since an fear, 'the man', is extracted (relativized). Note that both 
complementizers register the extraction path. The sentence in (39) shows that 
aL and goN  can co-occur, and that aL is used up to the extraction site of the 
fronted phrase, but that after the extraction site, goN  is used. The following 
examples show that aL is used not only when an argument is extracted (as in
(38) and (39)), but also when the fonted phrase is an adjunct (McCloskey 1979, 
quoted from Hukari & Levine 1995: 206):
(40) I mBetlehem aL duirt na targaireachtai
[in Bethlehem]j COMP said the prophecies
aL bearfat an Sldnaitheoir _ .
COMP would-be-bom the Saviour ej
'It was in Bethlehem that the prophecies said that the Saviour 
would be bom'
(41) Cen uair aL thding siad n'a bhaile _ ?
[which time]j COMP came they home ej
The extracted element in (40) is a topicalized locative adjunct, while in (41), a 
temporal adjunct is questioned. In both cases the choice of the complementizer 
is aL, indicating that there is an extraction path between the adjunct and its 
eventual position lower in the tree. Thus the distribution of the two forms of 
the Irish complementizer show that arguments and adjuncts behave alike in 
extraction contexts. As a last set of data, the next section discusses examples 
from English.
3.3.5. English
English does not have extraction-sensitive morphological or syntactic 
alternations. Hence to find evidence for the hypothesis that arguments behave 
like adjuncts proposed by Hukari & Levine (1994, 1995) is not as 
straightforward as in the cases considered so far. Hukari & Levine observe that
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despite the lack of obvious syntactic evidence, arguments and adjuncts behave 
alike in a way which would be unexpected if they resulted from different 
underlying structures. The parallel behaviour of arguments and adjuncts can 
be seen from the fact that both arguments and adjuncts can be extracted out of 
identical environments, including "... finite and infinite interrogatives, finite 
and infinite relative clauses (w ith or w ithou t overt w Jz-phrases), 
topicalizations, clefts, exclamatory wh-constructions, free relatives, and so forth 
..." (Hukari & Levine 1994: 289). Some of these parallel structures are illustrated
below:
(42a) What did Bill open GAP?
(42b) What did Bill open the door with GAP?
(43a) What does Sally believe Jim opened GAP?
(43b) What bed does Mary believe Sue refuses to sleep in GAP?
(44a) It was a sandwich Steve ordered GAP, not breakfast.
(44b) It was a house we lived in GAP, not a flat.
(45a) It is history I passed GAP, not maths.
(45b) It is Dr Miller I have to finish this for GAP, not Dr Smith.
The examples above illustrate w /z-questions and clefting, the (a) examples 
involving arguments extraction, the (b) examples extraction out of adjunct 
position. Similarly, if extraction of arguments is not possible, neither is 
extraction of adjuncts:
(46a) *What did Bill, who opened GAP, saw Mary?
(46b) *What did Bill, who opened the door with GAP, saw Mary?
As Hukari & Levine (1994: 290) point out, adjunct extraction is subject to strong 
and weak cross-over effects in the same way that argument extraction is:
(47a) *? Whoj did Mary claim hej asked Sarah to visit GAP}?
(47b) *?Whoj did Mary claim he* asked Sarah to have lunch with GAPj?
(48a) ?Whoj did Mary claim hisi mother asked Sarah to see GAPi?
(48b) ?Whoj did Mary claim hisj mother asked Sarah to have
lunch with GAP*?
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In the examples above, a co-indexed pronoun intervenes between a fronted 
phrase and the extraction site, creating a cross-over configuration. Although 
judgements vary, differences in acceptability result from the position of 
pronoun, i.e. whether it is embedded in larger constituent or not, but are not 
affected by the status of the fronted phrase, i.e. whether an argument or an 
adjunct is extracted. That is to say, cross-over data provide further evidence for 
the similarity between arguments and adjuncts.
To these distributional facts, the similarity of arguments and adjuncts in 
quantifier scoping can be added. An indefinite noun phrase in adjunct position 
can take wide scope over object and subject in the same way that an indefinite 
object may outscope its subject:
(49a) Every student kissed a local boy.
3xVy (local_boy(x) & (student(y) ->  kiss(y,x)))
(49b) Every student kissed a local boy at a beach.
3xVy3z (beach(x) & (student(y) ->  (local_boy(z) & kiss_at(y,z,x)))
Thus indefinite noun phrases can have wide scope both out of argument and 
out of adjunct position.
The examples in this section thus show that there are a number of 
contexts in English in which arguments and adjuncts behave alike.
3.4. Summary
The examples introduced in this section show that the distinction between 
arguments and adjuncts rests mainly on the obligatoriness of the former and 
the optionality of the latter. However, this distinction does not clearly correlate 
with any morphological, semantic, or syntactic distinctions. Morphologically, 
both adverbs and PPs can be obligatory, while semantically, optional PPs may 
have the same function as arguments. Finally, the syntactic evidence shows 
that arguments and adjuncts behave alike in languages which overtly indicate 
that a constituent has been extracted. This evidence taken together indicates 
that the distinction between arguments and adjuncts is weaker than implied by 
strict subcategorization.
Chapter 2: Arguments and Adjuncts 61
4. Preliminaries for an Analysis of Verb Phrase Adjunction in LDSNL
The evidence considered in the last section shows that verb phrase adjuncts 
behave like arguments in several respects. The analysis of arguments and 
adjuncts should thus reflect their similarity, as well as the difference between 
the two with respect to optionality. In this section I offer a preliminary 
discussion of the argument developed in this thesis, namely that verbal 
subcategorization is underspecified. I begin by showing that adjuncts stand in a 
daughter relation to the root node, rather than in a LINK relation (4.1.). I then 
provide a sample derivation of argument extraction, to show how an extracted 
argument is assigned its place in the eventual tree (4.2.). The derivation is 
contrasted with an attempted derivation of adjunct extraction, which shows 
that no obvious place in the tree can be found for the adjunct. I then present 
three alternative means to expand tree structure and indicate a preferred 
solution (4.3.). In the final section I discuss the relation between the tree 
structure needed for adjuncts and verbal subcategorization.
4.1. Adjuncts as Daughters
The data discussed in this chapter show that adjuncts stand in a daughter 
relation to the root node. As discussed in the last chapter, relative clauses are 
analysed in LDSNL as LINKed trees; a new tree is built which is LINKed to the 
head noun. One of the differences between the two structures is related to 
extraction; LINKed trees are islands for extraction. In LDSNL terms, this means 
that an unfixed node cannot be fixed in a LINKed tree. Since, as illustrated 
above, adjuncts and arguments can be extracted under the same circumstances, 
but neither can be extracted out of relative clauses, adjuncts can not be LINKed. 
The syntactic evidence discussed above thus indicates that both arguments and 
adjuncts are in a daughter relation to the root node.
The relevant tree relation can be seen in the tree for a transitive sentence 
like (50):
(50) Judy closed the window.
The corresponding LDSNL tree (before Completion) is given in (51):
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(51) Tree for "Judy closed the window"
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(the_window’)} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(close’),
Ty(e) Ty(e ->  (e -> t»}
The tree shows that the object the window functions as an argument to the 
verb, which requires two Ty(e) expressions. It is located at Tn(010), that is, in a 
daughter relation to both the VP node Tn(01) and the root node Tn(0). In the 
next section I show how an extracted object is assigned to this position in the 
eventual tree structure, and then develop an analogous derivation for an 
extracted adjunct, for which, however, no obvious place in the tree can be 
found.
4.2. Argument Extraction
The object of the example in (50) can be questioned as in (52):
(52) What did Judy close?
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the LDSNL analysis of extraction 
involves the building of an unfixed node, which is assigned its place in the 
eventual tree only after further tree structure has been built. I repeat the 
relevant parse stages here.
At the initial parse stage, the w h-pronoun is assigned to an unfixed node, 
and the root node is annotated with a question feature +Q:
(53a) Tree for "W hat
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
{Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
Ignoring the contribution of the auxiliary verb did, the next step is the 
scanning of the subject and the application of Introduction and Prediction to 
result in the building of the subject node for Judy:
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(53b) Tree for "What did Judy
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t))
/
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy'),
Ty(e))
(Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e))
The next step in the derivation is the application of Introduction and 
Prediction, which results in the building of Tn(01) with a requirement TODO 
Ty(e -> t):
(53c) Tree for "What did Judy
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
Ty(e)}
{Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
However, the type information from the verb close, i.e. Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)), does 
not match the requirement holding at Tn(01). The lexical information from 
close licenses in this situation the building of two new nodes, in accordance 
with the verb’s subcategorization requirement:
(54) Lexical Entry for close
IF ? Ty(e ->  t)
THEN put(?<do>Ty(e))
make(<di>), put(Fo(close'), Ty(e -> (e ->  t)))
ELSE abort
The lexical information from close drives the process of tree building and 
ensures that its subcategorization requirements are projected into the tree by 
building a functor node for its formula and type value, and by building an 
argument node with the requirement TODO Ty(e). Thus the following 
transition is licensed:
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(53d) Tree for "What did Judy dose
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(judy’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ol), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
(Tn(OlO), ?Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(dose’),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t»)
(Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
At this stage, the unfixed node has not yet been assigned its eventual location, 
but it is dear how this can be done. The w h-pronoun is of Ty(e), as indicated at 
Tn(0*). Furthermore, the DU has to be fixed at a position in the tree which is 
lower than Tn(0), that is, at a daughter node. These two spedfications match 
exactly the information holding at Tn(010). It is a daughter node of the root 
node, and there is a requirement TODO Ty(e). By merging Tn(010) with the 
underspedfied node Tn(0*), the tree can be completed with no requirement 
outstanding, and all nodes being fixed:
(53e) Tree for "What did Judy dose?"
• [Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(judy’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(WH), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(close’),
Ty(e ->  (e -> t))}
The w ^-pronoun is found in the eventual tree in object position as desired, 
and the tree is structurally identical to the tree for the corresponding 
declarative sentence in (51). Crudally, the unfixed node in (53d) could be 
assigned a position at a daughter node -  otherwise, the derivation would not 
have been completed. The presence of the daughter node Tn(010) results from 
lexical instructions from the verb, so it derives u ltim ately  from 
subcategorization information. The status of the questioned constituent as an 
argument to the verb is thus crudal to ensure its eventual place in the tree.
4.3. Adjunct Extraction
Given the analysis of argument extraction discussed in the preceding section, 
and in view of the fact that arguments and adjuncts behave alike with respect
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to extraction, a derivation for adjunct extraction is attempted in this section 
following the steps described in the argument extraction derivation above. 
This leads to a discussion of how an LDSNL analysis of verb phrase adjunction 
cam be developed, a discussion which will form the background for the analysis 
proposed in Chapter 3.
As an example, consider the adjunct in (55a) and the corresponding 
question in (55b):
(55a) Judy was sleeping in a sleeping bag.
(55b) What was Judy sleeping in?
The initial steps of an LDSNL derivation for (55b) are the same as those for 
argument extraction. First, the wh -pronoun is assigned to an unfixed node, 
and the root node is annotated with +Q. Since I do not analyse tense here, the 
second step is -  as above -  the introduction of the subject and the building of 
the VP node by Introduction and Prediction:
(56a) Tree for "What was Judy
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy’), • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
Ty(ej)
(Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e))
This is the state of the derivation when sleep is scanned. I assume that sleep is 
intransitive, as stated in the following lexical entry:
(57) Lexical Entry for sleep
IF ? Ty(e -> t)
THEN put(Fo(sleep'), Ty(e ->  t))
ELSE abort
The entry states that sleep can be introduced at a VP node, and that it annotates 
the node with its formula and type value, thereby fulfilling the requirement 
obtaining at that node:
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(56b) Tree for "What was Judy sleeping
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Fo(judy’), • {Tn(Ol), Fo(sleep'), Ty(e -> t) 0}
Ty(e)}
(Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
Note that the pointer at this stage is still at Tn(01), so that Completion can 
apply to record the fulfilled requirement as a modal statement at the root node 
Tn(0), where Elimination applies. With respect to subcategorized predicate- 
argument structure, the tree in (56b) is completed, since the combination of 
Fo(judy') and Fo(sleep') would result in a proposition of Ty(t). Yet the 
derivation cannot be completed, since there is further input, namely the 
preposition i n, and there is still an unfixed node, which needs to be fixed for 
the derivation to be successful. At this state, then, the parallelism between the 
derivation of argument extraction and the derivation of adjunct extraction 
ends. Whereas for the argument, the unfixed node could be located in the tree 
at a daughter node resulting from the verb's subcategorization information, 
there is no obvious place in the tree in (56b) for the adjunct at the unfixed 
node. As it stands, the tree is unfinished and the derivation is aborted.
What can be done? There is still the preposition, which might lexically 
contribute to a resolution of the problem, for example, by building a new Ty(e) 
node. Notwithstanding the LINK operation, there are three general possibilites 
to expand a tree like the one in (56b), and I sketch them here so as to prepare 
for the discussion in the following chapter.
The first possibility is inappropriate for the example discussed here, but 
should briefly be mentioned. This is to continue the tree after Completion has 
applied and the pointer has moved to the root node:
(58)
• (Tn(0), Fo(p(a)), Ty(t) 0}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(a), • {Tn(01), Fo(p), Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)}
In a situation like this, the tree could be expanded upwards by building a new 
root node (a ’grandmother' node):
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(59)
• l?Ty(t))
/ \
• (?Ty(t -> t) ♦ {Tn(0), Fo(p(a)), Ty(t)|
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(a), • {Tn(Ol), Fo(p), Ty(e ->  t))
Ty(e))
I have omitted several details in the tree in (59), such as the value of the tree- 
node predicate, or how a Ty(e) expression could be integrated into the tree. 
However, for the example discussed here, this tree continuation is not possible, 
since the new nodes are not in a daughter relation to the original root node. 
Intuitively, the continuation shown in (59) could be employed for the analysis 
of sentence adverbials such as possibly, but it is not a viable option for adjuncts 
such as those discussed here. I will thus not explore this possibility further.
Another possibility to integrate adjuncts into a tree like in (56b) might be 
to analyse the adjunct as operating on the VP node. Thus, a possible eventual 
tree for the example in (56b) might be the following:
(60) Possible Tree for "What was Judy sleeping in?"
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(judy’), Ty(e)} • {?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Fo(sleep’), Ty(e -> t)} • {?Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
{Fo(WH), Ty(e)} • {Fo(in),
Ty(e ->  ((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)))}
The continuation in (60) is downwards, and a new Ty(e) node is built which 
does stand in a daughter relation to the root node. The new functor node is 
built by the preposition, which acts as the main functor in the tree. Note that, 
as in the tree above, I have left out the tree addresses of the relevant nodes in
(60). Although here it is clear what they should be, it is not dear how they are 
assigned; in particular the tree-node value for the DU introduced by the verb 
would have to be assigned a new address. In the next chapter, I argue that a 
continuation like the one in (60) is impossible in LDSNL, so that it is not a 
viable analysis for verb phrase adjunction.
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The third alternative to be considered here is the one which I argue in 
the next chapter to be the best solution, namely to analyse verb phrase adjuncts 
as optional arguments of verbs25. A corresponding tree is shown below:
(61) Possible Tree for "What was Judy sleeping in?"
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(WH), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(sleep’),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
In (61), the verb appears as transitive, and a corresponding new argument node 
Tn(010) has been built at which the unfixed node has been located. The new 
node is a daughter of the root node and is below the original VP node, so that 
under this analysis adjuncts are transparently analysed as arguments of the 
verb. The syntactic contribution of the preposition can then be seen as licensing 
the necessary process of tree continuation. However, as pointed out in this 
chapter, adjuncts are not oligatory constituents of the verb phrase, they are not 
subcategorized for by the verb. One of the points discussed in detail in the 
following chapters is concerned with the role of subcategorization in view of 
an analysis of verb phrase adjunction which treats adjuncts as optional 
arguments. A preliminary discussion is offered in the next section.
4.4. Adjuncts and Subcategorization
A putative solution to the problem posed by the adjunct extraction derivation 
of the last section is to simply assume that there are two lexical entries for 
sleep, one intransitive one, and one which allows for the introduction of an 
argument. The derivation discussed above would then simply involve the 
right choice of predicate, for example in the case of sleep, discussed above, the 
one which allows for the introduction of an additional Ty(e) expression. The 
difference between arguments and adjuncts would under this view result from 
different lexical entries for verbs. This would explain the optionality of 
adjuncts since the choice of a particular lexical entry is in general optional.
However, while a lexical solution is an appropriate analysis for optional 
arguments of verbs with both an intransitive and a transitive use, such as, for
25 The alternatives illustrated here have been discussed in the literature. In Chapter 4, the 
analyses of Dowty (1979), McConnell-Ginet (1982) and Copestake, Flickinger & Sag (1997) are 
discussed in detail.
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example, drink, or read, it is implausible for verb phrase adjunction in general, 
under the assumption that adjuncts are analysed as (non-lexical) optional 
arguments, as implied in the tree continuation in (61), above. Under this view, 
all verbs allow for the optional introduction of Ty(e) expressions, as seen in 
(62):
(62) Mary was singing her favourite song at the top of her voice with 
her sister for their parents at Christmas in the drawing room.
In view of the generally free possibility of introducing Ty(e) expressions, which 
I take here to include PPs, a point discussed in detail in the next chapter, lexical 
subcategorization statements appear to be the wrong tool. Rather, a verb such 
as sing may be lexically categorized as requiring at least one Ty(e) expression, 
or, in its transitive use, two Ty(e) expressions, but, given the view of 
adjunction sketched here, there should in addition be the possibility to express 
that sing on occasion may combine with seven Ty(e) expressions, as in the 
example in (62). Thus, possible type values of sing include:
(63) Possible Type Values of sing
Ty(e ->  t)
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e -> (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))))))
The type values in (63) illustrate the intransitive and the transitive use of sing, 
as well as the necessary type value for the analysis of the example in (62) under 
the assumption that the Ty(e) expressions are introduced as arguments of the 
verb. While the first two type specifications might be regarded as lexical 
information from sing, the last type is the result of the general process of 
adjunction. In the next chapter I propose an analysis which models this general 
process of adjunction as type underspecification, that is to say, as an element of 
variability in verbal subcategorization. The remainder of the thesis is then 
mainly concerned with the formalization and implications of this view.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have more precisely stated what the problem discussed in this 
thesis is and determined the empirical range envisaged. I have introduced the 
relevant theoretical notions of verb phrase and subcategorization, and how
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these notions are defined in LDSNL. I have pointed out that the notion of strict 
subcategorization implies a distinction between obligatory and optional 
constituents of the verb phrase, i.e. between arguments and adjuncts, but that 
this distinction has no morphological, semantic, or syntactic correlates. In 
order to demonstrate this latter point a number of empirical data have been 
introduced and discussed. The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence 
presented in this chapter is that arguments and adjuncts differ from each other 
mainly with respect to optionality, so that adjuncts, once they are introduced, 
should be analysed as arguments. I have then turned to the question of how 
this observation can be expressed in LDSNL and have presented two sample 
derivations, contrasting argument and adjunct extraction. I have presented 
three possibilities for expanding tree structure so as to incorporate adjuncts, 
and the two possibilities relevant for VP adjuncts will be discussed further in 
the following chapter. However, I have already indicated that I propose to 
analyse adjuncts as optional arguments of the verb, and that this analysis leads 
to the introduction of underspecification into the type information provided 
by verbs.
Chapter 3
Formalizing Verbal 
Underspecification: e*
1. Introduction
In the last chapter, I have presented evidence to support the view that the 
distinction between arguments and adjuncts mainly reflects the difference 
between obligatory and optional presence in the verb phrase, but that adjuncts 
behave syntactically like arguments once they are introduced. In this chapter I 
propose various ways in which these facts can be modelled in the LDSNL 
model introduced in Chapter 1. In particular, I show that basic LDSNL 
assumptions about incrementality and underspecification lead naturally to the 
view that verbal subcategorization can be analysed as underspedfied. I review 
these assumptions in Section 2. In Section 3 ,1 discuss a possible analysis which 
assumes that adjuncts, rather than verbs are underspecified, and show some 
problems with this view. In Section 4, I develop an analysis of underspecified 
type values for verbs, and show how this type interacts with the overall 
LDSNL system. The results of this chapter are summarized and discussed in 
Section 5. The discussion in this chapter is concerned with the dynamics of tree 
building, while the semantic interpretation of adjuncts in general, and of the 
specific analysis of verbal underspedfication modelled in this chapter in 
particular will be discussed in the next two chapters.
2. Two Basic LDSNL Assumptions
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, LDSNL models the process of utterance 
interpretation which the hearer is required to perform in order to derive 
contextual effects. This process indudes the combination of lexical building 
blocks (supplied by phonological accessing) into larger structural units. The 
process is strictly left-to-right in the sense that each lexical building block is 
taken in turn and, by application of relevant rules, integrated into the 
unfolding tree structure. More formally, the structure building process is 
incremental. However, the mapping from ’surface structure', i.e. here the 
linear order of incoming lexical items, to conceptual structure, the output of
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the parse, is not one-to-one. Incrementality is achieved by allowing 
underspecification to be part of natural language expressions. These two 
assumptions are discussed in more detail in this section, since they are part of 
the motivation for the analysis of verbal underspecification proposed in 
Section 4.
2.1. Incrementality
To say that the process of building interpretable structures is incremental 
reflects the observation that, on the one hand, hearers receive syntactic 
information in units, as accessed in phonological domains, one block after the 
other, and that, on the other hand, syntactic processing is fast and automatic. 
The model should thus reflect that interpretations are built by knowing 
increasingly more about the eventual tree. I express this aspect of 
incrementality as ’informational incrementality’ as in (1):
(1) Incrementality (informational)
Interpretation always involves an increase in information.
The aspect of incrementality expressed in (1) involves some idealization vis-a- 
vis human parsing as reported in the literature (e.g. Frazier & Fodor 1978, 
Berwick & Weinberg 1984, Fodor 1995, Gorell 1995), where there is agreement 
that the human parser allows for local restructuring of already established 
structure, for example in certain types of garden path utterances. This means 
that (1) is too strong as a statement of real time human parsing. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that the LDSNL model is a model of competence in 
the sense discussed in Chapter 1, which by claim is amenable to psycho- 
linguistic evidence, but that it is not a proper model of a parser. There are a 
number of avenues to incorporate the restructuring evidence into the model, 
for example by allowing for several parallel parses, or by relaxing the 
requirement of incrementality in certain respects. In the present context, 
however, it seems justified to maintain (1) as it stands, since it leads to the 
formulation of more precise syntactic and semantic characterizations of 
incrementality, as presented anon, and since it is warranted as a theoretical 
assumption by the overall cognitive argument presented in Chapter 1.
The strong version of informational incrementality in (1) is paralleled in 
the syntax of LDSNL by the syntactic aspect of incrementality expressed here as
(2):
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(2) Incrementality (syntactic)
The process of building tree structure is defined as an incremental 
process. No process is defined which removes previously built 
structure.
This aspect of incrementality is the most im portant one in the following 
discussion of underspecified type values in the verb phrase. This syntactic 
restriction constrains the LDSNL system considerably -  both information from 
the lexicon and the transition rules have to be formulated such that they 
guarantee that all syntactic information is exploited at every step in a 
derivation, while at the same ensuring that there is no ’back-tracking’, that is, 
that every step in a derivation results either in leaving the tree as it is, or as 
developing it, but that no step in the derivation can ever remove nodes, or 
node descriptions from a given tree. The consequences of this restriction for 
the analysis of adjuncts will be discussed below.
Finally, the corresponding semantic notion of incrementality can be 
expressed as a requirement on tree structure:
(3) Incrementality (semantic)
Tree structure once built cannot be undone.
The notion of semantics invoked here is the structural notion of the semantics 
of tree structure -  the ’operational' semantics of the LDSNL system. The 
model-theoretic semantic interpretation of the natural language string is 
defined over the output of the structure building process, in particular over the 
information from the formula values. For the purposes here, it is the first, 
structural notion of semantics which is important.
Given the three aspects of incrementality discussed so far, the following 
’principle of incrementality' in LDSNL can be stated:
(4) Incrementality
The process of utterance interpretation as modelled in LDSNL is 
informationally, syntactically and semantically incremental.
Since the process of utterance interpretation in LDSNL includes information 
provided in the. lexicon as part of the tree building process, the following two 
corollaries result from (4):
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(5) Corollary 1: The LDSNL Projection Principle
Information which is established in the lexicon remains constant 
(unchanged) in a derivation.
(6) Corollary 2: Lexical Projection of Type Values
Type values established in the lexicon remain constant (unchanged) 
in a derivation.
That is, since lexical information is part of the derivation, it is subject to the 
principle of incrementality. Lexical information cannot be changed during a 
derivation (5). This includes in particular any type values established in the 
lexicon (6). If some lexical information includes the predicate Ty(e), it has to be 
associated with a node with a requirement of Ty(e), from which it follows that, 
as discussed in the preceding chapter, type shifting or function composition 
over types are not recognized processes in LDSNL, in contrast to Categorial 
Grammar.
The strong commitment to incrementality expressed in the principle of 
incrementality in (4) has the immediate consequence that the question, w hich  
information is available at a given step in a derivation? is of central 
importance to the LDSNL enterprise. The answer to the question from an 
LDSNL perspective has predominantly to do with the underspecification o f 
natural language.
2.2. Underspedfication
Certain instances of underspedfication in natural language are widely regarded 
as such -  pronominal expressions, for example, do not fully encode their 
referential information; they are underspecified in regard to their (model- 
theoretic) semantic contribution. In order to know what a pronominal 
expression refers to, it has to be pragmatically enriched, exploiting contextual 
and background knowledge. In LDSNL, this is modelled as an underspecified 
formula value, such that, for example, a personal pronoun encodes a 
metavariable, possibly with certain restrictions, as its formula value, which is 
taken to be an instruction to the hearer to establish some suitable referent. 
While this treatment seems to be rather uncontentious for the semantic
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interpretation of at least some pronouns26, it is not usually taken to be related 
to syntactic structure.
In LDSNL, however, structural, syntactic underspedfication is taken to be 
a key feature of natural language, providing the basis for the analysis of a range 
of syntactic phenomena, induding topic structures and question formation, 
where there is a mismatch between the surface position of a given constituent 
in a natural language string and its eventual position in the semantic tree. As 
demonstrated in the preceding chapters, fronted constituents are modelled as 
having an initially underspedfied tree location, which is only resolved at some 
later stage in the derivation. That is, question word ’movement’ is in LDSNL 
terms an instance of syntactic underspedfication. It is to a large extent due to 
the possibility of having structural underspedfication that the strong 
requirement of incrementality discussed in the preceding section can be 
maintained; a displaced constituent is not assigned an initial or intermediate 
place in the tree, but rather encodes the lack of any definite information as to 
its location. In that way, tree structure is not established, and resolving the 
final position of the displaced constituent can clearly be seen as an increase in 
information. The relevant steps of the derivation with unfixed constituents 
discussed in the last chapter demonstrate this:
(7a) Tree for "W hat
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
{Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
The DU introduced by w hat is not integrated into the tree, since this is not 
warranted by the available information at this stage in the derivation. The 
syntactic information encoded by this DU is underspecified with respect to its 
eventual location in the tree. During the following transitions, the 
information that the DU is an as yet unfixed part of the tree is available at 
every step of the derivation. The DU is eventually assigned a fixed position in 
the tree when the underspedfication is resolved:
26 The analogy with the interpretation of pronouns depends on the particular analysis of 
anaphoric expressions, some of which can be analysed, for example, as bound variables, rather 
than instances of underspedfication. The LDSNL view is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 in 
connection with the more general argument for mental representations.
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(7b) Tree for "What did Judy close ?"
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(judy'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(WH), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(close’),
Ty(e ->  (e -> t))}
In the final stage of the derivation, the underspecification of Tn(0*) is resolved 
as Tn(010) by an application of Merge, and the DU is integrated into the tree. 
With regard to the present discussion, it is important that the resolution of 
Tn(0*) to Tn(010) is an increase in information, that no previously established 
tree structure has been changed, and that all semantic relations holding before 
the final step in the derivation still hold after that step. In other words, 
underspecification and the resolution of underspecification can be expressed 
within a derivation which is incremental in the sense defined in (4).
The discussion so far has highlighted the relation between incrementality 
and underspedfication. While returning to incrementality presently, a final 
observation is directed at the forms of underspedfication introduced so far. As 
pointed out already, LDSNL employs underspedfied values of the Formula 
predicate, for example Fo(WH) for an interrogative pronoun as English who, 
or F o ( U s p e a k e r )  f°r a personal pronoun as English I. Additionally, there are 
underspedfied values for the Tree Node predicate, as for example Tn(0*) for a 
DU holding somewhere below the top node Tn(0), where '*’ is a short-hand 
notation for the Kleene star operation over the daughter modality <d>. This 
leads to the question of whether there are, analogously to the Formula and 
Tree Node predicates, underspedfied values for the Type predicate. In other 
words, since underspecification is taken in LDSNL to be a fundamental 
structural characteristic of natural language, expressed as underspedfied values 
of structural predicates, it is a natural extension of the system to inquire into 
the underspedfication of Type values, which is indeed what I propose to do in 
the remaining sections of this chapter.
In summary, the discussion so far shows that a successful LDSNL 
treatment of adjunction, to which I turn presently, has to provide an analysis 
which allows only incremental derivations, without tree restructuring or 
changing lexical information. In doing so, it might be helpful, but not 
necessary, to take advantage of the relation between incrementality and 
underspedfication. There is, how ever, theory internal independent 
motivation for exploring the possibility of underspedfication of values for the
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Type predicate, building on an analogy with Formula and Tree Node 
predicates.
3. Adjunction Rules
The first possible analysis of adjunction I discuss is a development of one of 
the two alternative proposals sketched at the end of the last chapter and 
follows the Adjunction rule in Kempson, Meyer-Viol & Gabbay (1999)27. 
Variations of this rule are discussed, including a version which assumes that 
the basic clausal relationship between a verb and subcategorized complements 
is fully specified, and that adjuncts can freely be added at several nodes of a 
tree. This is achieved by assigning an unspecified Type value to prepositions, 
so that prepositional adjuncts can be added. However, this approach is 
problematic, since it implies that tree structure has to be undone.
3.1. Adjuncts as Funtors
As was discussed in the last chapter, there are two possible ways to analyse verb 
phrase adjuncts in LDSNL, namely an analysis which treats adjuncts as 
functors, and one which treats adjuncts as arguments to verbs. In this section, I 
discuss a putative analysis which treats adjuncts as functors, while in the 
second half of this chapter, I propose an analysis which treats adjuncts as 
arguments.
To begin with, consider the example with a lexical adverb in (8):
(8) Mary smiled nervously.
In (8), nervously  might be analysed as acting as a modifier of the verb, which is 
of Ty(e ->  t). A possible derivation for the sentence might then proceed as 
follows:
27 The Adjunction rule discussed here was included in the draft version of Kempson, Meyer-Viol 
& Gabbay (1999) at the time of writing, but has subsequently been refined. The new version 
employs a Kleene star specification similar to the formulation I develop in this chapter, but 
crucially retains the underspedfication of the adjunct, as opposed to the predicate. The overall 
motivation for my proposal is thus not affected by this development, and I keep the section as it 
is.
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(9a) Tree for "Mary smiled
• {Tn(0)?Ty(t»
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Fo(mary'), • {Tn(Ol), Fo(smile'), Ty(e ->  t) 0}
Ty(e)}
The stage of the derivation displayed in (9a) is reached after the information 
from sm ile  is incorporated into the tree (ignoring, again, tense). The derivation 
cannot be completed here, since there is more lexical input, namely from
nervously. On the assumption that nervously  acts as a modifier, it is lexically
of Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)). In order to incorporate the adverb into the tree, the 
DU holding at Tn(01) has to be relocated so as to act as the argument to the 
modifier:
(9b) Tree for "Mary smiled nervously
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(mary’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
Ty(e)} / \
• {Tn(010), • {Tn(Oll),
Fo(smile’), Fo(nervously’),
Ty(e ->  t)} Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e -> t))}
In (9b), the DU previously holding at Tn(01) is ’lowered' to Tn(010), a new 
node is created for the DU introduced by nervously , namely Tn(Oll), and a 
second new node is created, Tn(01), with a requirement of Ty(e ->  t), which can 
be satisfied by Completion. I will argue in the next section that this process of 
lowering is problematic, but assume for the moment that it is a possibility.
Under this analysis, then, the adverb is lexically of Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)), 
that is a verb phrase modifier. However, the analysis could be extended to 
include examples such as those in (10):
(10a) Mary looked out of the window nervously.
(10b) Mary looked nervously out of the window.
(10c) Nervously, Mary looked out of the window.
In (10), nervously  seems to act as a modifier at different levels of clause 
structure, probably as a verb phrase adverb in (10a), as verb adverb in (10b), and
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as sentence adverb in (10c)28. The analysis described here could be extended to 
these cases by assuming that adverbs are lexically associated with a schematic 
type value. That is, an adverb such as nervously  does not lexically encode a 
type value Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)) as assumed above, but rather, its type value is 
a variable, which is instantiated by the type value of the relevant node of 
attachment:
(11) Lexical Type for Adverbs
Ty(X ->  X), where X = any Type value.
Possible Instantiations
Sentence Adverb: Ty(t ->  t)
VP Adverb: Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t))
IntransV Adverb: Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t))
TransV Adverb: Ty((e ->  (e ->  t)) ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))
DitransV Adverb: Ty(((e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))) ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))
By assuming the schematic value in (11), the adverb can be introduced at any 
node in the tree, while adverbs can still be characterized as being lexically 
unambiguously of a single underspedfied type. Note, however, that VP and 
intransitive verb adverbs are of the same type. The particular concept of type 
underspedfication assumed in (11) is that adverbs have no type spedfication in 
the lexicon at all, and that their type value is spedfied according to the 
expression they modify. That is, type underspedfication is here modelled as a 
variable over standard types.
On the analogy with adverbs, PPs in the verb phrase might be analysed as 
underspedfied adverbials. This is the assumption underlying the possible tree 
for adjunct extraction discussed in the last chapter, repeated below:
(12) Possible Tree for "What was Judy sleeping in?"
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(judy’), Ty(e)} • {?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Fo(sleep’), Ty(e ->  t)} • {?Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• (Fo(WH), Ty(e)} • (Fo(in),
Ty(e -> ((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)))}
28 I do not discuss these differences in detail since I drop (proper) adverbs presently.
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In (12), the preposition builds an argument node for the Ty(e) expression and 
combines with it to result in a verb phrase modifier. The preposition in (12) 
might thus be analysed as being lexically of the type below:
(13) Putative Type for Prepositions
Ty(e ->  (X ->  X))
Under this analysis, a preposition combines with a Ty(e) expression to result in 
an adverb. The underspedfication can be resolved according to the node to be 
modified.
In summary, an analysis of adjuncts as functors can be formulated by 
assuming that an operation of tree stretching, or lowering is possible, and by 
assuming that prepositions combine with a Ty(e) expression to result in an 
underspedfied adverbial. In the following section I show that both these 
assumptions are problematic.
3.2. Adjunction Rule
The analysis of adjuncts sketched in the preceding section can be formally 
stated by formulating an Adjunction rule which licenses an operation of ’sub­
tree lowering’ in order to introduce a new node in the middle of a tree. The 
rule is illustrated with abstract trees in (14):
(14a) Adjunction: Input Tree
• (Tn(n)}
/ \
{Tn(n0)}« • (Tn(nl), Ty(Y)}
/ \
(Tn(nlO), Ty(X -> Y)} • • {Tn(nll), Ty(X)}
The tree in (14a) is any given (sub-)tree, where 'n' may be any sequence of 0 
and 1. Similarly, the variables X and Y may stand for any well-formed Type 
value. The Adjunction rule now licenses the introduction of a new node with 
a DU of Type Ty(Y ->  Y), that is applying to the DU with Ty(Y) at Tn(nl) in 
(14a). The new node thus is a sister to Tn(nl) and results, furthermore, in 
another new node of Ty(Y) above the old Tn(nl) and the new sister node:
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(14b) Adjunction: Output Tree
• (Tn(n)}
l \
{Tn(nO)}* • (Tn(nl), Ty(Y)}
l \
{Tn(nlO), Ty(Y)} • • (Tn(nll), Ty(Y -> Y)}
/ \
{Tn(nlOO), Ty(X ->  Y)} • • {Tn(nlOl), Ty(X)}
The new nodes introduced by the Adjunction rule are indicated in bold print; 
they are (the new) Tn(nl) and (the new) Tn(nll). As a result of this ’tree- 
stretching’ operation, the old nodes Tn(nl), Tn(nlO) and Tn(nll) now become 
Tn(nlO), Tn(nlOO) and Tn(nlOl) respectively. The Adjunction rule thus 
licenses the introduction of new nodes ’into’ an already established tree29. 
However, the rule is problematic with respect to incrementality.
3.3. Adjunction: Incrementality
On the surface, the Adjunction rule does not seem to respect incrementality, 
since it involves the restructuring of already established structure; already 
established Tree Node values are changed. However, it might be objected that 
the relative tree relations between the nodes already established remain 
unchanged. This means that, irrespective of the actual Tree Node values, the 
relation between nodes as expressed in the tree node modalities <d> and <u> 
remain unchanged. For example, from the position in the tree where the DU 
with Ty(X) holds, it was and is true that the statement ’<u> Ty(Y)’ ("above of 
me is a DU with Ty(Y)’’) is true, as is '< u x d >  Ty(X ->  Y)' ("at my sister Ty(X ->  
Y) holds"). This is so, because all of these nodes have been lowered uniformly, 
namely ’one down’. Similarly, from the position of Tn(n), it was and is true 
that '<d> ...' (meaning here "down of me holds whatever it is that holds down 
of me"). This is true for two different reasons; for the left daughter, because 
both nodes have not been changed, and for the right daughter, because by 
definition the Adjunction rule introduces an identical node to the node the 
adjunct takes as an argument, i.e. since the adjunct is of type Ty(Y ->  Y), the 
Type value holding at the sister node is identical to the Type value holding at 
the mother node. For the nodes considered so far, it is thus indeed true that the 
relative tree positions hold. However, for the original node with Ty(Y), it is not
29 This analysis of adjunction follows the categorial grammar analysis found e.g. in Montague 
(1973), Dowty (1979), and Morrill (1994). Dowty’s analysis is discussed more fully in the next 
chapter.
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true; before adjunction, both '<u> ...' (here, "above me holds whatever holds 
above me") and ’< u x d >  ...’ (here, "at my sister holds whatever holds at my 
sister") were true, whereas after adjunction '<u> Ty(Y)' ("above of me is a DU 
with Ty(Y)") '< u x d >  Ty(Y ->  Y)’ ("at my sister Ty(Y ->  Y) holds") are true. 
One might argue that this particular difference is warranted, since it is after all 
the point of the rule to introduce these two DUs. But there is another problem. 
It is in general not true that relative tree relations are unchanged once the 
modality operators are iterated. For example, before Adjunction it was true for 
the node where Ty(X) holds that '< u x u >  ...’ (here, "up of up of me holds 
whatever up of up of me holds"), while after Adjunction the correct statement 
is '< u x u >  Ty(Y)'30. Similarly, from Tn(n), before Adjunction '< d x d >  Ty(X)' 
is true, whereas after Adjunction '< d x d >  Ty(Y)' and < d x d >  Ty(Y ->  Y), as 
well as ’< d x d x d >  Ty(X)', but not '< d x d >  Ty(X)’ hold. Iteration of operators, 
however, cannot be excluded, since it is needed for the characterization of 
<d>*, that is, for the characterization of underspedfied tree locations, and since 
iterated modality statements are part of lexical instructions. It might be possible 
to introduce revisions into the LDSNL system, so that no reference to iterated 
modality operators is necessary, other than <d>*, by restricting lexical 
specifications31. This would mean that the tree restructuring involves only 
irrelevant information, and thus that the Adjunction rule does respect 
incrementality in the sense that relative, but not absolute, tree node locations 
count as established tree structure, and provided that relative tree locations are 
suffidently described by modality statements with one modality operator only. 
The Adjunction rule discussed here, then, does provide a possible analysis of 
verb phrase adjunction, but it implies non-trivial revisions of the overall 
LDSNL system and it does not, as it stands, respect incrementality in a clear 
sense. Thus, with respect to both conceptual assumptions and formal tools, the 
Adjunction rule does not present an optimal analysis of verb phrase 
adjunction in LDSNL.
3.4. Adjunction: Type Values
In addition to the problems pointed out in the last section, there is the further 
problem that the Adjunction rule is not the right analysis for the adjuncts
30 From now on I omit the English glosses.
31 A possible way to do this is to use the go predicate and specify pointer movement not in 
relation to tree nodes, e.g. go<U!>, but in relation to the intended endpoint of the movement, e.g. 
go(<u*> ?Ty(X)), i.e. "go up to a node where Ty(X) holds". I am not sure, however, if such an 
analysis could fully replace iterated modality operators.
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discussed in the last chapter. It results in problems with respect to the typing of 
prepositions, and with respect to the semantic structure assigned to PPs 
modifying the verb.
Under the Adjunction rule, PPs act as functors which take another 
functor as argument. For example, the relevant type information for the 
preposition for the tree in (12) is shown below:
(15) (Fo(in), Ty(e ->  ((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t))))}
With the typing in (15) the preposition combines with a noun phrase (which is 
of Ty(e)) to give the necessary type Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)), which combines with 
an expression of Ty(e ->  t) to result in another expression of Ty(e ->  t), as 
required by the Adjunction rule. However, this analysis implies that PPs 
always act as modifiers, and is thus problematic for subcategorized PPs32:
(16a) Jane put the book on the shelf.
(16b) *Jane put the book
(16c) *Jane put the book the shelf
The problem here is that, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the distinction 
between PPs and NPs is not co-extensive with the distinction between 
arguments and adjuncts, so that any attempt to derive the latter distinction 
from lexical typing of the former encounters problems with these cases.
A second point to note about the Adjunction rule is the formula value 
which it derives at the Ty(t) node. Assuming that the typing problems 
mentioned above can be solved, a derivation with the Adjunction rule of an 
example like (17) looks as follows:
(17) John baked a cake for Mary.
32 The same argument holds for subcategorized adverbs, illustrated in the last chapter.
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(18) Tree for "John baked a cake for Mary"
• {Tn(0), Fo^forXmary'JXfaake’Ccake’JXjohn’)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john’), • {Tn(01), Fo((for’(mary’))((bake'(cake'))),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo((bake’(cake')), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(for’(mary')),
Ty(e ->  t)} Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t»}
/ \  / \
• {Tn(0100), • {Tn(0101), • {Tn(OllO), • {Tn(Olll),
Fo(cake'), Fo(bake’), Fo(mary’), Fo(for’),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} Ty(e)} Ty(e->  (X->  X)}
In the resulting structure in this derivation, the position of the adverb node 
Tn(Oll) is such that the adjunct acts as functor which takes the verb phrase at 
Tn(010) as argument. However, as noted in the last chapter, some adjuncts 
behave as arguments to the verb, rather than as functors taking the verb, or the 
verb phrase, as arguments, so that for those adjuncts the adjunction rule gives 
the wrong analysis. The semantic aspects of this distinction are discussed in the 
next chapter, but here it is worth noting that locating the underspecification of 
type values, as implied in the Adjunction rule, in the adjunct rather than in 
the predicate will always result in the adjunct acting as functor. In the next 
section, I develop an analysis which locates the underspedfication involved in 
adjunction in the verb, and which introduces adjuncts as optional arguments 
to the verb.
4. Underspedfied Verbs as e*
In this section I come to the main proposal of this thesis. I propose a 
formalization of verbal subcategorization which treats verb phrase adjuncts 
syntactically as arguments, and, at least potentially, both arguments and 
adjuncts as being syntactically optional33. Following overall LDSNL strategies, 
and similar to the Adjunction rule discussed above, the proposal involves the 
structural underspedfication of lexical information. However, in contrast to 
the Adjunction rule, the underspedfication is not located in the type 
information of the adjunct, but in the type information of the verb. The idea is 
that verbs structurally underspedfy the number of Ty(e) expressions, taken to 
include both NPs and PPs, with which they may combine to form a verb
33 This view of adjunction has been explored in the Categorial Grammar paradigm notably by 
McConnell-Ginet (1982), whose analysis I discuss in the next chapter.
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phrase. In addition to obligatorily required complements, the type information 
of verbs which I propose thus explicitly encodes the possibility of adding 
arguments optionally. If further Ty(e) expressions are introduced, they are 
treated as arguments. The argument adding is modelled as a step-by-step 
process, where the valency of the verb is increased in the context of suitable (in 
a sense left open at present) Ty(e) expressions, so that verb phrase 
interpretation can then be seen to proceed incrementally. One consequence of 
this view is that the arity of a predicate introduced by a verb is in general 
determined anew at every occasion of use of the verb.
In this section I provide the necessary formal definitions for this model 
of underspedfication. I first define an underspedfied type spedfication which I 
assume is lexically assodated with verbs (Section 4.1.). The following sections 
illustrate how derivations with underspedfied types for verbs can be formally 
defined. In Section 4.6., a sample derivation is provided as an illustration. The 
analysis is discussed and evaluated in the following Section 5.
4.1. Definition of Ty(e* ->  X)
The lexical type spedfication assodated with verbs in LDSNL is a conditional 
type spedfying the number of Ty(e) expressions required by the verb to give an 
expression of Ty(t), as for example in Ty(e ->  t) for intransitive verbs. I retain 
this general format, but add to it the possibility of introdudng additional 
expressions of Ty(e). This is achieved by making use of the Kleene star 
operation, already employed in the system for the analysis of fronted 
constituents.
In particular, I define the Type value Ty(e* ->  X) as in (19):
(19) Definition of (e* ->  X)
(e* ->  X) = d ef. {(X) V (e* ->  (e ->  X))}
where X G {TYPE}
This reads as 'if estar, then some type X’ is defined as 'X, or if estar, then if e, 
then X'. The net effed of this definition is that 'e*' is underspedfied as to how 
many 'e’s' it stands for. This is achieved by defining e* disjunctively, where 
the left part of the disjunction corresponds to the case where e* stands for zero 
e's, and the right part corresponds to the case where e* stands for one e. Since 
the definition is recursive (the right part of the disjunction is itself an e*
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predicate), e* can be interpreted as standing for an infinite number of e's34. 
Note that the definition in (19) does not enrich the vocabulary of the language 
Type, since e* is defined over elements of that language35. In fact, starred types 
can be defined for all types by the generalized star definition in (20):
(20) Definition of (X* ->  Y)
(X* ->  Y) =def. {(Y) v (X* -> (X ->  Y))} 
where X,YG {TYPE}
I do not explore the possibilities the definition in (20) raises. In this thesis I
only employ e* for verbs, so that the definition in (19) can be expressed more
specifically as:
(21) Definition of (e* ->  t)
(e* -> t) =def. {(t) v (e* -> (e ->  t))}
From the definition in (21) it follows that the underspecification inherent in 
the starred type can be resolved to predicates of any arity:
(22) Resolution of Ty(e* ->  t)
Ty(t)
Ty(e ->  t)
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))
Note that after resolution of the underspedfication, the starred type reduces to 
some ordinary type specification already employed in the LDSNL system, 
which interacts with binary branching trees equally employed in the system.
A possible alternative formulation would result in flat, n-ary branching 
trees. I introduce one such formalization here for illustration purposes, 
although I do not develop it further in what follows:
34 This is of course a very powerful characterization, a point which I discuss below.
35 The disjunction symbol (vel) in the definition is not part of the type, but meta vocabulary.
Chapter 3: Formalizing Verbal Underspedfication 87
(23) Definition of (en -> t)
(en -> t) =def. {(t) v ((ei, ea,...en) ->  t)} 
where n £ N
The new aspect of (23) is that expressions of Ty(e) are added to an unordered set 
with little internal structure36. The disadvantage of this formalization is that it 
requires much more far reaching revisions of the LDSNL system than the 
alternative given in (21), since in (23) the language Type is enriched (by the 
comma), and corresponding tree relations are not defined. On the other hand, 
any advantages gained from either (21) or (23) can only be seen once the types 
are used, and the role of order of Ty(e) expressions for structure building and 
interpretation is explained. As it turns out, the formalization in (21) is 
completely adequate for the purposes I have in mind, so that I will in the 
remainder of this thesis only briefly point to differences between (21) and
(23)37.
4.2. Tree Building with e*: Introduction
In order to use the underspedfied type e* in the LDSNL system, it has to be 
stated how transitions from one parse state to another are licensed when 
predicates with e* are involved. In particular, in order to integrate verbs with 
e* into a derivation, the DU with e* has to be assodated with a correspondingly 
underspedfied location in the tree. This means that transitions with e* can be 
characterized as subcases of transitions for underspedfied tree nodes. There are 
two ways in which the assodation between the underspedfied type e* and an 
underspedfied tree location can be expressed with the resources given by the 
LDSNL architecture. Either a general transition rule is defined, which licenses 
derivations with e*, or derivations are driven by a set of actions, assodated 
with predicates involving e*, which are stated in the lexicon. I discuss these 
alternatives in turn.
4.2.1. e* Introduction by Rule
The first alternative is to define a transition rule for e* similar to the transition 
rules outlined in Chapter 1, which licenses the introduction of a DU with e*
36 The internal structure in (23) is expressed by a comma. Equally well I could have used 
conjunctions, or required an ordered set
37 In particular with respect to Minimal Recursion Semantics discussed in the next chapter.
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type, and its association with an underspecified tree location. This can be done 
by employing the rules Introduction and Star Adjunction. An e* Introduction 
rule is formulated in (24):
(24) e* Introduction
(n ... ?Ty(X)}__________________
{n • • ■ ? Ty(X), ?<d*> Ty(e* -> X)}
The rule states that at a parse state where at a given node Tn(n) TODO Ty(X) 
(where X any type) holds, a modal requirement may be introduced which 
requires that in a position lower than Tn(n) a DU with the underspedfied type 
value Ty(e* ->  X) (where X is the same type as at Tn(n)) be found. By Star 
Adjunction, an unfixed node may be built where the new DU is introduced. 
The corresponding tree structure resulting from e* Introduction and Star 
Adjunction is given below:
(25) e* Introduction: Tree
• (Tn(n),... ? Ty(X)}
{Tn(n*), ..., ?Ty(e* ->  X)}
The e* Introduction rule ensures that verbs with an e* type are introduced into 
the parse, by assigning them an underspedfied tree node predicate Tn(n*). The 
type underspedfication corresponds thus to an underspedfication of location -  
it is as yet not known where in the eventual tree the DU from the verb is 
located. This situation means that there might be two locationally 
underspedfied nodes in a given tree, since now both the verb and any 
unlocated nominal constituent (e.g. Wh o )  are unfixed. However, the two 
nodes can always be distinguished by their type values, since constituents 
standardly analysed as being unfixed are Ty(e) expressions, while unfixed e* 
expressions are always of Ty(e* ->  t), so that no unwanted interaction between 
the two nodes results. This is because I restrict here underspecified types to 
verbs, so that the e* Introduction rule can only be used in environments 
where the requirement is to build a Ty(t) expression from a given number of 
e's. Under this interpretation, the variable ’X’ used in the rule does effectively 
stand for requirements such as Ty(e ->  t), Ty(e ->  (e -> t)), etc.
However, there are two problems with defining a general rule for e* 
introduction even if it is restricted to verbs. The first is that the rule is
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specifically designed for underspedfied types which are meant to be assodated 
with verbs. However, despite involving type underspedfication, verbs might 
still vary as to their strictly required arguments. For example, sing might be of 
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t)), but close of Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), but the rule is neutral 
with respect to this difference. Since idiosyncratic information of individual 
verbs has to be introduced from the lexicon, it seems to be more economical to 
also introduce their (underspedfied) type value by lexical instruction, in which 
case a general introduction rule is unnecessary. In other words, the general 
aspect of verb phrase underspedfication is that Ty(e) expressions may be 
introduced optionally, and this should be captured by a general rule. However, 
the contribution of the verb in this process is not in general optional, but 
rather to provide the (or, one) necessary condition for the process, which might 
also include idiosyncratic information. The general rule does not adequately 
express the contribution of the individual verb, which can be better stated as 
lexical instructions.
Secondly, the rule e* Introduction as it stands licenses the introduction of 
an underspecified location with an underspecified type at any parse stage. 
Although e* Introduction is, like all transition rules, optional, this treatment 
still seems to be unecessarily powerful. In a strict SVO language like English, 
for example, verbs are in general introduced at the VP node, i.e. at a node with 
the requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t), which acts as a condition for the 
introduction of the verb from the lexdon, so that there are effectively no cases 
where the e* Introduction would be needed. On the other hand, a general rule 
for e* Adjunction might be needed in languages where the position of the verb 
is less predictable, as for example for an analysis of verb ’raising' in German. I 
discuss this point in more detail in Section 5, after the e* analysis has been 
more fully formulated, but I note here already that a general rule of e* 
Introduction threatens to undermine an analysis of unfixed verbs for the 
phenomenon characterized in other frameworks as verb movement, and that, 
since the introduction of unfixed nodes from the lexicon provides a viable 
alternative to introduction by rule, it seems more cautious to reserve the 
general rule option for alternative applications.
The conclusion is then that e* Introduction fails to address the 
contribution of individual verbs to the development of tree structure, while at 
the same time being too powerful for the aims it is designed to achieve. I thus 
consider in the next section an alternative formulation under which 
underspedfied types are introduced into the tree from the lexical entry of 
verbs.
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4.2.2. e* Introduction from the Lexicon
As outlined in Chapter 1, lexical entries in LDSNL consist of a set of statements 
which define the particular context in which a lexical expression may be 
introduced into a derivation, and how it contributes to the development of
tree structure. For example, the lexical entry for sing can be stated, without e*,
as follows:
(26) Lexical Entry for sing
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN put(Fo(sing'), Ty(e ->  t))
ELSE abort
According to (26), the condition for the introduction of the DU introduced by 
sing is a requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t). If this condition is met, then the node 
with the requirement may be annotated with the formula and type values as 
stated in the entry. If the requirement is not met, the derivation ends. For the
introduction of e*, the lexical information has to be modified, since the DU
with the predicate has to be associated with an unfixed node. This is expressed 
in the lexical entry in (27):
(27) Lexical Entry for sing with e*
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(sing’), Ty(e* -> (e ->  t))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t))
ELSE abort
The difference between these two specifications is that in (26), the DU from 
sing is associated directly at the node with the requirement, while in (27), a 
new unfixed node is built, where the DU is associated. The go predicate 
indicates that the next lexical action proceeds from the requirement TODO Ty(e 
->  t), i.e. the pointer moves back to the point of origin38. The effect of this 
lexical specification is the same as that of the e* Introduction rule of the last 
section, so that the same tree results. However, the difference between the two 
characterizations shows with a transitive verb like close, the lexical entry for 
which is given below:
38 Throughout this thesis I assume that statements such as go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)) in the entry 
above are instructions for the pointer to move up in the tree to the f i r s t  node with the relevant 
requirement. In Kempson et al. (1999) this is defined explicitly, but for the cases discussed here, 
the formulation adopted is sufficient.
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(28) Lexical Entry for dose with e*
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(dose’), Ty(e* ->  (e -> (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
In (28), it is part of the lexical specification of the verb to build the tree structure 
required needed to fulfill its subcategorization requirements. The entry licenses 
the building of three new nodes/ an argument node (<do>), a functor node 
(<di>), both with the appropriate requirements, and an unfixed node for the 
verb. This means that both sing and close, and quite generally any verb, can be 
introduced as a requirement of TODO Ty(e ->  t). The corresponding tree 
structures are shown below:
(29a) Tree before the introduction of close
•{Tn(0),...?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00),..., Ty(e)} • {Tn(01) ? Ty(e ->  t) 0}
The tree in (29a) includes the requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t) at Tn(01), which 
provides a suitable condition for the introduction of close. The lexical 
spetifications of close in (28) then result in the following tree:
(29b) Tree after the introduction of dose
• {Tn(0),... ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00),..., Ty(e)} • {Tn(01) ?Ty(e ->  t), ?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/
• {Tn(010) ?Ty(e) 0}
(Tn(01*), Fo(dose'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
As can be seen from (29b), the lexical specifications spedfy all required nodes; 
the unfixed node Tn(01*) and the argument node Tn(010) are built directly, 
while the corresponding functor node is required by the modal statement
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holding at Tn(01), which results by the application of Prediction in the building 
of this node39.
The same fomat for lexical information can be used for the ternary 
predicate put. Furthermore, since a lexical characterization can be used to 
encode specific idiosyncratic information provided by verbs, p u t may be 
characterized as requiring a Ty(e) expression referring to a location. A possible 
lexical specification for put is given below:
(30) Lexical Entry for put with e* (first version)
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(put’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
make(<di>),
put(?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)), ?<dx> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
make(<do> +ioc?Ty(e)), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
make(<do>), put(? Ty(e))
ELSE abort
As in the previous entries, the entry for p u t in (30) specifies the tree structure 
to be built and introduces an unfixed node for the predicate, so that the 
condition for the introduction of p u t can be given as TODO Ty(e -> t). The 
specification of idiosyncratic requirements such as the ’+loc’ feature employed 
in (30) requires further discussion which is provided in the section on the role 
of prepositions below, where also a revised entry for pu t is proposed; the point 
here is rather that introducing e* in the lexicon has the additional advantage 
that highly specific information can be added by simple annotations.
The preceding discussion illustrates that the introduction of e* through 
lexical information, rather than by general rule, has the advantage that verbs 
in English can uniformly be introduced at a node requiring TODO Ty(e ->  t), 
the VP node. Furthermore, in the lexical format precise statements regarding 
lexical idiosyncracies can be introduced, which are difficult to express by a 
gneral rule. In conclusion, then, I assume that underspecified type information 
involving e* is introduced via the lexical information from the given verb. In 
the next section I consider how the underspedfication of e* predicates can be 
resolved.
39 In the following discussions I occasionally assume that Prediction applies automatically, i.e. I 
omit the step from requirement to node building.
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4.3. Tree Building with e*: Resolution with Merge
Following the discussion in the last section, I assume that e* predicates are 
lexically associated with an underspecified tree node location. In this section, I 
show how the underspecified node is assigned its eventual fixed position in 
the tree, and how the underspecified type is resolved. The resolution of e*, 
however, is, in contrast to the introduction of e*, not subject to lexical 
requirements. As noted above, a rule characterization for the optionality of 
Ty(e) expressions is adequate. The problems with the introduction of e* by rule 
resulted from specific subcategorization information of individual verbs. 
Consequently, the resolution of e* can be defined by general rules. This section 
shows how e* interacts with the general rule Merge, which resolves the 
underspecification.
Since e* is defined as Kleene star operation, and since unfixed nodes are 
independently available in the system, the resolution of e* can be defined by 
exploiting independent LDSNL operations. In particular, an unfixed node with 
e* provides suitable input for the transition rule Merge, which is used in the 
resolution of unfixed nodes, for example with question words. As pointed out 
in Chapter 1, Merge is formulated completely generally, stating that two node 
descriptions (ND), corresponding to what is referred to as DU here, can be 
combined, so as to result in the union of whatever information is associated 
with the two DUs (Kempson, Meyer-Viol & Gabbay 1999: 82):
(31) Merge
{...ND. ND'.-.I 
{... NDUND’ ...}
The rule licenses effectively the merging of the information from two distinct 
nodes into one node. In practice, the effect of the rule is restricted since in most 
cases merging two nodes results in inconsistent information. However, in the 
case of underspecified nodes, it is exactly the combination of information 
which is required. Thus, in the case of e*, Merge is instantiated as follows:
(32) Merge e*
l„ ... ?Tv(X)l. !„•... Tv(e* 
In Ty(e*-> X) ? Ty(X)|
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In this instantiation, the information from the unfixed node is merged with 
the requirement of a fixed node in the tree. If, by the definition of e* in (19), 
Ty(e* ->  X) can be reduced to Ty(X) in this situation, Thinning can apply, and 
the requirement is fulfilled. The effect of Merge e* can be represented by two 
trees, corresponding to the input and to the output of Merge e* respectively:
(33a) Merge e* (before)
• (Tn(n),... ? Ty(X)}
(Tn(n*), ..., Ty(e* ->  X)}
Before the application of Merge, the e* predicate is at an unfixed node, and 
some requirement holds at a fixed node somewhere above the unfixed node. 
The application of Merge results in the merging of the information of the two 
nodes:
(33b) Merge e* (after)
• (Tn(n) Ty(e* ->  X), ?Ty(X)}
The resolution of Ty(e*) predicates is thus achieved in the same way that 
underspecified nodes are resolved in general, namely by Merge. Thus, for 
example, a derivation for John sang with e* involves the introduction of an 
unfixed node, by the lexical information from sing, and the resolution of the 
underspecification by Merge:
(34a) Tree for "John sang
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(john’), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
(Tn(01*), Fo(sing'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))}
The tree in (34a) is the result of building the tree structure specified in the 
lexical entry for sing in (27). In the absence of further input, Merge can apply to 
derive the tree in (34b):
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(34b) Tree for "John sang"
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), Fo(sing’),
Ty(e* ->  (e -> t)),
?Ty(e->t)}
The information holding at Tn(01) is consistent, since Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t)) can be 
resolved as Ty(e ->  t), and thus Thinning can apply, which then leads to the 
completion of the derivation.
4.4. Introduction of Optional Ty(e) Expressions
The initial and the final steps in derivations with e* have so far been defined: 
the introduction of e* predicates from the lexicon, and the resolution of the 
underspecification by Merge. What needs to be defined is the introduction of 
additional Ty(e) expressions, and how they interact with the predicate. Again, I 
discuss two options, the first employing the general rule Introduction, and the 
second, better one, employing lexical actions for prepositions.
4.4.1. Ty(e) Introduction by Introduction Rule
The optional intermediate steps in a derivation, in particular the optional 
introduction of Ty(e) expressions, could again be stated by referring to the rules 
Introduction and Prediction, which are independently defined in the system. 
Consider a tree with an unfixed e* node:
(35a) Tree with unfixed e* node
• (Tn(n),... ? Ty(X)}
(Tn(n*), ..., Ty(e* ->  X)}
Scanning an incoming Ty(e) expression, the tree is updated by Introduction of 
the requirement TODO (<d> ?Ty(e)) and the building of the requisite node by 
Prediction:
Chapter 3: Formalizing Verbal Underspecification 96
(35b)
• (T^n), ...?Ty(X)}
/
• {Tn(nO), ..., Ty(e)}
(Tn(n*), Ty(e* ->  X)}
Similarly, Introduction and Prediction result in the building of a new functor 
node with the requirement Ty(e ->  X):
(35c)
• (Tn(n),... ?Ty(X)}
/ \
• (Tn(nO),..., Ty(e)} • (Tn(nl) ? Ty(e ->  X)}
(Tn(n*), ..., Ty(e* ->  X)}
Two further applications of these two rules would result in two new nodes, 
one of which carries a requirement of Ty(e ->  (e ->  X)). This process could go 
on until no further Ty(e) expressions are scanned. At every step, Merge could 
apply to resolve the underspecification. This solution would drive derivations 
with e* with no changes to the overall system -  the introduction of the DU 
with e* at an unfixed node would be followed by possibly several applications 
of Introduction and Prediction, and the resolution of the underspecification by 
Merge.
However, this solution threatens to be too powerful. Lexical information 
merely requires the presence of a given number of Ty(e) expressions. If further 
Ty(e) expressions could be freely introduced without any restrictions, as is 
indeed the case in this solution with Introduction, there would be no means to 
exclude strings like (36):
(36a) ?John met Mary Bill the house.
(36b) ?Sally closed the window the kitchen.
(36c) ?Allan put the flowers the table.
The strings in (36) would go through since the noun phrases are introduced by 
Introduction, and e* allows for the introduction of Ty(e) expressions into the 
predicate. However, what is missing in (36) is a preposition:
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(37a) John met Mary with Bill in the house.
(37b) Sally dosed the window in the kitchen.
(37c) Allan put the flowers under the table.
From the contrast between (36) and (37), it appears that prepositions function to 
license the introduction of further Ty(e) expressions. In the next section, I 
discuss how this function can be best expressed in the present context, and how 
the analysis of prepositions can be used to provide an alternative to the 
analysis employing the Introduction rule.
4.4.2. Ty(e) Introduction from the Lexicon
I have so far at least tadtly assumed that PPs are of Ty(e). It is only under this 
assumption that an e* analysis could be employed for PPs which behave as an 
argument of the verb:
(38a) Fran opens bottles with her teeth.
(38b) The Bakers travelled to Paris in their van.
(38c) They discovered the corpse in the fridge.
The idea is that the verb is underspedfied, and that all post-verbal constituents 
in (38) can be introduced as arguments to the predicate40. Given the definition
of e*, both NPs and PPs have to be of Ty(e) for this analysis to work. But this
state of affairs, in conjunction with the unrestricted availability of 
Introduction, leads to the undesirable results illustrated at the end of the last 
section, namely that not only PPs, but both PPs and NPs can freely be added 
into the VP, which by and large is not true.
One possible solution to this problem would be to say that PPs are not of 
Ty(e) after all, but of a discrete type, say, for the sake of argument, of Ty(pp), so 
that it is not Ty(e) expressions but Ty(pp) expressions which can be freely added 
and be incorporated into the predicate by a corresponding type, say, Ty(pp* ->  
(e ->  t)). But that would take almost all of the original motivation for e* out of 
the picture since it is exactly PPs which appear most clearly to modify verbs in 
an argument-like fashion and thus should be treated in a similar way. In 
addition, it would increase the available types in LDSNL without, I believe, 
proper motivation.
40 In the relevant reading, that is. PPs may modify NPs, a case discussed below.
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A better way to go seems to be to make prepositions the licensors of 
Introduction, for example by saying that Ty(e) expressions can only be 
introduced if they are marked by a preposition. But that runs into problems for 
the main context where Introduction is needed. This is the building of the 
subject node in English. Introduction licenses the transition from a 
requirement TODO Ty(t) to the building of a Ty(e) node:
(39a) • (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
The application of Introduction and Prediction at a parse stage like (39a) results
in a tree such as (39b):
(39b) • (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
/
• {Tn(00) ? Ty(e)}
The rule Introduction is needed to ensure that an initial Ty(e) expression in a 
string of words can be assigned a position in the tree. Clearly, in this 
environment, the Ty(e) expression, i.e. the subject, need not, in fact cannot, be 
licensed by a preposition. Since I want Introduction to take care of the structure 
building in cases like (39), I cannot restrict it to be licensed by prepositions. This 
means that I cannot use Introduction for the introduction of optional Ty(e) 
expressions, and that optional Ty(e) expressions have to be introduced into the 
tree by some other means. I thus propose that optional Ty(e) expressions are 
introduced by the lexical instructions of prepositions, and not by a general rule. 
Consider a case like (40):
(40) Sandy opened the window with the broom.
Given the lexical definintions for verbs above, the NP the window  is licensed 
in the tree since the Ty(e) node has been built from lexical instructions. 
Furthermore, the predicate has been assigned to an unfixed node, resulting in a 
parse state like (41):
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(41a) Tree for "Sandy opened the window
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sandy’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(the_window')/ • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)}
{Tn(01*), Fo(open'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The next step in the derivation should result in the introduction of the PP at a 
new argument node Tn(0110). I assume for the moment that Introduction is 
blocked from applying in this situation (in a sense to be made more precise 
soon). The sensible assumption then is that it is the preposition w ith  which 
builts the necessary node, to result in a tree like (41b):
(41b) Tree for "Sandy opened the window with
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(sandy'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(the_window’)/ • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)}
/
• {Tn(OllO), ?Ty(e)}
(Tn(01*), Fo(open'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The tree in (41b) is identical to a potential tree where Tn(0110) would have 
been introduced by Introduction. Thus, it can be developed further without 
problems. Prediction results in the building of a functor node Tn(Olll) with 
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), and the DU from the broom, an expression of Ty(e), 
fulfills the requirement at Tn(0110). Finally, Merge applies, and the derivation 
is finished.
The claim is thus that Tn(0110) is built not by Introduction but from the 
lexical information from the preposition w ith. This can be achieved with the 
following lexical entry:
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(42) Lexical Entry for with (first version)
IF ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))
THEN put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e -> t)))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
While some modifications are still needed, it is clear that this specification 
does what is needed -  the entry specifies that w ith  builds an argument node 
with the requirement TODO Ty(e). I assume that lexical entries for prepositions 
consists minimally of such an instruction to build a TODO Ty(e) node. There 
are two further points. The first concerns the condition (i.e. IF) for the 
introduction of the preposition. In (42), the preposition can be introduced if 
there is a requirement TODO Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)) at the relevant parse state, as was 
the case in the example discussed (i.e. (40)). In general, however, PPs can be 
introduced at any stage with the requirement for a predicate, e.g. TODO Ty(e ->  
t), TODOTy(e ->  (e ->  t)), TODO Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))) etc. But this is exactly 
the range of cases covered by Ty(e* ->  t). Thus e* can be used here as a 
requirement. Given that the relevant PPs here are introduced into the VP, the 
universal condition for the introduction of prepositions is Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t)). 
This results in the following first version of a schematic entry for prepositions, 
which will be modified below:
(43) Schematic Lexical Entry for Prepositions (first version)
IF ?Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))
THEN put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
With this specification, the Ty(e) node needed to drive intermediate steps in 
derivations with e* is built by lexical instructions from the lexical entries of 
prepositions, without the need for the Introduction rule. Note that the 
requirement obtaining at the argument daughter here implies the resolution 
of the underspecified requirement; in particular, it has to be read not as an 
absolute statement, but as the resolved type specification relative to the parse 
state. Thus for a requirement such as Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), the first action is 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))). In this way, the preposition requires the 
building of a corresponding functor node by Prediction.
A second point relevant for the lexical entry of prepositions is their 
'semantic' contribution, since the entry thus far only specifies that prepositions
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build nodes. I will here not provide a detailed discussion of the meaning of 
prepositions in English (or in general). Rather I simply show how the semantic 
contribution of prepositions can be encoded into lexical entries of the kind 
discussed here in general. The easiest way to do this is to employ features 
which specify that the Ty(e) expressions be of a particular semantic/thematic 
kind. In the example considered above, for example, with the broom may be 
regarded as an 'instrument', so that the preposition in this case requires the 
Ty(e) node to be annotated with a feature '+instr'. This may simply be written 
into the lexical specification:
(44) Lexical Entry for with (final version)
IF ?Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))
THEN put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(+in8tr, ?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
A feature like ’+instr’ in (44) can be thought of as a language specific set of 
words, e.g. the feature ’+loc' in English would be something like {in, on top of, 
behind, under, ... }, or it can be given a specific semantic interpretation, e.g. in 
terms of force dynamics, or lexical-conceptual structures. However, I am not 
developing such an account here, nor do I review the available literature. 
Although formal semantic accounts have been developed for temporal and 
spatial prepositions41, the analysis of instruments or commitatives as in (45) 
appears to be much more intricate:
(45a) Fran wrote her dissertation with an ink pen.
(45b) John went to the party with Mary.
Rather than defining the particular semantic contribution of the preposition in 
cases like these, I simply use features, and, since I do not go into further details 
here, I prefer to use one feature per preposition, that is, for example, w ith  
annotates the Ty(e) node with a 'feature' ’+with'. On occasion, I use a general 
feature ’+prep', meaning a Ty(e) expression with a preposition, i.e. a PP. For 
the purposes here, the main contribution of prepositions in cases where PPs 
function as arguments to the verb is to license the introduction of their object 
(i.e. the noun phrase) into the predicational range of the verb, that is, 
prepositions may function, in conjunction with the verb, as instructions for
41 For example, Dowty (1979), Gawron (1985), Pratt &: Frands (1997), Zwarts (1997), as well as 
several non-formal approaches, e.g. Bennett (1975), Jackendoff (1983).
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argument adding. In this sense, the use of prepositions corresponds to the 
function of case in languages like Finnish or German, which mainly signals 
the relation of the noun phrase with the verb without any clear semantic 
contribution, at least with respect to tree building, which is the focus of this 
chapter42. In the cases in (45), for example, the contribution of the prepositions 
is intuitively to allow the construction of a three place semantic writing 
relation between Fran, her dissertation, and an ink pen for (45a), and the 
construction of a three place semantic going relation between John, the party, 
and Mary for (45b). This process of constructing semantic relations will be 
discussed more extensively in the next two chapters. For the present, I assume 
that the information from the preposition is projected into the formula value 
of the Ty(e) expression, so that with the broom results in a Ty(e) expression 
with a formula value Fo(with_the_broom). The interpretation of formula 
values in general will be discussed in more detail in the following two 
chapters, so that I assume here that prepositions minimally build a Ty(e) node 
and provide some annotation on it.
The lexical treatment of the introduction of a Ty(e) node provides an 
alternative to the introduction of Ty(e) expressions by Introduction discussed 
in the last section. However, the analysis is not yet a solution to the problem of 
the unwanted optional NPs. This is because the application of general rules is 
in general optional. Thus, although Ty(e) nodes can now be built from the 
lexicon, they still can be built by Introduction. What is missing is a statement to 
the effect that Ty(e) expressions can only  be built from the lexicon, in other 
words, the assumption that Introduction is blocked which I have made in this 
section has to hold. It is, however, difficult to block a rule from applying since 
rules, including Introduction, are not context sensitive in the relevant sense. 
Rather, what this analysis of e* entails is that there is no general rule 
Introduction. As pointed out above, Introduction is needed for the 
introduction of subjects in English. But this is, as far as I can see, the only 
context where the rule is required. If this turns out to be true, Introduction can 
be replaced by (46):
(46) Subject Introduction
lg ... ?Tv(t)0l___________________________
(„... 7Ty(t), ?<do>Ty(e), ?<dj>Ty(e->  t) 0 )
42 This position seems also plausible with respect to language change, since it has been noted 
especially in the Grammaticalization literature that case markers diachronically develop out 
of prepositions; cf. e.g. Heine, Claudi & Hiinnemeyer (1991), Hopper &Traugott (1993).
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The rule Subject Introduction licenses the introduction of a Ty(e) node, which 
then can be built by Prediction, only in context of a Ty(t) task, that is, at the root 
node. This still licenses the introduction of subjects (in languages where this is 
necessary), but does not interfere with the introduction of Ty(e) expressions at 
any other position in the tree. This is in fact the only major revision of the 
overall LDSNL architecture which the analysis of adjunction by e* developed 
here requires, and for the purposes of this thesis I assume that Introduction is 
replaced by Subject Introduction.
Before progressing, I briefly mention two implications of this analysis of 
prepositions. The first concerns the lexical entry for verbs like put, obligatorily 
requiring a PP. The tentative lexical entry for p u t developed in Section 4.2.2. is 
repeated here for convenience:
(47) Lexical Entry for put with e* (first version)
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(put’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
make(<di>),
put(?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)), ?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
make(<do> +ioc, ?Ty(e)),' 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
make(<do>), put(? Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The relevant clause in (47) is make(<do> +ioc, ?Ty(e)). In the light of the 
discussion in this section, this has to be revised, since all properties of the 
relevant node can now be built from the preposition. However, the 
requirement for such a node to be in the tree is still part of the lexical 
information from put. The revised entry is as follows:
(48) Lexical Entry for put with e* (final version)
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(put')/ Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)),
make(<di>), put(?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)), ?<do> +prep, Ty(e),
?<di> Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)) 
make(<do>), put(? Ty(e))
ELSE abort
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The revised entry states that there be a Ty(e) node with an annotation +prep as 
a requirement at the VP node. That is, no node is built, but its presence is 
required43. Again, there is some uncertainty about the feature value. The way 
the entry reads now results in a successful derivation of, for example, (49):
(49) ?Sally put the books at noon.
The question is w hether (49) is ungrammatical or just semantically 
unacceptable. According to (48), (49) is grammatical, because I have opted for a 
more liberal characterization of the lexical syntactic requirem ents. 
Alternatively, one might use a feature +loc again, as in (47), which would block
(49). Since I am here concerned with general characterizations of tree growth, I
leave the question open. The important point here is that in a derivation
invloving put and a PP, some tree building comes from the lexical entry from 
put, and some from the preposition, where the latter is restricted by the lexical 
requirements imposed by put. Subcategorization can thus be characterized as 
either building nodes, or merely requiring nodes to be present.
A second implication of this analysis is that some NPs may lexically be 
characterized as building nodes. I am thinking here of adverbials like yesterday, 
tomorrow, or possibly hom e. For these, their lexical entries may specify that 
they effectively are like PPs without preposition, so that they may be freely 
introduced:
(50a) I saw him yesterday.
(50b) They will leave from Manchester tomorrow.
(50c) I walked her home.
A lexical characterization in the Ty(e) expressions in these examples guarantees 
that they, at least under some readings, can be introduced as optional 
arguments to a given predicate. However, rather than going into more details 
here, I leave this as a possibility, and continue with the characterization of 
derivations with e*.
In this section, I have argued that optional Ty(e) expressions are 
introduced into the tree structure by instructions from the lexicon. This 
treatment has the advantage that the intuition that prepositions function as 
licensors of Ty(e) expressions is formally expressed. This analysis replaces a
43 The node can still be built by an (optional) application of Prediction, but this would result in 
an illicit derivation since there would be two nodes requiring TODO Ty(e).
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putative alternative under which Ty(e) nodes can freely be built by the general 
rule Introduction. A derivation with e* thus involves the building of an 
unfixed node for the predicate, which is achieved by lexical instructions, the 
optional building of Ty(e) nodes by prepositions which are filled by their NP 
objects, and finally, the application of Merge which results in the resolution of 
the underspecification of the type, and the assignment of a fixed position in the 
tree of the unfixed node. Note that under this characterization, the 
underspecified type is resolved 'in one go', i.e. only with the application of 
Merge is the underspecified type resolved to whatever the current requirement 
is. Although I think this is ultimately correct, I develop in the next section a 
rule which allows for the incremental partial resolution of e* predicates, where 
every introduction of an expression of Ty(e) is 'registered' at the unfixed node. 
This incremental notion of e* resolution is needed for the semantic analysis 
developed in the next chapter, although it is not needed for the conceptual 
analysis developed in Chapter 5.
4.5. Incremental Transition Rule for e*
As just noted, the definitions discussed in the preceding sections imply that the 
underspecification of e* is resolved at once, with the application of Merge. If, 
for example, there is a node with the requirement Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), the 
underspedfied type Ty(e* ->  t) can be resolved as meeting this requirement. 
However, for some applications, it might be useful to have a more context 
sensitive rule for e* which states that the underspecification is partially 
resolved with every instance of the introduction of a Ty(e) expression. The 
choice depends really on the interpretation of underspedfed verbs, which is 
discussed in the next two chapters. In this chapter, I formulate a rule which 
allows for partial resolution of e* predicates as a more spedfic characterization 
of its syntax.
The rule for partial resolution applies after the introduction of e* and 
before the application of Merge and can be stated as follows44:
(51) e* Partial Resolution
f n * ... Ty(e* ->  X)}, I n n .. .Ty(e) 0)
Ini* — Ty(e* ->  (e ->  X)}, {„o ...Ty(e) 0}
44 The rule could be regarded as an instantiation of the rule Propagation, which ensures that an 
unfixed node is 'passed down' the tree. However, Propagation does not define the updating of the 
type value, which is expressed in the rule given here.
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The rule licenses the following transition: Given a parse state with a DU with 
underspecified type Ty(e* ->  X) at an underspecified location Tn(n*) and the 
current task state at an argument node where a DU of Ty(e) holds, the 
underspecified node can be updated to 1) holding at or below the 
corresponding functor node Tn(nl), and 2) being minimally reducible to an 
expression with Ty(e ->  X), but not simply to Ty(X). According this rule, the 
introduction of the Ty(e) expression is ’registered’ at the unfixed node by 
partially resolving the underspecification. The following trees illustrates the 
transition licensed by e* Partial Resolution:
(52a) e* Partial Resolution: Tree (before)
• (Tn(n),... ?Ty(X)}
/
(Tn(nO),..., Ty(e) Q}«
(Tn(n*),..., Ty(e* ->  X)}
(52b) e* Partial Resolution: Tree (after)
• (Tn(n),... ?Ty(X)}
/
(Tn(nO),..., Ty(e) <>}•
(Tn(nl*), ..., Ty(e* ->  (e ->  X)}
The effect of the rule is to update the information at the unfixed node. The 
rule may apply after every introduction of a Ty(e) expression into the tree. The 
final resolution of the underspecification of e* is achieved by Merge, as before.
In what follows, I assume that e* Partial Resolution is part of the LDSNL 
rules until the interpretation of e* predicates has been discussed. Since this is a 
more specific statement of the syntax of e*, any derivation with the rule is also 
licensed without it, so that no harm is done to assume it.
With these formal specifications at hand, the function of e* within the 
LDSNL model can be demonstrated by a sample derivation provided in the 
next section.
4.6. e* for Verbs: Sample Derivation
The combination of the definition of e*, the lexical specifications, and the rules 
discussed in the preceding sections together define complete derivations with 
e* predicates. In this section I provide a sample derivation, illustrating how e*
Chapter 3: Formalizing Verbal Underspecification 107
is used in the LDSNL system. I assume here that at least one Ty(e) expression is 
lexically required by every verb, a point discussed in more detail in the next 
section. On the other hand, I assume that all verbs allow for the introduction 
of optional Ty(e) expressions. Thus, the lexical entry for the (transitive)45 verb 
bake can be represented as in (53):
(53) Lexical Entry for bake with e*
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(bake'), Ty(e* ->  (e -> (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e -> t)), 
put(? <di> Ty(e -> (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The important part of the entry in this context is the underspecified type value 
Ty(e* ->  (e -> t)), which states that the DU introduced by bake minimally 
requires one expression of Ty(e) (the ’subject’), and that it allows for a 
potentially unlimited number of optional Ty(e) arguments.
In this section, I give a sample derivation of the following example in
(54), involving bake, to show how the definitions for e* are used in the 
unfolding tree structure:
(54) John was baking a cake for Mary in the kitchen.
The example in (54) involves two prepositional VP adjuncts, the ’benefactive’ 
for Mary and the locative in the kitchen. The relevant derivational steps are as 
follows:
(55a) Tree for "John
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(john’), • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)}
The first steps in the derivation up to the scanning of the verb are familiar. 
The requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t) holding at Tn(01) is the condition for 
introducing the information from bake. Thus, two fixed daughter nodes are 
built, as well as an unfixed node for Fo(bake’):
45 Cf. the section on optional arguments below.
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(55b) Tree for "John was baking
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), ?Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
{Tn(01*), Fo(bake'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))}
The next expression in the string, a cake, (I ignore the internal structure of the 
NP throughout) is of Ty(e) and thus fulfills the requirement holding at 
Tn(010):
(55c) Tree for "John was baking a cake
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(a_cake), Ty(e)} • (Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
fTn(01*), Fo(bake’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))}
At this stage in the derivation, Merge could apply, so that the 
underspecification would be resolved and the unfixed node be merged with 
Tn(Oll). This would in fact be the derivation of John was baking a cake. 
However, in this case, there is further input and the application of Merge is 
prevented due to the the lexical information from the next word, for, the 
lexical entry for which is:
(56) Lexical Entry for for
IF ?Ty(e* ->  (e -> t))
THEN put(?<di> Ty(e -> (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(+for, ?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
If Merge applied before the introduction of for, the condition for introducing 
fo r  would not be met, since there would be no requirement TODO Ty(e* ->  
(e ->  t)), so that, by the ELSE clause, the derivation would be aborted. Since the
application of Merge is optional, it is enough to say that here, it doesn’t apply
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without any need to specify this further46. The information from for, then, 
results in the building of a new argument node:
(55d) Tree for "John was baking a cake for
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john'), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(a_cake), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/
• {Tn(0110), +for, ?Ty(e)}
{Tn(01*), Fo(bake’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))}
The new node Tn(0110) is built and annotated according to the lexical 
instructions from the preposition. The corresponding functor node Tn(Olll) 
can be built by Prediction, and the next word in the string, Mary, of Ty(e), can be 
associated at Tn(0110), resulting in the following state:
(55e) Tree for "John was baking a cake for Mary
• (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john’), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01) ? Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(a_cake), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll) ? Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Ty(e), • {Tn(Olll) ?
Fo(for_Mary')} Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
(Tn(01*), Fo(bake’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))}
At this stage, e* Partial Resolution can apply to partially update the unfixed 
node47, which then becomes (I reproduce only the unfixed node here, the tree 
does not change):
(55f) {Tn(0111*), Fo(bake'), Ty(e* -> (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
46 Note that this works here, since the application of Merge would result in the application of 
the ELSE dause in the entry o tz o i th .  The problem with the rule Introduction discussed above is 
different since its unrestricted use would not automatically result in abort.
47 Recall that I assume the rule e* Partial Resolution to be operative. Without it, nothing would 
happen at the unfixed node at this juncture.
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By e* Partial Resolution, the tree node location is updated, and one e is 
introduced into the underspedfied type, corresponding to the Ty(e) expression 
at Tn(0110) in the tree. The introduction of the second PP in the kitchen repeats 
these steps exactly -  the preposition builds a node which is filled by the Ty(e) 
expression the kitchen, Prediction builds a functor node, and the unfixed node 
is updated by e* Partial Resolution. Of course, if there were no further input 
after Mary, the parse of John was baking a cake for Mary would be successfully 
completed by the application of Merge. With the introduction of in the 
kitchen, however, the resulting tree is:
(55g) Tree for "John was baking a cake for Mary in the kitchen
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(a_cake'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Fo(for_mary'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Olll),
?Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
/ \
• {Tn(OlllO), Fo(in_the_kitchen’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ollll),
?Ty(e ->  (e -> (e ->  (e ->  t))))}
{Tn(n01111*), Fo(bake'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))))}
The tree in (55g) represents the parse state after introdudng in the kitchen, the 
building of Tn(Ollll), and the updating of the underspecified type value. Since 
there is no further input, Merge applies and the underspedfication is resolved 
in the manner defined in the definition of e*. The DU provided by bake is then 
assodated at Tn(Ollll), fulfilling the requirement holding at that node, and 
Completion can apply:
Chapter 3: Formalizing Verbal Underspecification 111
(55h) Tree for "John was baking a cake for Mary in the kitchen"
•{Tn(0),
Fo((((bake,(in_the_kitchen,))(for_mary,))(a_cake'))(john’)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(john'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01),
Ty(e ->  t)
Fo(((bake,(in_the_kitchen,))(for_mary,))(a_cake’))}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(a_cake’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)), 
Fo((bake'(in_the_kitchen,))(for_mary'))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Fo(for_mary'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Olll),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), 
Fo(bake'(in_the_kitchen'))}
/ \
• {Tn(OlllO), Fo(in_the_kitchen'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ollll),
Fo(bake‘),
Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))}
The tree in (55h) concludes the derivation of John was baking a cake for Mary 
in the kitchen  with the underspecified type value e*. I have assumed that the 
lexical type information of bake is underspecified and that it is resolved in the 
context of the utterance within which it is used. The definition of e*, together 
with lexical information and transition rules, results in a parse where Ty(e) 
expressions can be introduced into the tree as arguments to the underspecified 
verb, and where the underspecification is incrementally resolved, depending 
on the input to the parse.
However, I have not yet discussed any semantic interpretation for e*, 
which will be the topic of the following two chapters. There are, on the other 
hand, a number of points which need to be addressed before the discussion of 
semantic interpretation, so that I turn now to the discussion of some details of 
this analysis.
5. Discussion
In this section I discuss a number of questions related to the e* analysis 
developed in the preceding section and turn to points which have already been 
raised but have not been discussed in full. The first two sections are concerned 
with subjects and optional arguments, while the following section discusses 
the relation between the analysis proposed here and the LINK analysis of 
secondary predication proposed in Swinburne (1999). Section 5.4. offers several
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examples of how the analysis represents extraction, while the final Section 5.5. 
briefly points out how the analysis relates to positionally unfixed verbs such as 
are found in German.
5.1. Universal Subjects
As indicated above, I assume that verbs universally require at least one 
expression of Ty(e), corresponding to the logical subject. This does not follow, 
however, from the definition of e* given in (21). In fact, it is tempting to think 
of an example like sing that it lexically encodes the weaker type Ty(e* ->  t), so 
that the following parse could be derived:
(56) • (Tn(0), Fo(sing’), Ty(t)}
The 'tree' in (56) could be thought of, for example, as the representation of 
imperatives like Sing!, since no element of type Ty(e) is in the utterance, and 
the underspecification of sing could, under this assumption, simply be 
resolved to Ty(t). The problem in the structure in (56) is that there is no 
expression in the tree corresponding to the logical subject -  in the case of 
imperatives, the addressee. The preferred parse tree for Sing! is rather:
(57) • {Tn(0), Fo(sing,(Uaddressee)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), • (Tn(01), Fo(sing’),
Fo(Uaddressee)/ Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)}
In (57), the subject position is annotated with a formula value which has a 
metavariable, indicating an instruction to the hearer to search for a suitable 
representation, and a restriction on that variable to the effect that the 
interpretation of the metavariable be the representation of the addressee. For 
this example, imperatives in English, the licensing and annotating of the 
subject node involves several sources of information; the formula value 
results presumably from the information from the paradigm48, while the 
licensing of the node as such might be regarded as resulting from an 
Introduction rule such as Subject Introduction. Yet intuitively, the presence of 
the subject node results partly from verbal information. Furthermore, on the 
technical side,' it is not clear if the introduction of one ’e’ into the
48 For example, ’mood’, or 'clausal typing'; in fact this might be even more clearly expressed by a 
category feature similar to the Cat(+Q) feature in questions, e.g. as Cat(+Imp).
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underspecified type (i.e. the application of the right disjunct of the definition) 
is licensed by the node built due to Introduction, or by the grammatical 
information from the paradigm, or both. To avoid this problem, and to capture 
the intuition about the relation between information from the verb and the 
subject, I restrict the underspecification in verbal subcategorization 
information to the verb phrase, that is, including objects and VP adjuncts, but 
excluding subjects. This is partly in order to restrict the scope of inquiry in this 
thesis, but also because I think it is correct: verbal information includes the 
requirement of the presence of a subject. I thus assume that all lexical 
specifications for verbs include a statement that at least one Ty(e) expression, 
directly dominated by the node with Ty(t), which is the position of the logical 
subject (cf. Kempson, Meyer-Viol, Gabbay 1999), be present49.
5.2. Optional Arguments
Under the analysis developed here, Ty(e) expressions can be introduced into 
the verb phrase either by lexical instructions from the verb, or by lexical 
instructions from prepositions, and possibly, in some restricted cases, by lexical 
specification of bare Ty(e) adverbs. However, this means that optional 
arguments such as in (58 - 60) are not covered by the analysis:
(58a) Kelly was singing.
(58b) Kelly was singing a song.
(59a) Mr. Yu spent the whole afternoon baking.
(59b) Mr. Yu spent the whole afternoon baking cakes.
(60) Everybody was eating, but only Billy was eating pasta.
The optional objects in these examples are not introduced by a preposition, and 
they are not of the kind such that one would want to say that they build their 
own node by lexical specification. This leaves, under the proposal developed 
here, only the possibility that optional arguments are in fact introduced by 
lexical specification from the verb. This is, I think, partly warranted by the fact
49 Two further related problems are not discussed in this thesis: the analysis of 'weather' verbs 
which possibly do not have a logical subject; and the much bigger problem of grammatical 
functions, including grammatical function changing, i.e. the relation between grammatical and 
logical subjects, and grammatical expressions which appear to encode/change this relation. Both 
problems have not been addressed in detail, to my knowledge, in the LDSNL literature in 
general.
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that in general there are semantic restrictions on which optional arguments go 
with which predicate, whereas these restrictions are much weaker for true 
optional Ty(e) expressions. I will thus assume here, that optional arguments 
are encoded in the lexical specifications of verbs. This means that a verb like 
sing has a disjunctive lexical entry, specifying the intransitive and the 
transitive use:
(61) Disjunctive Lexical Entry for sing with e*
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(sing’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(sing’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e)), 
put(? <di> ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
As was the case with prepositions, the argument node may be annotated with 
further restrictions specifying that the expression of Ty(e) denote something 
singable, e.g. a song, or an aria. However, for the present, I leave the 
specification as it is as an illustration of a disjunctive entry.
This analysis of optional arguments as disjunctive lexical entries is in fact 
not quite as desired, since optional arguments can be regarded as a dear case of 
verbal underspedfication, and they should thus be more amenable to the 
general analysis proposed here. However, I leave this question for future 
research, and keep the lexical analysis.
5.3. e* and LINK
Under the e* analysis, prepositions contribute to the building of tree structure, 
and provide an annotation of an assodated Ty(e) expression. Prepositional 
phrases thus relate to verbs as arguments, rather than as functors. In this 
section, I discuss the relation between PPs as arguments and as functors in the 
fight of the LDSNL operations LINK and e*.
The view that PPs are arguments of Ty(e) contrasts with the view that PPs 
act as predicates, which seems an appropriate analysis for prepositional phrases 
in copular sentences:
(62) Jamie is in the garden
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A possible analysis for (62) would take either the preposition or the whole PP 
as being predicated of the subject, which, assuming that Jamie is of Ty(e), 
means that the PP appears as the functor:
(63) • {Fo(in_the_garden’(jamie’)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Fo(jamie’), Ty(e)} • {Fo(in_the_garden'), Ty(e ->  t)}
Under this analysis, the copula is a mere placeholder for temporal 
information, and does not contribute to the establishment of predicate- 
argument structure, a view which is supported by languages which allow 
copula-less predication (e.g. Hebrew, Arabic, cf. Kempson, Edwards & Meyer- 
Viol 1998, Swinburne 1998), so that a uniform analysis can be achieved by 
assuming that the PP in copula constructions functions as a predicate.
A similar observation can be made about PPs functioning as adjuncts to 
NPs. I follow the general line proposed in Swinburne (1999) to analyse these 
cases of instances of the LINK operation, introduced in Chapter 1. The LINK 
operation establishes a relation between two (sub-)trees, with particular 
instructions or requirements which may vary from language to language50. 
Semantically (or, 'informationally'), a LINKed tree can be characterized as 
providing extra information for or about the expression it is LINKed to, i.e. the 
head. Thus, for example, the PP in (64) can be regarded as being LINKed to the 
subject:
(64) With his hat in his hand, the man left the room.
Following the analysis outlined in Swinburne (1999), the preposed PP is in a 
LINK relation to the subject, about which more information is given. The 
requirement imposed by the LINK relation is that at least one node between 
the two LINKed expressions be shared. For the example in (64), this would 
result in a structure like (65) (irrelevant details suppressed):
50 For example, in .relative clauses as discussed in Chapter 1, the LINK operation may merely 
encode the requirement that there be a shared formula value between the head and the relative 
clause (as e.g. in Arabic), or it might provide a node with a copy of the formula value of the head 
with the requirement that the node by introduced into the relative clause (i.e. the LINKed tree) 
(as in English), cf. Kempson, Edwards & Meyer-Viol (1998).
Chapter 3: Formalizing Verbal Underspecification 116
(65) • [Tn(0) ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• [Tn(OO), Fo(the_man'), Ty(e)} • (Tn(Ol), Fo(leave’(the_room')), 
/ Ty(e ->  t)}
LINK
/
• {Tn(OOLO) ? Ty(p)}
/ \
• {Tn(OOLOO) • [Tn(OOLOl),
?Ty(e)} Fo(with_his_hat_in_his_hand'),
Ty(e ->  p)}
There are a number of details in the tree in (65) which are worth commenting 
on. However, I am not concerned in the present context with LINK structures 
as such, but with the role of PPs in them. In particular, the (complex) PP in (65) 
acts as a predicate which takes the subject of the LINKed tree as an argument. 
Since the LINK operation requires that there be a shared value between the 
two trees, it is a copy of the formula value Fo(the_man') which can fill the 
subject node at Tn(OOLOO), so that the derivation results in a well formed 
structure. Semantically, the tree corresponds to the two related (i.e. LINKed) 
formulae, shown in (66):
(66) Fo(leave’(the_room')(the_man’)) 
Fo(with_his_hat_in__his_hand’(the_man')).
The second formula is, according to Swinburne (1999), of type Ty(p), a type 
specification for propositional structures which are not related to temporal 
location -  in contrast to those of Ty(t), which are. Correspondingly, the PP here 
is of Ty(e -> p), so as to ensure that the shared formula value is incorporated 
into the tree and that a propositional structure results. As Swinburne 
demonstrates, this view results in a unified analysis of a number of cases of 
'secondary predication', including PPs, participle clauses, and adjectival 
clauses, as in the following examples:
(67a) John left the office [with a cheerful smile].
(67b) The man, [sitting at the bar], had another gin.
(67c) Lucy, [angry at the crowd], stormed out of the cinema.
According to Swinburne, the bracketed strings in (67) are LINKed structures of 
Ty(p).
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Swinburne's analysis differs from the analysis presented here with 
respect to the role of prepositions. While the LINK analysis assumes that 
prepositions are functors of Ty(e ->  (e ->  p)), the e* analysis assumes that 
prepositions have no type specification, but rather provide the tree structure 
for the introduction of optional Ty(e) expressions. However, the two analyses 
are concerned with different data, and distinct functions of prepositions in the 
building of semantic representations. While the two analyses taken together 
result in systematic ambiguity of the lexical specifications of (English) 
prepositions, they also provide a principled structural reflex of the different 
functions of PPs, where the dividing line is drawn between PPs which are 
"incorporated into the semantic unit the verb establishes" (Swinburne 1999: 
217), that is, e*, and PPs which express a predication and, hence, build a LINKed 
tree.
One result of the two analyses is that attachment ambiguities receive 
distinct structural analyses as either involving e* or LINK:
(68) Bill saw the man with the telescope
(68') Bill ((saw (e the man))(e with the telescope))
(68") Bill (saw (e the man [link with the telescope]))
The ambiguity in (68) is represented as resulting from a possible interpretation
of the PP as complement (68’), or as LINKed structure (68").
In the light of the preceding discussion, the claim put forward in this 
thesis is thus that PPs can function as arguments to a verb, and that if so, they 
are of type Ty(e). Although the investigation of the full consequences which 
result from the division of labour between e* and LINK is a topic for future 
research, the two different analyses jointly provide the basis for an explanation 
of adjunct extraction, as shown in the next section.
5.4. Extraction
The analysis of VP and NP adjuncts as e* and LINK respectively results in an 
an account of the extraction patterns discussed in the preceding chapter. I 
discuss extraction of an NP, extraction of a PP, and the morphological 
registration of extraction in turn.
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5.4.1. Extraction of NPs
A LINK relation indicates an island for extraction, while extraction is 
permitted along a path of functor-argument relations. Since by e*, NPs 
introduced by a preposition are associated at an argument node in the tree, they 
can be extracted. LINKed PPs, in contrast can not be extracted out of:
(69a) I went to the movies with Jane.
(69b) Who did you go to the movies with?
(70a) I liked the man with green hair.
(70b) ??What did you like the man with
Similarly, (71) can only be questioning a structure like (68’), but not (68"):
(71) What did you see the man with?
The answer The telescope as reply to (71) is only appropriate if the seeing was 
done with the telescope, but not if the man was with the telescope.
In LDSNL terms, this means that the unfixed constituent introduced by 
the zvh-pronoun can be merged with a requirement TODO Ty(e) if this 
requirement is introduced by the preposition under e*, but not if there is an 
intervening LINK relation. The following parse stage shows the relevant tree 
configuration:
(72) Tree for "What did you see the man with?" (e*)
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(u+addressee)/ Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ol), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(the_man'), Ty(e)} • (Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), +with, ?Ty(e), • {Tn(Olll),
?Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
{Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
{Tn(0111*), Fo(see'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))}
The tree in (72) illustrates the derivation just before the unfixed nodes are 
merged. The Ty(e) node Tn(0110) has been built by lexical instructions from the 
entry for with. Note that now two unfixed nodes are in the tree, the unfixed
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Ty(e) node from the pronoun and the unfixed e* node from the verb. By two 
applications of Merge, the nodes are associated at Tn(0110) and Tn(Olll) 
respectively. The tree shows clearly why adjunct extraction works like 
argument extraction -  the relevant tree configurations are identical.
In contrast, the unfixed Ty(e) node cannot be assigned an eventual 
location in a tree with LINKed NP adjunct:
(73) Tree for "What did you see the man with?" (LINK)
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(u+addressee)/ Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), Fo(the_man'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/
LINK
/
• (Tn(OOLO), ?Ty(p)}
/ \
• {Tn(OOLOO), ?Ty(e)} • {Tn(OOLOl), ?Ty(e ->  p)}
/ \
• {Tn(OOLOlO), ?Ty(e)} • {Tn(OOLOU), Fo(with'),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  p))}
{Tn(0*), Fo(WH), Ty(e)}
{Tn(011*), Fo(see'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The tree in (73) results in an incomplete, and hence disallowed, derivation 
since the unfixed Ty(e) node can not be introduced into the tree. The 
underspecified tree node cannot be resolved to hold at Tn(OOLOlO) since the 
Kleene star operation over tree node addresses is defined only over any 
number of 0's and l's, but not over any address involving an L (i.e. a LINK 
relation). Since there is no requirement TODO Ty(e) in the matrix tree, all 
putative applications of Merge lead to inconsistency, and the derivation is 
aborted.
5.4.2. Extraction of PPs
The e* analysis developed so far provides, as shown in the preceding section, a 
structural explanation for NP extraction out of VP adjunct position with 
stranded preposition, such as for example in (74):
(74) Who did you go to the movies with?
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However, for questions with fronted PPs such as (75), the analysis has to be 
slightly amended:
(75) With whom did you go to the movies?
Examples like (75) should be subject to the same analysis as standard object 
extraction and NP extraction as discussed in the last section, namely as 
involving an unfixed Ty(e) node which is integrated into the tree by e* and 
Merge, so that before Merge the following parse state obtains:
(76) Tree for "With whom did you go to the movies?
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(u+addressee)/ Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), ? Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(to_the_movies’), • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
{Tn(0*), Fo(with_WH), Ty(e)}
{Tn(011*), Fo(go’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))}
The challenge PP extraction poses is that the lexical instructions of prepositions 
as currently formulated state that the condition for their introduction into the 
tree is that there be a requirement TODO Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t)). In question 
formation, however, the preposition is found at the outset of the parse, where 
the requirement TODO Ty(t) holds. In the light of the tree in (76), the lexical 
entry for prepositions has to be modified such that they can be introduced at 
the beginning of the parse, and that if they are, they are integrated into the verb 
phrase. This can be achieved by a disjunctive lexical entry for prepositions, 
which is, however, activated by a uniform condition51:
51 This uniform condition might turn out to be important since if the LINK analysis discussed 
above is integrated into the system, lexical statements for prepositions need to include more 
information, including a statement to the effect that LINKed prepositions have type 
information. The way the entry is built here ensures that everything relevant for e* will be found 
under one condition.
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(77) Schematic Disjunctive Lexical Entry for Prepositions
IF ?Ty(e* ->  t)
THEN IF ?Ty(t)
put(? <d*> +prep, Ty(e)) 
make(<d*>), put(+prep, ?Ty(e))
ELSE put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(+prep, ?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The lexical entry in (77) states firstly the condition for the introduction of 
prepositions, where the definition of e* is finally fully exploited, since now 
possible instantiations include a simple Ty(t). However, two cases are 
distinguished by the two clauses under THEN. The first case is where the 
preposition is introduced directly under the root node, that is w hen a 
requirement TODO Ty(t) holds, as is the case in questions. If this condition is 
met, two actions are performed. The root node is annotated with a modal 
requirement that down of the root node a Ty(e) expression with a prepositional 
annotation holds. This statement ensures in conjunction with Prediction that 
the PP can eventually be introduced into the tree. The second clause states that 
an unfixed node be built where an expression of Ty(e) is required. At this node, 
the interrogative pronoun, a Ty(e) expression is introduced. The resulting 
expression at the unfixed node meets the requirement which the first clause 
puts at the root node, so that it can later be introduced into the tree. The ELSE 
clause is the ordinary case where the preposition builds a node for an optional 
Ty(e) expression. This clause remains unchanged. The relevant parse states are 
given below:
(78a) • (Tn(0), ? Ty(t)}
The initial state of a parse provides the condition for the introduction of a 
preposition. This results in (78b):
(78b) • {Tn(0), ?Ty(t), ?<d*> +prep, Ty(e))}
(Tn(0*), +prep ?Ty(e))}
The following wJz-pronoun fulfills the requirement at Tn(0*) and annotates 
the root node with the question feature +Q (as standardly assumed):
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(78c) • (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t), ?<d*> +Prcp, Ty(e)))
(Tn(0*), tprep, Fo(prep_WH), Ty(e)))
The following steps proceed in a standard fashion to result in a tree like (78d), 
which is identical, in the relevant respects, to the tree in (76) above52:
(78d)
• (Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t), ?<d*> +prep, Ty(e)))
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e)) • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)|
/ \
• (Tn(010), Ty(e)) • (Tn(011), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))
(Tn(0*), +prep, Fo(prep_WH), Ty(e)))
(TnfOll*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))))
The next step in the derivation is the application of Prediction, which results 
in the building of a node with the requirement specified in the root node:
(78e)
• (Tn(0), +Q, 7Ty(t), ?<d‘> Ty(e)))
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e)) • (Tn(01), 7Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(010), Ty(e)) • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)))
/
• (Tn(0110), ? +prep, Ty(e)))
(Tn(0*), +prep, Fo(prep_WH), Ty(e)))
(Tn(011*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))}
At this stage, Merge applies to Tn(nO*) and Tn(0110) so that the underspecified 
Ty(e) node is introduced into the tree:
52 That is, without formula values and now including the changes resulting from the new lexical 
specification for prepositions.
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(78f)
• {Tn(0), +Q, ?Ty(t), ?<d‘> +prep, Ty(e)))
/ \
♦ (Tn(OO), Ty(e)) • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t))
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), Ty(e)) • (Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))l
/
• {Tn(OllO), +prep,
Fo(prep_WH), Ty(e))}
[Tn(011*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e -> t))))}
With this step, the requirement introduced by the preposition at Tn(O) is 
fulfilled, since a Ty(e) expression with a +prep feature holds down of Tn(0). 
The derivation can now be completed by Prediction and Merge, and eventually 
by Completion.
With the disjunctive lexical defintition of prepositions as given in (77) 
both question patterns of PP adjuncts can now be derived.
5.4.3. Registration of Extraction Paths
A final point with respect to extraction to be addressed is the explicit syntactic 
or morphological marking of argument and adjunct extraction as discussed in 
the preceding chapter. Given the important role of lexical instructions for the 
analysis presented here, cross-linguistic differences are expected to reside to 
some extent in the characterization of prepositions, case, and NPs, as well as 
general rules of tree building. Thus, no full analysis of the languages discussed 
by Hukari & Levine (1994, 1995) showing marking of adjunct extraction can be 
produced here. Rather, I just show how the symmetrical behaviour can be 
stated, irrespective of the actual analysis of the morphological or syntactic 
reflex.
Consider again the case of the Irish complementizers (McCloskey 1979, 
quoted from Hukari & Levine 1995: 206):
(79a) I mBetlehem aL duirt na targaireachtai 
[in Bethlehem]j COMP said the prophecies
aL bearfat an Slanaitheoir
COMP would-be-bom the Saviour ej
'It was in Bethlehem that the prophecies said that the Saviour 
would be bom’
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(79b) Cen uair aL thding siad na bhaile
[which time]j COMP came they home ej
As seen in the examples, the complementizer is aL if an argument or an 
adjunct is extracted. In LDSNL terms, the difference between the two 
environments is that in (79) an unfixed Ty(e) node (and an appropriate +Q 
feature) has been introduced into the tree, as opposed to the non-extraction 
environment, where all Ty(e) nodes are fixed. A possible lexical analysis of the 
complementizer aL in Irish could express this as follows:
(80) Lexical Entry for Irish Complementizer aL
IF ?Ty(t ->  (e* ->  (e ->  t)))
THEN IF exist({Tn(n*), Ty(e)})
THEN make(<do>), put(?Ty(t), ?<d*> Ty(e)))
ELSE abort
The entry in (79) assumes that aL is a context sensitive allomorph of an 
’abstract’ lexical complementizer. For lexical access, this means that the parsing 
of one form necessarily accesses the other. The two forms are then reflexes of 
the different clauses in the lexical entry. For the case of aL, the entry states the 
condition for the existence of an unfixed node, which does not need to be 
fulfilled for goN, which is used in sentences without extraction. In the main 
condition, I have included a tentative type for verbs taking sentential 
complements which allow for the introduction of Ty(e) expressions before the 
introduction of the sentential complement. However, a full treatment of this 
question is outside the scope of the thesis, and thus the formulation in the IF 
clause is only tentative. What is relevant in (79) is that the condition stated for 
the introduction of aL in the lexical entry is sensitive to unfixed Ty(e) 
expressions, so that aL is used for both extracted arguments and extracted 
adjuncts.
The brief consideration of Irish here does not purport to be a serious 
analysis. The only relevant point is that the symmetry of arguments and 
adjuncts follows in the e* analysis from the fact that both questioned 
arguments and questioned adjuncts are assigned to an unfixed node of Ty(e), 
and that this fact can be exploited in stating whatever language particular reflex 
it has. Furthermore, the characterization of verbs as involving an unfixed, but 
conditional, type ensures that the two kinds of underspecified nodes can 
always be distinguished.
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The evidence from extraction thus confirms the e* analysis of verbal 
underspecification, which provides a means to introduce optional Ty(e) 
expressions into the verb phrase as arguments, so that optional and obligatory 
Ty(e) expressions can be seen to behave alike with respect to extraction.
5.5. e* and Unfixed Verbs: German
In the discussion so far, a number of points have been discussed mainly with 
English in mind. In this section I offer a short discussion of German and show 
how the e* analysis works in that language. As briefly pointed out above, one
reason for introducing e* predicates from the lexicon rather than by general
rule is that a general rule of e* Adjunction might be needed more urgently for 
an analysis of verb movement. In this section I discuss this point with 
reference to German. For the purposes of this thesis I assume that German is 
rigidly verb-second /verb-final, that is that the tensed verb, including tensed 
lexical verbs, is found either after the first constituent of the clause, or in final 
position53. Furthermore, I ignore issues involving auxiliary and modal verbs, 
including cross-modal dependencies54. The point of interest here is then how 
e* predicates interact with the generally unfixed nature of verbs in German.
As in English, PPs can freely be added into the VP in German, both in 
main and in subordinate clauses:
(80a) Frank sang 
Frank sang 
'Frank was singing'
(80b) Frank sang Arien 
Frank sang arias 
'Frank was singing arias’
53 Both of these assumptions are necessary in view of the examples below:
(i) Den Peter den habe ich schon ewig nicht mehr gesehen. 
the-AGC P the-AGC have I already forever not anymore seen 
’Peter I haven't seen in ages’
(ii) Petra glaubt dafi Sonja gesagt hat dafi Holland morgen gewinnt.
P believes that S said has that Holland tomorrow win
'Petra believes that Sonja said that Holland will win tomorrow'
In (i), two NPs precede the tensed verb in a main clause, while in (ii) the sentential complement 
otsagen, 'say', follows the verb. However, I go not into these details here.
54 Cf. e.g. Hinrichs & Nakazawa (1994).
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(80c) Frank sang in der Wanne
Frank sang in the.DAT tub.DAT 
’Frank was singing in the bath-tub’
(80d) Frank sang aus vollem Halse Arien in der Wanne
F. sang out full.DAT throat.DAT arias in the.DAT tub.DAT 
'Frank was singing arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub’
(80e) ... dafi Frank aus vollem Halse Arien in der Wanne sang
that F. out full.DAT throat.DAT arias in the.DAT tub.DAT sang 
'that Frank sang arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub’
The examples show singen, ’sing’, with different arguments and adjuncts; the 
intransitive use (80a), transitive use with optional argument (80b), with a 
locative adjunct (80c), with optional argument, locative and manner adverb in 
main (80d) and subordinate clause (80e). The order of the VP constituents is, at 
least syntactically, unfixed:
(81a) Frank sang Arien aus vollem Halse in der Wanne
F. sang arias out full.DAT throat.DAT in the.DAT tub.DAT 
’Frank was singing arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub’
(81b) Frank sang in der Wanne Arien aus vollem Halse
F. sang in the.DAT tub.DAT arias out full.DAT throat.DAT 
'Frank was singing arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub’
(81c) ... dafi Frank in der Wanne aus vollem Halse Arien sang
that F. in the.DAT tub.DAT out full.DAT throat.DAT arias sung has 
'that Frank sang arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub'
Furthermore, the position of the tensed verb varies between second and final 
position in main and subordinate clause.
Given the data in (80) and (81), I assume that the e* analysis of verbal 
underspecification holds for German, including the analysis of optional 
arguments involving disjunctive lexical entries, and the general requirement 
that Ty(e) arguments needs to be licensed to be introduced into the tree. 
However, in contrast to English, the structure building process cannot be 
characterized as proceeding to a large extent from lexical information from the 
verb, but has to be achieved in a way similar to how I have characterized the 
introduction of optional arguments in English, namely by structure building 
operations from prepositions and case. From this perspective, the final 
position of the verb can be taken to be basic, so that subcategorization 
requirements can be checked against already established tree structure.
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Consider for example a parse for a simplified version of (81c):
(82) ... dafi Frank in der Wanne Arien sang
that F. in the.DAT tub.DAT arias sung has 
’that Frank sang arias in the bath-tub'
The corresponding tree just before the introduction of the verb is given in (83):
(83a) Tree for "... Frank in der Wanne Arien
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(frank')/ Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(in_der_wanne’), • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Fo(arien’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Olll),
?Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
In order to ensure a particular order relation on the introduction of Ty(e) 
expressions, an explicit characterization of the function of prepositions and 
case in German has to be given, as well as an addtional notion of locally 
unfixed Ty(e) nodes. Although these are interesting questions, I assume that 
Ty(e) expressions are introduced into the tree in the order in which they 
appear, since I am here interested in the introduction of the verb. The next step 
in the derivation in (83) is the scanning of the verb. On the assumption that 
singen is transitive in the relevant reading here, it specifies the obligatory 
presence of the subject and the object, and is thus of Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))). 
The important point with respect to this final position is that the verb does not 
have to be assigned to an unfixed position -  when the verb is introduced in 
final position, no more Ty(e) expressions can be introduced, all expressions 
which determine the predicate's eventual valence are already in the tree. The 
derivation thus proceeds immediately with the association of the DU 
introduced by the verb at Tn(Olll):
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(83b) Tree for "... Frank in der Wanne Arien sang
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t»
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Fo(frank'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(in_der_wanne'), •{Tn(Oll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(OllO), Fo(arien')/ Ty(e)} • {Tn(Olll)
Fo(singen’),
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))
?Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The tree in (83b) shows this step. The information at Tn(Olll) is consistent and 
the requirement can be checked by Thinning. In German, then, the verb when 
introduced in final position is not assigned to an unfixed position. This is 
expressed in the following lexical entry:
(84) Lexical Entry for singen (first version)
IF ?Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))
THEN put(Fo(singen’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> +ACC), go(<u*> +NOM), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(t)).
ELSE abort
The requirement in (84) indicates that transitive singen cannot be introduced 
into the tree unless at least two Ty(e) expressions have been introduced into 
the tree. This is important, since, as already said, no further Ty(e) expressions 
can be introduced at this stage, so all required Ty(e) expressions have to be 
present. If this condition is fulfilled, the formula and type values of the verb 
are introduced at the node where the requirement holds. The go predicates 
have two functions. The first two of them ensure that the Ty(e) expressions are 
indeed the ones required by the verb, and not optionally introduced ones. The 
instructions cause the pointer to go up the tree to check for the case feature 
+ACC and +NOM, where the object is lower than the subject. The third go 
predicate causes the pointer to go to the mother node Tn(0) where TODO Ty(t) 
holds. This is to ensure that no further expressions can be introduced into the 
tree. The combined effect of this definition is that the verb is introduced 
directly at a fixed position in the tree, and that subcategorization requirements 
are checked, since they have to be met at this stage.
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The lexical definition given so far has now to be extended to cover V2 
cases. It is for the analysis of V2 that a general e* Adjunction rule is needed. 
The first additional observation in this respect is that the intitial position in 
German is not reserved for subjects. Rather, in principle any constituent may 
be introduced into the parse intitially:
(85a) Frank sang aus vollem Halse Arien in der Wanne
F. sang out full.DAT throat.DAT arias in the.DAT tub.DAT 
Trank was singing arias at the top of his voice in the bath-tub'
(85b) In der Wanne sang Frank Arien aus vollem Halse
(85c) Arien sang Frank in der Wanne aus vollem Halse
(85d) Aus vollem Halse sang Frank Arien in der Wanne
The data in (85) show that all constituents can be found before the verb. In 
LDSNL terms this means that the initial position is a locally unfixed position 
which will be fixed only at some later stage during the parse. This in turn 
means that the verb in V2 is introduced at a stage where TODO Ty(t) holds. 
The building of the initial unfixed position can be characterized by a general 
adjunction rule55:
(86) e Adjunction
L v . .?T y (tj}_______________
in ••• ?Ty(t), <d*> ?Ty(e)}
The rule e Introduction licenses the introduction of an unfixed node with the 
requirement TODO Ty(e) at the root node. The eventual position of the node 
depends then on case or prepositional information. On the assumption that 
the introduction of the initial Ty(e) expression always involves e Adjunction, 
the condition for the introduction of the verb in V2 position can be stated as a 
requirement TODO Ty(t):
55 Cf. the rule Star Adjunction, introduced in Chapter 1.
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(87) Lexical Entry for singen (final version)
IF ?Ty(e* ->  t)
THEN IF ?Ty(t)
THEN make(<d*>),
put(Fo(singen’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)),
<u*> +ACC, <u*> +NOM) 
go(<u*> ?Ty(t))
OR ?Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))
THEN put(Fo(singen’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> +ACC), go(<u*> +NOM), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(t)).
ELSE abort
The new part of the entry, the first disjunct of the main THEN statement, 
licenses the building of an unfixed node for the verb. The go statements of the 
verb-final entry are now modal requirements, ensuring that both subject and 
object are found above the verb's eventual position in the tree. The second part 
of the entry remains unchanged. The new entry licenses the following step in 
the derivation of a V2 verb:
(88) Tree for "In der Wanne sang
• (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
{Tn(0*), Fo(in_der_wanne’), Ty(e)}
(Tn(0*), Fo(singen'), Ty(e* -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The remaining steps in the derivation proceed standardly, that is, the tree is 
developed similar to derivations with final verb, where the only difference is 
that the verb has already been assigned to an unfixed position. From the 
perspective of the verb, the derivation proceeds exactly as in English in that 
Merge applies after all Ty(e) expressions have been scanned. I thus do not give 
the remaining steps of the derivation.
What this brief consideration has shown is that e* can be used for 
languages with verb movement, under an analysis which specifies different 
conditions of introduction in a disjunctive lexical entry. There are two 
important points to note for the e* analysis. The first is that it is not always the 
case that underspedfied types and unfixed location go together. Although they 
do go together English and in V2 in German, the final verb is crucially 
introduced into the tree directly. This is the reason for introducing e* 
predicates from the lexicon, rather than by general rule, since this treatment 
ensures that the two kinds of underspecification can be separated. The second
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point to note is that incremental interpretation of e* predicates doesn’t work 
for final verbs in German, since in these cases, the predicate is introduced 
directly, so that no application of Merge is necessary. Rather, the 
underspedfication of undersperified predicates is resolved simply by Thinning. 
In view of this fact, the interpretation of e* predicates can better be analysed as 
a in-one-go process. However, for the next chapter, where an incremental 
semantics for e* is developed, I do in fact assume that e* predicates can be 
incrementally interpreted, and that the rule e* Partial Resolution is operative. 
The assumption is dropped in Chapter 5, so that I do not provide an 
incremental resolution for final verbs in German here56.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have introduced the main proposal made in this thesis, 
namely that the subcategorization information provided by verbs is 
undersperified in the sense that the type value provided by verbs explicitly 
licenses the optional introduction of arguments. I have provided a formal 
statement of this observation -  e* -  and have shown how this undersperified 
type interacts with the overall LDSNL system. Since e* employs resources 
independently provided by the system, it can be used without major revisions. 
The formalization models successfully both the optionality of verb phrase 
adjuncts, and their behaviour as arguments once they are introduced into the 
tree. The building of verb phrases can, under this proposal, be characterized as 
the interplay between lexically provided information and more freely available 
general processes. In the next two chapters, I turn to the question of how verbs 
with undersperified types can be semantically interpreted. Chapter 4 provides a 
formalization of incremental semantic interpretation of underpecified verbs, 
where each introduction of a Ty(e) expression into the tree is matched by a 
corresponding semantic operation on the formula value (i.e. the lambda 
expression) introduced by the verb. However, some problems w ith this 
analysis are noted, so that in Chapter 5 I explore an alternative to this semantic 
treatment, which relates the interpretation of undersperified verbs to the 
pragmatic process of concept formation.
56 One possible way to do this is to state incrementality over Completion, since by the time 
Completion applies all predicates have a fixed arity and the application of modus ponens over 
formula values proceeds in a step-by-step fashion.
Chapter 4
Semantic Interpretation for 
Underspecified Verbs
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I have proposed a formalization of verbal 
underspecification as an analysis of optional Ty(e) expressions in the verb 
phrase. I have shown that certain symmetries between arguments and adjuncts 
can be expressed in the system by an underspecified verbal type, e*. The 
formalization captures the fact that the main difference between arguments 
and adjuncts is the difference between obligatoriness of the former and 
optionality of the latter. The proposal furthermore provides a unified analysis 
of the role of NPs and PPs in verb modification, as well as expressing the 
syntactic constituency of PPs. The formulation of verbal underspecification as 
e* has been shown to be closer to general LDSNL assumptions than the 
possible alternative treatment as expressed by the rule of Adjunction, e* is thus 
a natural extension of the framework which exploits independent resources, 
working on the inherent dynamics of the system. However, the discussion so 
far has mainly been concerned with the syntactic properties of underspecified 
verbs and their role in the establishment of tree structure. Thus far, I have not 
discussed semantic aspects of e* in detail, which will be the subject matter of 
this chapter. The first section, I discuss three analyses of adjunction from the 
form al/categorial grammar tradition which complement the syntactic 
distinction between Adjunction and e* of the last chapter; Dowty's (1979) 
intensional semantics, McConnell-Ginet’s (1982) extensional semantics, and 
Minimal Recursion Semantics (Copestake, Flickinger & Sag 1997). This chapter 
thus also serves to show how the argument developed in this thesis relates to 
proposals reported in the literature. After discussing the three analyses 
presented, I develop semantic rules for underspecified verbs, based on the 
work of McConnell-Ginet, which provide a means to assign model-theoretic 
interpretation to verbs with an undersperified type. However, the evaluation 
of the rules leads, together with LDSNL assumptions about the interpretation 
of natural language expressions, to the rejection of this analysis, and provides
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the transition to the next chapter, where the role of underspecified verbs in 
relation to conceptual structure is discussed.
2. Adjuncts as Functors or as Arguments
In the discussion of the two alternative formalizations of adjunction in LDSNL 
in the last chapter -  Adjunction and e* -  I have omitted a discussion of the 
semantics of these two approaches, since the discussion was concerned with 
the dynamics of tree building and an evaluation of the two proposals with 
respect to central LDSNL assumptions. The focus of the chapter also meant 
relevant proposals in the literature were not discussed in depth. By turning to 
the semantics of e* in this chapter, I discuss three proposals from the 
Formal/Categorial Grammar tradition, which are concerned with effectively 
the same problem, albeit from a different perspective, namely the correct 
representation of adjuncts, and of adverbials more generally. As will be seen, 
the semantics of adjuncts developed by Dowty (1979) can not be simply 
extended to the Adjunction rule of the last chapter, despite superficial 
similarities (2.1), while, in contrast, the proposal developed by McConnell- 
Ginet (1982) can be adapted to provide a semantic rule for e* (2.2), which is 
presented in section 3. The last proposal discussed, Minimal Recursion 
Semantics (Copestake et al. 1997), is shown to provide a useful technical tool 
for developing a semantics in LDSNL, but it is not further developed for 
conceptual reasons.
2.1. Adjuncts as Functors
The Adjunction rule discussed in the last chapter follows the treatment 
developed in Dowty (1979) (and in fact in Montague 1973), who combines 
Montague Grammar with the lexical decomposition approach advocated 
within Generative Semantics (GS) (cf. e.g. Lakoff 1971). Following Montague, 
Dowty develops a possible world semantics for a type-logical system, and 
combines this with the 'abstract' underlying predicates CAUSE and BECOME 
introduced within GS. These predicates are, together with the temporal 
predicates such as PRES, FUT, PAST, defined in a temporal possible-world 
semantics. The two main underlying assumptions in Dowty’s work, that truth 
-theoretic semantic meaning is assigned directly to natural language 
expressions, and that words can be decomposed into smaller underlying 
meaning-bearing units, are not shared by LDSNL. Both these points are further 
discussed in the final Section 4 of this chapter. In this section, I merely want to
Chapter 4: Semantic Interpretation 134
show that Dowty’s semantic rules if transferred to LDSNL create more syntactic 
problems for Adjunction, and that his semantic rules can likewise not easily be 
transferred to LDSNL. The main point of this discussion is to show that there 
are no independent semantic reasons for motivating Adjunction, and that 
given an appropriate formulation of the semantics of e*, the latter account is to 
be preferred.
2.1.1. IV/IV and TV/TV
In the light of examples like (1) and (2), Dowty (1979: 207/208) proposes to 
distinguish between intransitive verb and transitive verb modifiers:
(la) John walked.
(lb) John walked to Chicago.
(2a) John moved the rock.
(2b) John moved the rock to the fence.
The PPs in (1) and (2) are similar in that they turn an 'activity' verb into an 
'accomplishment' verb, that is, in Dowty's system, they add a BECOME 
predicate to the verb. However, (lb) entails that the referent of the subject ends 
up in Chicago, while (2b) entails that the referent of the object is at the fence, 
which can be expressed with a CAUSE predicate. Thus, there are two 
prepositions to; the first denotes a function from intransitive verbs to 
intransitive verbs (IV/IV), the second denotes a function from transitive verbs 
to transitive verbs (TV/TV). The first of these is illustrated in the analysis tree 
below (Dowty 1979: 211)57:
(3a) Analysis Tree for "John walks to Chicago"
John walks to Chicago, t 
/ \
John, T walk to Chicago, IV
/ \
to Chicago, IV/IV walk, IV 
/ \
to, (IV/IV)/T Chicago, T
571 have omitted references to the syntactic rules licensing steps of combination which are given 
in the original. Though obviously related, the Montagovian type system is different from the 
types employed in LDSNL, as briefly pointed out above (Chapter 2, Section 2.1.); here 
approximate correspondences are t = Ty(t),T = Ty(e), IV = Ty(e ->  t), and (IV/IV)/T = Ty(e ->  
((e ->  t) -> (e ->  t))).
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The most interesting step to note here is the combination of the verb and the 
PP, where the PP acts as functor which takes the verb as argument. The 
preposition is correspondingly typed. The semantics for the preposition, a 
complex lambda expression, results after appropriate conversion in the 
translation in (3b):
(3b) Translation for "John walks to Chicago"
walk'(j) & BECOME [be-at'(j, c)]
Thus here, the preposition introduces the BECOME predicate (which is 
interpreted as meaning intuitively a temporal ’before-after' sequence) and the 
locational predicate be-at’, which is not further analysed, although Dowty 
indicates ways to provide a more detailed analysis by employing a LOC 
function assigning positions to individuals in a (every) model. The sentence is 
interpreted as a conjunction of two predicates, where walk’ remains unary, and 
the relation between the referents of subject and object is expressed by be-at’ 
(hence the preposition is 'transitive').
The second to is illustrated in (4) (Dowty 1979: 212):
(4a) Analysis Tree for "John pushes a rock to the fence"
John pushes a rock to the fence, t
/ \
John, T push a rock to the fence, IV 
/ \
a rock, T push to the fence, TV
I / \
rock, CN to the fence, push, TV 
TV/TV 
/ \
to, (TV/TV)/T the fence, T
I
fence, CN
In (4a), in contrast to (3a), the preposition combines with its object to form the 
transitive verb modifier to the fence. There is the technical problem that when 
the 'transitive verb’ push to the fence combines with the object of push, that is, 
a rock, the object has to be 'inserted' between the verb and the PP, which have 
already combined -  the solution being some kind of 'wrap' operation without 
semantic content. While this is not problematic in Montague Grammar (cf. 
McGee Wood 1993, Morrill 1994), such a mechanism would have to be defined
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in LDSNL if the system were to incorporate Dowty’s semantics. The translation 
corresponding to (4a) is then:
(4b) Translation for "John pushes a rock to the fence"
3x [rock’(x) & 3y[Vz [fence’(z) <-> y = z] & push'*(j, x) CAUSE
BECOME [be-at’(x,y)]]J
As (4b) shows, the transitive modifier preposition introduces, in addition to 
BECOME, a CAUSE predicate into the translation, indicating that it is the object 
which ’moves’, and not the subject58.
The two translations for prepositions (to is just an example) as IV/IV and 
TV /TV lead to a systematic ambiguity in the lexicon in that there are (at least) 
two entries for each preposition. Dowty proposes a translation rule, which 
translates intransitive modifiers into transitive modifiers, so that prepositions 
only need to be listed as IV/IV. This means that the semantic operation 
associated with TV/TV can be defined on the operation IV/IV59. But this 
operation cannot be integrated into LDSNL as it stands, since, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, lexically established types cannot be changed. The solution for this 
problem sketched in Chapter 3 was to ’underspecify’ the types of modifiers by 
using variables over types such as Ty(e ->  (X ->  X) for prepositions. But given 
Dowty's semantics, this type underspecification really translates into a 
disjunction for every preposition such that the Adjunction rule has to encode 
that if X = Ty(e ->  t), apply semantic rule A, but if X = Ty(e ->  (e ->  t), apply 
semantic rule B. That is, the ambiguity is not resolved60.
In order to give a consistent interpretation of PPs as modifiers, Dowty 
translates verbs which subcategorize for a PP such as put, set, lay as requiring a 
modifier as argument. That is, put is of category TV/(TV/TV), requiring a 
transitive verb modifier to yield a transitive verb, corresponding to an LDSNL 
type Ty(((e -> t) ->  (e ->  t)) ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))). Again, this is not a possible
58 The clause Vz [fence'(z) <-> y = z] indicates that the fence  is definite, the notation push'*
means that push  translates into an ’extensional' predicate, in contrast to for example seek. Both 
points are irrelevant here.
591 do not reproduce the translation rule here, nor for that matter the actual translation rules for 
prepositions. For the present discussion, the difference between IV/IV and TV/TV as the absence 
or presence of the CAUSE predicate is all that is needed. The actual rules involve the 
intensional interpretation of all expressions and are without a discussion of the relevant 
interpretations not very illuminating. However, the issue of intensionality is not really relevant 
here and will only briefly be discussed in relation to McConnell-Ginet's criticism of Dowty in the 
next section.
60 In view of the lexical entries discussed so far, and of those to be introduced in Chapter 6, this is 
in fact not a very forceful criticism.
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expression under the interpretation of Type in LDSNL. The background of this 
discussion about possible types is that, as briefly discussed in Chapter 2, while 
Categorial Grammar treats types as an inference system, allowing, for example, 
for transitivity of types and function composition, LDSNL types are interpreted 
m uch more restrictedly as transparently encoding lexically determined 
syntactic combinatory properties. It is this difference between the two systems 
which makes it difficult to integrate Dowty’s work on PPs into LDSNL. The 
comparatively weak (but sufficient for present purposes) claim made here is 
thus that despite appearances, there is no straightforward semantic motivation 
for an Adjunction rule in LDSNL, on top of the syntactic problems the rule 
brings with respect to the tree building noted in the last chapter.
2.1.2. Some Problems Noted by Dowty
Dowty himself notes that the analysis of PPs as either IV/IV or TV/TV is not 
without problems. Since TV /TV results from a translation rule applying to 
IV/IV, all PPs can function as IV/IV, since the translation rule is optional. For 
example, the PP in (5) can apply as IV/IV to the rVP’:
(5) John threw the letter into the wastebasket.
The preferred interpretation here is that the PP is a TV /TV so that the letter 
ends up to be in the wastebasket. However, the PP might equally well function 
as IV/IV in which case it is John who comes to be in the wastebasket (1979: 
233). These two readings are always possible within the system, but one reading 
is 'highly unlikely’ for pragmatic reasons. A slightly different situation arises 
with (6):
(6) John drove his car to Chicago.
In (6), both interpretations seem to be possible (or, maybe, required) since both 
John and his car end up in Chicago. Dowty proposes that sentences like (6) 
"may well be syntactically (and semantically) ambiguous, though the two 
readings are indiscemable for pragmatic reasons" (1979: 209). The assumption 
here is that pragmatics chooses between different readings generated by the 
syntax / semantics. Given, however, that the semantics here is largely set up to 
capture exactly entailments like the ones relevant in (5) and (6) (by 
introduction of 'CAUSE to be in /a t .. .’), the division of labour between 
semantics and pragmatics seems to be not clear. In addition, it is not clear
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either how the role of the predicate, that is, the verb, in these entailment 
relations can be expressed, since the analysis assigns semantic operations of PP 
modification to the preposition. For example, the contrast between (6) and (7) 
seems to result from the choice of the predicate, and not from the PP:
(7) John wrote a letter to the editor.
That is, the particular pragmatic knowledge about who and what ends up 
where involved in these cases includes knowledge about driving and writing, 
that is, about concepts addressed by the verbs, yet by treating PPs as functors, 
this observation is not expressed directly.
2.1.3. Concluding Discussion
The point of discussing Dowty’s analysis of prepositions and PPs was to show 
that his semantic rules can not straightforwardly be incorporated into LDSNL, 
despite the superficial similarity with the Adjunction rule. It turns out that the 
only similarity is that in both systems, PPs are treated as functors which take 
verbs as arguments. However, Dowty employs a typing system which is very 
different from the LDSNL types, and proposes a semantic analysis which, in 
addition to being completely intensional, employs predicates like BECOME and 
CAUSE resulting from 'lexical decomposition'. The reasons for not 
introducing these notions into LDSNL have to do with assumptions about the 
relation between natural languages strings and truth conditional content, 
which for Dowty is direct, while in LDSNL, the relation is mediated by an 
intermediate level of representation, over which semantic interpretation is 
assigned. Since under this view, the contribution of lexical items is to address a 
mental concept, lexical decomposition is not a natural solution from the 
perspective adopted here. This point is discussed further in the last section of 
this chapter, but for the moment, it suffices to point out that providing a 
semantics for Adjunction along the lines discussed here would have 
unwanted consequences for the LDSNL system, so that there is no 
'independent' semantic motivation for Adjunction.
2.2. Adjuncts as Arguments: McConnell-Ginet (1982)
An alternative semantics for adjuncts as been proposed by McConnell-Ginet 
(1982). In fact, some of the syntactic arguments for preferring e* over 
Adjunction go back to this work. However, although developed as an
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alternative to Dowty, McConnell-Ginet's account is mainly concerned with 
true lexical adverbs such as rudely, quickly, and leaves certain questions about 
the role of NP and PP adjuncts open. In my discussion of McConnell-Ginet’s 
analysis I concentrate on those aspects which are relevant for e* and largely 
ignore her main arguments relating to adverbs in general. Since her syntactic 
arguments have been partly presented already, I review them only briefly here. 
The intuition behind and formalization of her proposal for the semantics of 
adjuncts, in contrast, will be presented more extensively.
McConnell-Ginet’s main claim is that a treatment of adjuncts as functors 
(e.g. of Ty((e ->  t) ->  (e ->  t)) as in Adjunction) has two serious problems. It 
fails to express entailments like the one from (8a) to (8b), and it forces an 
analysis in terms of possible worlds, which, according to McConnell-Ginet, 
seems superfluous in these cases (1982: 165):
(8a) Linda spoke to Marcia.
(8b) Linda spoke.
Intuitively, the PP in (8a) specifies the predicate -  not only did Linda speak, but 
she also addressed Marcia in doing so. Conversely, speaking to someone entails 
speaking, so (8b) is entailed by (8a). To illustrate that by Adjunction, this 
relation is not expressed, McConnell-Ginet discusses the analysis of the adverb 
quickly as functor. If quickly is combined with an intransitive predicate like 
walk as an argument to result in an (another) intransitive predicate, the 
corresponding ('standard') semantic operation is the mapping from a function 
from individuals to truth values to another function from individuals to truth 
values61. However, there is no explicit formal statement in this semantic
operation that there is a relation between the first set of individuals (the
walkers) and the second set of individuals (the quickly_walkers): "Given the 
semantics proposed, there is no reason to conclude that talking quickly is a 
kind of talking -  that the set of those who talk quickly is a (probably proper) 
subset of the talkers" (1982: 161/62). Similarly, if to Marcia in (8a) is a function 
with speak as argument, the resulting expression would pick out the set of 
people speaking to Marcia, without relating it explicitly to the set of speakers -  
the entailment from (8a) to (8b) remains unexpressed (unless explicitly stated, 
e.g. as meaning postulates).
61 McConnell-Ginet is discussing in particular Thomason & Stalnaker (1973), but her point is 
more general.
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McConnell-Ginet's second point is that an analysis of adverbs as functors 
needs to employ a semantic representation involving possible worlds, which, 
she argues, is the wrong tool to employ for adverbs. Her illustrative example 
(1982: 162) is a case where in a given model the people who are walking are 
exactly those who are talking. In this situation, McConell-Ginet argues, an 
extensional semantics for quickly would imply that those who talk quickly are
exactly the ones who walk quickly, a conclusion which might be wrong. This
problem can be overcome by having the functor taking the intension rather 
than the extension of the predicate as argument (1982: 162):
(9a) walk quickly translates into (quickly(Awalk»
(9b) talk quickly translates into (quickly(Atalk))
By introducing intensions, walk  and talk are interpreted not with respect to the 
original model (where their extensions are still identical), but with respect to 
possible worlds (or situations), where the people who are walking are not 
identical to the people who are talking (otherwise w alk  and talk would indeed 
mean the same thing). In this way, the results of applying quickly to w alk  and 
talk are differentiated. Now, McConnell-Ginet's criticism of this solution is 
that it does not provide an explanation for what one intuitively thinks of the 
difference between walking and walking quickly, namely that quickly specifies 
walk, indicating a special way of walking, say, 'at a fast rate'. A similar 
observation holds for the difference between cooking and eating on the one 
hand, and cooking fish and eating fish on the other. In a similar scenario, 
where cooks and eaters are the same people, the thing to do in order to get the 
contribution of fish  is to think of a further specification of the situations of 
cooking and eating: "Cooking fish and eating fish can be distinguished in a 
model that does not distinguish cooking and eating, with no appeal to 
alternative situations" (1982: 163). The conclusion from this is that "intensions 
are beside the point here" (1982:163), but yet alternative situations are the only 
set-theoretic mechanism to distinguish walking quickly from talking quickly in  
the situations assumed. The conclusion from that is that adverbs should not be 
treated as functions on predicates.
The alternative proposal McConnell-Ginet develops models adverbs as 
arguments of verbs. It does not only cover lexical adverbs, but can be extended 
to include optional arguments. The relevant basic features are, first, that VP- 
internal adverbs combine with verbs rather than with a VP, secondly, that 
adverbs typically have a dual function -  they augment the order of the verb 
with which they combine and they specify the value(s) of the added argument
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place(s), and thirdly, adverbs combine with verbs independently of verbal 
subcategorization (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 167)62. That is, for example, an 
optional PP combines with a verb by adding an argument position to the verb 
and specifying at the same time how it should be filled (e.g. by a ’location' if it 
is a locative adverb). This process is freely available, independent of the 
subcategorization of the verb.
The formal statement of this approach makes use of ’multiple-order 
predicates’, a possible translation of verbs like speak, which can be used as 
intransitive and as transitive verbs. The verb speak could be translated as 1/2- 
order predicate with the restriction in (10) (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 168), where 
'Den' abbreviates the denotation of a predicate in particular situations:
(10) if <a, b> E Den(speak), then {a} E Den(speak)
That is to say, if an ordered pair of constants, meaning, maybe, Anne and Berta, 
is in the extension of speak', then so is the first member of the pair, that is 
here, Anne. Under this interpretation, speak can be used with or without PP, 
and the inference from (11a) to (lib) is valid:
(11a) Anne spoke to Berta.
(lib) Anne spoke.
But rather than just translating some verbs as being of multiple order, 
McConnell-Ginet develops a formulation with which multiple-order verbs can 
be formed by adverbs, which ’augment’ the verb. This is defined formally as 
(McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)63:
(12) Admissible Augmentation (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)
Let a  be a verb in category X that translates into an n -order
predicate denoting an «-ary relation R. Then a + is an 
Admissible Augmentation of a  in categories X and X/Y only 
if a + translates into an nln+1-order predicate denoting R + =
R U S, where S £ R x Type Y. The augmented verb a + is 
admissible relative to £ E Y only if S £ R x Den(^) * 0 .
62 A fourth characterise is that VP adverbs are basic and that their function as higher-level 
adverbs can be defined by meaning postulates. This does not carry over to e*.
63 Note that here and throughout this chapter indicates a subset relation.
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The definition in (12) says that, for example, a binary predicate can be formed 
from a unary predicate if it can be augmented by a modifying expression such 
as an adverb. The denotation of this new predicate (R+) is formed from the 
union of the denotation of the original, unaugmented verb (R) with the 
denotation obtained from the product of R and the 'categorial range’ (Type Y) 
of the modifier (§). The categorial range of manner adverbs, for example, is 
'manner', that is, the added argument is restricted relative both to the verb's 
meaning and the 'kind' of modifier. A verb may be augmented by a modifier 
only if there is at least one member in the union of the denotation of verb and 
modifier (S * 0). Thus for the example (4), above, rather than translating speak 
as multiple-order predicate, it can be translated as a unary predicate, because by
(12) it can become a multiple-order predicate if it is used with a modifier (here, 
the PP). The step from Anne spoke’ (speak unary) to Anne spoke+’ (speak 
binary) is licensed (admissible) if there is somebody who Anne spoke to, as for 
example Berta. In this scenario, the denotation of the new predicate spoke+' is 
both {Anne}, the denotation of the original verb, and {<Anne, Berta>}, the 
union of verb and modifier denotations, where the categorial range of the 
modifier would be 'addressee'.
With this formulation of augmenting a verb, optional adverbial 
modification can be formulated as follows (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)64:
(13) Ad-Verb Rule (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)
Let a  be a lexical verb belonging to category X where X *
Y/AD-V and ^ be an expression belonging to category AD-V.
Then expression al= belongs to category X. A translation of a |  
is defined if 3a+, an admissible augmentation of a  relative to 
^ in categories X and X/AD-V. Then tr(a^) = tr(a+)(tr(^)).
With the rule in (13), any verb of any category (i.e. intransitive, transitive, etc.) 
can be augmented by an expression of category AD-V, that is, if it is an Ad-Verb, 
a type which includes those expressions which (can) function as optional 
arguments of a predicate and thus modify it. The combination of the verb and
64 There is a corresponding rule for obligatory adverbial modification, for cases like (McConnell- 
Ginet 1982:166):
(i) Liz resides in Kalamazoo
(ii) *Liz resides
This is irrelevant here since I treat PPs as Ty(e) (in contrast to Ty(AD-V)), so that (i) does not 
need a special rule (other than lexical).
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the Ad-Verb (e.g. by function application) yields an expression of the same 
category as the original, unaugmented verb -  both a  and belong to category 
X (hence the rule is recursive). The interpretation of this rule (its translation) 
restricts its application, since a translation is only defined if there is an 
admissible augmentation (as defined above). If there is, then the interpretation 
of the complex expression is defined as the translation of the augmented 
verb (as defined above) applied to the translation of the Ad-Verb.
To consider an example, if speak is an intransitive verb of type Ty(e ->  t) 
(i.e. <e,t> in Montagovian notation) denoting speak’ and to Linda is an Ad- 
Verb of type Ty(AD-V) of ’addressee’ Ad-Verbs, then an expression speak to 
Linda of type Ty(e ->  t) can be created. The interpretation of this new 
expression is the interpretation of speak, i.e. in terms of the lambda calculus 
Fo(kx speak'(x)), plus the augmentation, so that a + here would be Fo(kx 
speak'(x) & XyXx speak'-addressee'(y)(x)), which combines with (to) Linda such 
that Linda’ fills the second variable slot:
(14) (Xx speak’(x) & Xvkx speak’-addressee’(v)(x)) (linda’)
(Xx speak'(x) & Xx speak'-addressee’(linda')(x))
That is, under this view, Ad-Verbs create an additional argument slot of the 
predicate which they subsequently fill. In this sense, the Ad-Verb and 
Augmentation rules describe a two-step process, creating and filling of 
argument slots. Since the meaning of the augmented verb is built on, and 
incorporates the unaugmented verb, the inference from Mary spoke to Linda 
to Mary spoke is explicitly recorded in the semantics. By assuming different 
kinds of Ad-Verbs, the Augmentation rule ensures that only semantically 
’suitable’ Ad-Verbs can augment predicates.
McConnell-Ginet concludes that this characterization of Ad-Verbs 
overcomes the problems created by treating adverbials as functors. It takes 
account of the fact that Ad-Verbs modify their base verb, and that the meaning 
of the base verb is entailed by the augmented verb. The semantics is both 
compositional and extensional, this latter quality being argued to be more 
suitable than an intensional treatment. Finally, the proposal draws on certain 
similarities between lexical adverbs and optional term phrases (NPs and PPs), 
and provides thus an analysis for both cases.
The analysis presented here is similar to McConnell-Ginet's proposal 
with respect to the role of optional Ty(e) expressions in the verb phrase, so that 
I will use the Augmentation and Ad-Verb rules when I propose an extensional 
semantics for e* in Section 3. Before presenting this discussion, however, the
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next subsection presents a digression from the main argument developed here 
- 1 discuss a third way of developing a semantics for adjuncts, which in a way 
overcomes the dichotomy between the functor and the argument approach, 
namely Minimal Recursion Semantics. I show how this semantics can be used 
for e*, but argue that this does not present a conceptually interesting 
alternative, so that I use McConnell-Ginet's approach as a starting point for a 
semantics for e*.
2.3. Adjuncts as Scope
The idea advocated in the preceding chapters, that verbal subcategorization is 
underspecified, has been explored in models other than LDSNL. In fact, part of 
the discussion in Chapter 2 was based on work conducted within Head Driven 
Phrase Structure (HPSG)65. In this section, I trace the formalization of this 
observation in HPSG, and present the corresponding semantics, Minimal 
Recursion Semantics (MRS). As will be seen, MRS provides an alternative to 
the two analyses of the semantics of adjuncts introduced so far. Although 
eventually I do not adopt the ideas developed in MRS, I discuss the system 
here because it presents a pertinent proposal in the (formal semantics) 
literature. The section will serve furthermore as a more general comparison of 
LDSNL and HPSG with particular reference to the topic discussed here. The 
section proceeds as follows: I offer a brief introductory discussion of the 
relation between LDSNL and HPSG (2.3.1.) and then turn to the HPSG/MRS 
analysis of verbal underspecification (2.3.2.). I develop a semantics of e* based 
on MRS (2.3.3.) and discuss why I do not develop this line further (2.3.4.).
2.3.1. LDSNL and HPSG
The main distinctive quality of LDSNL with respect to alternative 
conceptualizations in linguistics is the assumption that natural language 
grammar reflects comparatively directly the fact that grammatical knowledge is 
used by hearers in the incremental building of interpretations for strings of 
words. The picture drawn in LDSNL is thus performance (in particular, hearer) 
orientated and representational, so that ultimately a psychological claim is 
being made. In contrast, HPSG, which has its roots in the formal semantics 
tradition, is less concerned with cognitive claims, but rather develops a formal
65 In particular Bouma, Malouf & Sag (1997) and Sag (1998). See Pollard & Sag (1994) and also 
Horrocks (1987) and Lappin & Johnson (1999) for discussions of HPSG/GPSG and its relation to 
other theoretical approaches.
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apparatus to capture the relation between syntactic strings and their semantic 
form directly, as well as grammatical well-formedness conditions. While 
influenced in particular by computational approaches to linguistics, the basic 
HPSG architecture is neutral between parsing and generation, so that there is 
no particular reflex of parsing in the formulation of the basic grammar.
However, with respect to formalization, LDSNL and HPSG are less 
distinct than one might expect from their different theoretical approaches. 
Basic underlying HPSG representations (here a non-technical term) are typed 
feature structures (Carpenter 1992), where syntactic and semantic information 
of words and morphemes is expressed by features which have particular 
values, and combination of words into phrases are modelled as feature 
interaction, in particular feature unification. Within this general approach, 
functor-argument relations are captured as heads and daughters: a head 
inherits features from its daughter(s), a notion which corresponds to the 
syntactic-semantic types of Categorial Grammar. The versatility of HPSG 
results from the fact that there is no theoretical restriction of what features are 
postulated, nor, in principle, a restriction on feature interaction. Given the 
head-daughter relation, HPSG feature structures can be represented as binary 
trees, and any (ordinary) binary tree can be represented as a typed feature 
structure.
The relation between trees and structural desription in LDSNL is rather 
similar to HPSG, since any LDSNL tree can be represented as a tree description 
employing the basic vocabulary for tree description introduced in Chapter 1. So 
for example, a simple tree like (15) can be represented as (16):
(15) Tree for "John saw Sally"
• (Tn(0), Fo((see'(sally,))(john'))/ Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), • (Tn(01), Fo(see'(sally’))}
Fo(john'), Ty(e)} / \
• {Tn(010), • {Tn(Oll), Fo(sally’), Ty(e)}
Fo(see')}
(16) Tree Description for "John saw Sally"
(Tn(0), Fo((see’(sally,))(john,))A Ty(t), Ts(si < sutt), <d0> (Fo(john'), 
Ty(e)), <di> (Fo(see'(sally’)), Ty(e ->  t)), < d ixdo>  (Fo(see’),
Ty(e -> (e ->  t))), < d ix d i>  (Fo(sally'), Ty(e))}
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The tree in (15) can thus be converted into the single albeit long statement in
(16) by exploiting the modality operator <d>, which means that the tree in (15) 
is described in (16) as seen from the perspective of the top node. In general, an 
exhaustive description of any LDSNL tree can be given as a set of annotated 
nodes with annotations. I have also included, for reasons which will be clear 
shortly, a predicate Ts (tense) in (16) which states that the time of the event 
described by the formula value precedes the time of utterance.
To bring out the analogy to HPSG more clearly, one might consider the 
LDSNL Predicates (like Tn, Fo, Ty, etc.) as features. For example, the predicate 
Fo corresponds rather closely to the HPSG feature CONT, where ’lexical’ 
semantic information from words is recorded, and values of daughters (i.e. 
LDSNL arguments) are recorded in the CONT feature of the head (i.e. LDSNL 
functors). In this case, function-application in LDSNL is rendered as feature 
inheritance. For other predicates, there seems to be even less difference -  this 
was the reason for including the Ts predicate in (16). The value of the tense 
predicate is recorded at the root node by pointer movement; from the point in 
the tree where temporal information is provided, the pointer is licensed to go 
up to the root node, record a value, and return to the point of origin. The 
pointer movement in this case is not related to predicate-argument structure, 
function-application, or any of the computational rules of the LDSNL system. 
In that sense it resembles closely the feature unification employed in HPSG66. 
However, the analogy is not so close for the LDSNL type predicate, where no 
simple translation is available, since HPSG employs a number of features to 
describe combinatorial properties, e.g. SUBCAT(egorization), VAL(ence), 
SUBj(ect), OOMP(lements). This difference reflects the fact that the notion of 
subject is defined structurally in LDSNL as the last argument to a functor 
yielding Ty(t) (or, alternatively, as the argument node dominated directly by 
Tn(0)), and not directly as predicate value. The more general observation is 
here that a number of structural notions are not recognized in HPSG. This 
includes in particular the structural underspecification modelled as <d*>, and 
the LINK relation between (sub-)trees. However, given the isomorphism 
between trees and tree description, there is, I believe, no principled reason 
which would prevent the translation of <d*> and LINK into HPSG, although 
that would probably result in LDSNL in HPSG terms, rather than in HPSG as 
we know it, the difference being what one chooses to formalize, rather than 
what one can formalize. Although more could be said at this point, I conclude
661 do not discuss the details of tense and temporal information here. The interpretation of tense 
in LDSNL is discussed in Perrett (1996, fcmg.).
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here by stating what I wanted to show with this brief comparison, and what I 
want to use it for. From what has been indicated here, two points follow, 
namely that LDSNL and HPSG are similar with respect to large parts of the 
formalization (except possibly for the underspecification), but that, on the other 
hand, there is a significant difference in conceptual content67.1 will concentrate 
on the formal similarities throughout most of this section, where I develop an 
underspecifed semantics for e* by 'translating' Minimal Recursion Semantics 
(MRS), developed with HPSG in mind, into LDSNL, but the conceptual 
differences are addressed at the end of this section.
2.3.2. Minimal Recursion Semantics
Although structural underspecification is not expressed in HPSG, there are 
proposals to express argument-adjunct symmetries, similar to the proposal 
made here. The syntactic statem ent to achieve this is in fact more 
straightforward than the e* formalization, partly because incrementality plays 
no role, and partly because features may be introduced rather liberally as long 
as warranted by the data. Following Bouma, Malouf & Sag (1997), Sag (1998) 
proposes a lexical rule by which a verb can take any modfier occuring with it as 
an argument68 (Sag 1998:10):
(17)
\word }
|HEAD 3 |
[vb-lxm  } | |
(ARG-ST 1 J =>LR |ARG-ST1 © listf MOD \ HEAD 3 ]} \
| { [ CONT2 JJ |
I CONT 2 J
The lexical rule in (17) states that for any given verb with a given argument 
structure, a new word can be derived which is like the input verb, but where 
the argument structure is supplemented with a list of modifiers. The amend 
symbol (’©’) indicates an addition to a list, since argument struture in general
67 I assume here tacitly that theories can be distinguished on more grounds than empirical 
coverage, cf. Davidson (1999).
68 A number of alternative formulations are discussed in Sag (1998) and elsewhere, some of them 
restricting the introduction of modifiers as arguments to slash values (i.e. extracted modifiers), 
some of them running on a separate DEP(endent) feature, rather than on argument structure. The 
formulation reproduced here comes closest to e*
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is modelled as a list69. The head feature of the modifier unifies with the head 
feature of the derived word, that is, whatever the (syntactic) head of the 
modifier (for example, a preposition) is, it is dominated by the verb, and, 
similarly, the content of the modifier is represented in the content list of the 
derived form.
The syntactic effect of (17) is similar to the e* formalization developed in 
the last chapter. Under both formalizations a sentence like (18) will have three 
arguments:
(18) The Sheriff of Nottingham sentenced Robin Hood for three years
In both LDSNL and HPSG (with e* and (17) respectively), the modifier for three 
years can be analysed as an argument of the verb sentence under the same 
structural configuration as Robin Hood is, at some level of syntactic 
description. The difference between the two approaches is that (17) is 
formulated as a lexical rule, while e* is defined syntactically and does not 
change lexical information. Furthermore, given the comparative formal 
richness of HPSG, the impact of (17) can be constrained by additional features 
where syntactic or semantic valency can be stated (e.g CONT, VAL, COMP), while 
corresponding predicates are not readily available in LDSNL70.
Irrespective of the differences between the two formalizations, both do, or 
may, result in a struture where sentence appears as ditransitive:
(19) (((sentence,(for_three_years'))(RH,))(sheriff_of_n’))
The representation in (19) is a LDSNL with e* representation, but an HPSG 
representation of (18) would be identical in the relevant respects, in particular 
since the semantics which goes with it presupposes even less syntactic 
structure than is given in (19) -  Minimal Recursion Semantics is defined over 
flat verb phrase structures, so that the functor-argument structure inherent in
(19) can be removed:
(20) sentence(sheriff_of_n’, RH’, for_three_years')
69 In the present context this can simply be seen as addition. Formally, amend is 'weaker' than 
set union since it not only does not impose order (which has to be specified additionally if 
desired) but also allows for doublets, i.e. two identical expressions are two elements.
70 With the exception of lexical instructions.
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In fact, MRS allows for a flat representation of sentences, represented as simple 
lists under conjunction (symbolized here as 7  V):
(21) / \ {sentence', sheriff_of_n’, RH’, for_three_years'}
MRS is a semantics which makes it possible in principle to represent semantic 
scope irrespective of the order of elements in the predicate. Before seeing how 
this works exactly, it is useful to state the objectives MRS is trying to achieve. 
MRS as described by Copestake, Flickinger & Sag (1997) (CFS) is developed for 
computational semantics, with the particular aim of providing a clear link 
between syntax and semantics, to express the relation between the meaning of 
the whole and the meaning of its parts, and to allow for underspecification 
(CFS 1997:1). This latter requirement refers not so much to underspecification 
as discussed here, but to cases where a fully resolved resolution of, for example, 
quantifier scope interaction is either not necessary, or not possible71. Given the 
application of MRS in computational linguistics, this might arise in a case 
where a fully scoped structure would involve "arbitarily complex reasoning on 
completely open-ended world knowledge" (CFS 1997: 2).
The most extensively discussed examples in CFS are sentences involving 
quantifier scope, such as the sentence in (22a), where scope can be represented 
as in (22b):
(22a) Every tall man is old
(22b) every(x, man(x) & tall(x), old(x))
The corresponding flat representation is (23):
(23) / \ {every(x), man(x), old(x), tall(x)}
But the problem with (23) is that it is not only the representation of (22a), but 
also of (24):
(24) Every old man is tall
71 The notion of underspecification here is closer to underspedfied Discourse Representation 
Structures (UDRS), cf. e.g. Reyle (1993), Konig & Reyle (1998), an intermediate structure between 
natural languages strings and DRS's proper. I omit a discussion of UDRS for reasons of space.
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That is to say, completely flat structures obliterate scope distinctions encoded in 
syntactic structure, and, as CFS argue, need to be enriched so as to preserve 
scope information.
This enrichment of flat structures is achieved in MRS by introducing a 
feature HANDLE into the feature structure of every expression, which serves to 
make reference to it in the semantics:
(25) top 0
/ \ {0: every(x, 1, 2), l:man(x), l:tall(x), 2:old(x)}
In (25), all words have been assigned a numerical index, corresponding to the 
value of the HANDLE feature. With this -  albeit informal -  representation, it is 
possible to state the scope restrictions expressed by (22a) (and, by changing the 
indices, those expressed by (24)). The value of the ’top' node indicates that the 
expression with the index 0, here ’every(x, 1, 2)’, is outermost, so that it 
outscopes all other components of the list (i.e. the representation of the 
sentence). The representation of every , like those of all quantifiers in MRS, is 
given as a generalized quantifier, with bound variable, restriction and scope72. 
The fact that tall, rather than old as in (24), is in the restrictor of every  is 
captured by the fact that the index of tall is 1, while the index of old  is 2, 
matching the index in the scope of every. Although the actual HPSG/MRS 
formalization of HANDLE (and two related features, LISZT and KEY) looks rather 
different from (25)73, the basic idea is that by providing an extra feature, any 
expression in a sentence can be related to any other expression as being 
identical to it in relevant respects, as well as being dependent on it. 
Furthermore, co-indexation of a HANDLE value with the top value results in 
wide scope reading. Since all this is formulated as values of the HANDLE 
feature, underspecification can be modelled by defining variables as values for 
HANDLE. Thus, in (26b) p, n, m and are variables over handles, and the MRS 
structure is underspecified with respect to object or subject wide scope. The 
scoped representations are given in (26c) (wide scope subject) and (26d) (wide 
scope object):
72 See Barwise & Cooper (1984), Keenan (1996), Cann (1993:187ff.) for discussion of generalized 
quantifiers (GQ’s).
73 MRS structures are, like HPSG structures, defined as feature structures. However, I do not 
represent more technical details than are necessary for the present discussion.
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(26a) Every dog chased some cat
(26b) top p
/ \ {l:every(x, 3, n), 3:dog(x), 7:cat(y), 5:some(y, 7, m), 4:chase(e, x, y)} 
(26c) top 5
/ \ {l:every(x, 3,4), 3:dog(x), 7:cat(y), 5:some(y, 7,1), 4:chase(e, x, y)} 
(26d) top 1
/ \ {l:every(x, 3,5), 3:dog(x), 7:cat(y), 5:some(y, 7,4), 4:chase(e, x, y)}
As can be seen from (26c) and (26d), the two different readings of (26a) are 
captured by choosing different values at the top node. As can also be seen, the 
choice of which handle is top implies the choice of the value of the scope of the 
quantifiers. More generally, there are a number of constraints on possible MRS 
structures in general, as well as sentence-particular constraints on particular 
value combinations. These constraints are expressed as relations between a pair 
of HANDLE values, namely either equivalence, i.e. the values are identical, or 
outscope, i.e. one value has scope over the other. In general, any MRS 
structure is fully specified if the handle values are such that a path can be 
traced from the top value through all handles and that the resulting structure 
is a tree. In addition, for any MRS structure, any constraints on handles (i.e 
equivalence or outscope) can be established in the incremental unification of 
feature structures (i.e. in the syntactic computation of the sentence).
In a scoped MRS structure, variables are generally bound by quantifying 
expressions. However, for certain variables, 'implicit toplevel’ binding is 
possible, that is, the values are immediately dependent on the top node. The 
variables which allow for implicit toplevel binding are event variables, a 
variable introduced by a proper name or a pronoun, or a variable which occurs 
in a position where it corresponds to a syntactically optional argument. The 
former two cases will not be discussed any further, but the last type of variable 
is important for the present discussion. What implicit toplevel binding 
effectively means is that the scope analysis of quantifiers is extended to the 
relation between adjuncts and verbs, so that predicate-argument relations are 
analysed as scope relations. Recall that functor-argument relations in HPSG 
are expressed as features and feature unification, similar to the representation 
of scope dependencies within MRS. On this analogy, the difference between 
treating an adjunct as a functor or as an argument with respect to the verb can 
be expressed as simple restrictions on handles, by outscope. That is, the
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sentence in (27) can be syntactically represented as flat (as in (28)), provided that 
predicate argument relations can be expressed as handle interaction (CFS 1997: 
4)74;
(27) On Monday Kim ran in Foothills Park.
(28) / \ {on(e, Monday), run(e, Kim), in(e, Foothills_Park)}
The extension of MRS to adjuncts provides a means for developing a semantic 
analysis of adjuncts, which is to a certain extent independent of the syntactic 
arguments discussed with respect to Adjunction and e*. Thus, given that, on 
the one hand, adjuncts can be analysed in HPSG as (optional) arguments, 
namely by the lexical rule presented in (17), above, and that, on the other hand, 
optional arguments permit toplevel binding75, it seems plausible to test the 
possibility to develop a semantic analysis for e* on analogy with MRS. This 
will be done in the next section.
2.3.3. Minimal Recursion Semantics for e*
Given the areas of overlap between HPSG and LDSNL with respect to formal 
architecture discussed above, it seems viable to adopt some aspects of MRS and 
exploit them for the development of rules for the semantic evaluation for 
underspecified verbs. Recall that the reason for discussing the semantics of 
adjuncts, and for introducing MRS, was the observation put forward in the last 
chapter that in order to evaluate the advantages and problems of 
underspecified verbs, an account of the interpretation of structures like (29b), 
derived with e* from (29a), should be given:
(29a) John was singing with Mary in the kitchen
(29b) (Tn(0), Ty(t), Fo(((sing,(m_the_kitchen,))(with_mary,))(john’))}
MRS appears to offer another possibility to tackle that problem -  I will propose 
in this section that the adjuncts in (29), with Mary, and in the kitchen, while
74 CFS (1997: 3) introduce these examples for expository purposes only, not as serious proposals 
for analyzing temporal adverbs. Yet they presumably illustrate the scope of the semantics. 
Examples like this are discussed below in the LDSNL version of MRS. Note that the argument 
here does not depend on the use of the event variable.
75 The relation between MRS and optional arguments has been discussed further in conference 
presentation by Copestake (1996), but which has, to my knowledge, not been published.
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syntactically behaving like arguments, can semantically be treated as toplevel 
bound adjuncts. In order to make this work, some modifications of the e* 
analysis developed so far are introduced and discussed. Note, however, that 
MRS as it stands is not exclusively designed for HPSG -  it should be possible, 
in principle, to model all semantic interpretation in LDSNL as being defined by 
MRS, although it is not clear what the benefits of this approach would be. In 
the following discussion, I am thus only concerned with providing a means to 
amend the e* analysis of the last chapter so as to make it compatible with MRS, 
which then provides a semantic interpretation in which the relation between 
verbs and arguments is analysed as a scope relation. After introducing the 
necessary modifications, the results of such an analysis are discussed and 
evaluated.
To start with, two modifications are required -  the introduction of 
’handle' values, and a top level predicate where adjuncts can be projected.
Since in LDSNL, all tree positions are uniquely identified by their tree 
address, one could use these addresses as handles. However, I introduce a new 
predicate named Handle (Hd(x)) to make the modification more explicit, and I 
furthermore assume that its value is part of the semantic content of declarative 
units, that is, it is part of the formula value. I include handle predicates for 
expressions at terminal nodes, in the order in which they are introduced into 
the tree, and provide a predicate holding at the root node, where all handle 
values introduced into the tree are recorded. Thus, for example, (30) is a 
declarative unit with handles:
(30) {Hd(l), Fo(l: sing), (Hd(2), Fo(2: john)}
In order to model top binding of adjuncts, i.e. Ty(e) expressions introduced by 
the resolution of underspecification, I assume that handle values are projected 
directly at the top node, Tn(0). This can be formally expressed by introducing a 
predicate o({x, y, z, ...}), where handle values are recorded. Finally, handle 
values are recorded at the root node by lexical actions. The rule in (31) defines 
that lexical action addHandle:
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(31) Handle Rule
(1) IF T
THEN ... add_handle ...
where T an arbitrary trigger
(2) AddHandle: 1) put(Hd(x)), where x = 1, 2 ,... and x is fresh
2) a  := a  U (x),
where a  is the set of handles at Tn(0).
The first clause of the Handle rule states that add_handle is a possible lexical 
action. The second clause of the rule states that the action to be carried out 
consists in introducing a handle predicate and a new value for it, i.e. a value 
which has not yet been assigned in the tree, and, secondly, to introduce the 
value into the set a  where all handle values which have been assigned are 
recorded76. The rule results in representations where the presence of adjuncts 
is recorded at the top node Tn(0). This does not interfere with the syntax of e*, 
since the Handle rule simply adds a new action predicate to the set of actions 
stated in the lexicon.
A derivation for (29a), repeated here, thus results in a tree like (32) before 
completion:
(29a) John was singing with Mary in the kitchen
(32) Tree for "John was singing with Mary in the kitchen" (with e* and
M RS)
• {o({ 1, 2, 3, 4}), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Hd(l), Fo(l: john’), Ty(e)} • { ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Hd(3), Fo(3: with_mary'), Ty(e)} • {?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• (Hd(4), Fo(4: injritchen'), • (Hd(2), Fo(2: sing'),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
According to the e* rule, all PPs have been introduced as arguments. The 
underspecification in the verb has been resolved, and a place in the tree has 
been assigned. The new feature in the tree is that all expressions are
76 I have not included an explicit statement for pointer movement, which could be added by 
employing the go predicate and an appropriate modal operator. I also assume that new (fresh) 
values can be identified.
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represented at Tn(0) by their handle value. Since the handle predicate now 
provides explicit access to Ty(e) expressions, verbal underspecification could 
under this analysis, i.e. with handles, be modelled as en as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, that is, as flat verb phrase. I retain the e* formulation here, 
but note that the formalization with en would show the power of the handle 
predicate even more clearly, and would be closer to the original MRS 
conception. But even with e*, it is clear that in a tree like (32) explicit reference 
can be made to the members of a, so that semantic scope can be stated 
independently of the syntactic underspecification.
Of course, as it stands, it is not clear what sort of semantic interpretation 
is assigned to e* with MRS -  all that has been done is to introduce a new 
predicate and a lexical rule. But with this modification it is possible to model 
an analysis of adjuncts both as functors and as arguments if these relations are 
regarded as scope relations. For example, in (32), in the kitchen might be taken 
as a functor to the predicate, while with Mary may be an argument, which can 
be expressed as handle scoping at Tn(0):
(33) Tree for "John was singing with Mary in the kitchen"
(with e*lMRS, scoped)
• {o({ 1,2,3,4}, {4 > 2}, {2 > 3}), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Hd(l), Fo(l: john*), Ty(e)} • { ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Hd(3), Fo(3: with_mary’), Ty(e)} • {?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Hd(4), Fo(4: injdtchen’), • {Hd(2), Fo(2: sing’),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The additional constraints over handles express the different semantic 
functions of the two PPs as scope constraints, where the relation ’>’ means 
outscope.
By further developing the account of semantic interpretation for 
underspecified verbs with handles, a num ber of extensions could be 
developed77. However, the analysis outlined so far illustrates two points. First, 
it is not difficult to define the necessary predicates which make it possible to 
semantically interpret underspecified verbs, and LDSNL trees in general, with
77 For example the interaction of adjuncts and tense, as well as a precise statement of the handle 
constraints imposed by adjuncts incrementally. However, as outlined in the following discussion, I 
do not develop this line of inquiry further.
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recourse to MRS. On the other hand the formalization is very powerful since it 
is possible in principle, though probably not in a fully formalized analysis, to 
obliterate syntactic structure established during the parse, and to replace 
structures established by function-application by scope relations stated over the 
handle values introduced by terminal nodes. These two points are briefly 
discussed in the following section.
2.3.4. Discussion
The preceding discussion shows that a rule of semantic interpretation for e* 
can be developed by adopting proposals from MRS. The advantage of this 
approach is that it provides a means to express both an analysis of optional 
Ty(e) expressions as arguments to the verb, and an analysis of optional Ty(e) 
expressions as functors taking the verb as argument, namely by employing the 
outscope relation. However, the disadvantage is that the notions of quantifier, 
or operator scope and function-application are conflated, and that the 
dissociation of semantic and syntactic structure implies that the relation 
between structure established during the parse and semantic combination is 
obliterated, which contradicts the basic LDSNL assumption that hearers build 
semantic trees incrementally. Thus, while it is possible to augment the analysis 
of verbal underspecifcation as e* with a handle feature, the resulting 
interpretation does not express the structural properties associated with e*, 
namely that adjuncts can be treated as arguments to verbs because verbal 
subcategorization is underspecified. The introduction of handles to connect e* 
verbs with MRS is thus a possible, but not an optimal interpretation for e*.
However, it is worth pointing out that the formalization proposed here 
does not unduly overstretch the formal apparatus provided by LDSNL. While 
the introduction of the handle predicate, together with the associated Handle 
rule, adds to the predicates already recognized, it keeps clear of any unwanted 
interaction, since it is only used with the equally new a  predicate. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility, although I have not explored it here, that 
the handle predicate might in fact be ’reduced* to the tree node identifier. 
Similarly, the a  predicate is only one in a number of predicates at the root 
node, such as clausal typing (the 'Q' feature), and, more importantly tense. The 
handle values are, similar to tense, projected directly at the root node, which 
implies vacuous pointer movement (in the sense that it is not driven by 
function-application), similar to feature unification. Since this possibility is 
independently required, no undue burden is put on the overall system by the 
introduction of the handle predicates. Finally, the constraints on handles can
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be introduced incrementally, that is at every step of introducing a new Ty(e) 
expression, with the verb always having widest scope. In that way, the syntactic 
mode of combination is mirrored in the scope relation representing semantic 
interpretation. However, it is less clear if the point about incrementality retains 
its force if the semantic interpretation is, even if only in principle, defined as 
being independent of structure building processes. Thus I conclude that the 
e*/MRS formulation provided here is not problematic with respect to the 
formal architecture employed in LDSNL, although it is problematic with 
respect to basic theoretical assumptions.
As noted at the outset of this section, the difference between LDSNL and 
HPSG is really a matter of theoretical assumptions about (the cognitive basis of) 
natural language, and not so much one of formal expression. From this 
perspective, it is not surprising that e* could be combined with MRS. However, 
e*/MRS has very little to say about why there should be underspecification in 
the verb phrase, as it makes no reference to the process of building 
interpretations, or to the role of the hearer. In other words, e*/MRS is not a 
very 'natural’ solution, given the over all assumptions of the system. I will 
thus not pursue this solution any further.
2.4. Semantics of Adjuncts -  Conclusion
I have presented three possible ways of analyzing adjuncts which have been 
proposed in the formal semantics literature. The first proposal, to treat 
adjuncts as functors taking predicates as arguments corresponds to the 
Adjunction rule proposed in Chapter 3, which I have rejected mainly with 
reference to basic LDSNL assumptions about the incremental nature of tree 
building. The second proposal, to treat adjuncts as arguments of predicates, 
corresponds closer to the idea I want to express with e*. It additionally provides 
further semantic reasons for rejecting the Adjunction rule. Finally, I have 
presented a third proposal, MRS, which is neutral between Adjunction and e*. 
I have shown how, on the model of MRS, a semantics for e* can be given, but 
rejected this formulation on conceptual grounds. The discussion of MRS has 
served further as an opportunity to compare LDSNL with HPSG. In the 
following section, I develop semantic rules for e \  based on the analysis 
provided by McConnell-Ginet (1982), and discuss the question of semantic 
evaluation and the interpretation of tmderspedfied verbs more generally.
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3. Adjuncts as Arguments: Extensional Semantics for e*
In this section I develop an extensional semantics for e* based on McConnell- 
Ginet's analysis presented in the last section. As has been discussed at various 
points in the preceding chapters, LDSNL assumes that model-theoretic 
semantic interpretation is assigned to the proposition expressed, and not to 
natural language expressions directly. In contrast, all proposals discussed in 
this chapter assume that the relation between natural language and model 
theoretic interpretation is unmediated. Since in this section I develop an 
analysis of semantic interpretation for e* which is based on McConell-Ginet 
(1982), I suspend the LDSNL assumption about mental representations for the 
purposes of this section and assume with McConell-Ginet that semantic 
operations are stated in tandem with syntactic operations. After I have shown 
how an analysis of extensional semantic interpretation for underspecified 
verbs can be developed, I discuss the problem of semantic interpretation from 
the perspective of LDSNL in Section 4.
Out of the three analyses of the semantic interpretation of adjuncts, the 
proposal by McConnell-Ginet (1982) seems to be the most suitable formulation 
for developing a semantic analysis for underspecified verbs, since it reflects 
syntactic predicate-argument structure (in contrast to the more liberal 
formulation of MRS, where syntactic and semantic structure can be dissociated) 
and assumes that adjuncts can be analyzed as optional arguments (in contrast 
to Dowty’s formalization which treats them as functors). After introducing the 
necessary adjustments, I show how the semantic rule for e* works and give a 
sample presentation. Some problems and evaluations are presented in the last 
subsection.
3.1. Adjustments and Formulation of a Semantic Rule for e*
As has been noted, the adverb rule(s) proposed by McConnell-Ginet are close in  
spirit to e*, since adjuncts are treated as arguments to verbs. Semantic 
interpretation is furthermore established incrementally, in tandem with the 
introduction of the adverb. In order to retain the basics of McConell-Ginet’s 
proposal, I use the incremental rule e* Partial Resolution in this section and 
show how it can be used to state a semantic rule for underspecified verbs. The 
rule e* Partial Resolution is repeated below as (34):
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(34) e* Partial Resolution
(n*... Ty(e* -> X)}, (no.. .Tv(e) 0)
{nl* ... Ty(e* -> (e -> X)}, {n0.. .Ty(e) 0}
The Ad-Verb rule by McConell-Ginet (1982: 169) is repeated here as (35):
(35) Ad-Verb Rule (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)
Let a  be a lexical verb belonging to category X where X * 
Y/AD-V and £ be an expression belonging to category AD-V.
Then expression aS; belongs to category X. A translation of a!= 
is defined if 3 a+, an admissible augmentation of a  relative to 
£ in categories X and X/AD-V. Then tr(a?=) = tr(a+)(tr(^)).
The first difference between the two rules is that the e* rule in (34) is defined 
for the combination of an expression of type Ty(e* ->  X) with an expression of 
type Ty(e). In contrast, the rule in (35) combines a lexical verb belonging to any 
category with an expression belonging to the category AD-V. The difference 
reflects the fact that e* models adjunction as structural underspecification of 
verbs, and consequently adjuncts as simple nominal expressions of Ty(e), 
while the rule in (35) does not express any underspecification. Rather, 
optionality is introduced in part by the recursive nature of the rule, where the 
expressions to which the rule applies are of 'standard' lexical types, and in part 
by assigning adjuncts to the lexical type AD-V. Thus, the categories in (35) have 
to be replaced by LDSNL types, expressing that e* combines with expressions of 
type Ty(e)78. Secondly, McConnell-Ginet’s rule assumes the complete parallel 
operation of syntactic and semantic rules, as implemented in Categorial 
Grammar ('bottom-top') derivations. Thus the two steps of adverbial 
modification, the creation and filling of an argument slot are both expressed in 
the rule. In contrast, e* models the incremental growth of a semantic tree, 
where the unfolding of tree structure is achieved by the structure building 
actions of lexical items and the rule prediction, while the actual combination of 
functors and arguments by Elimination and Completion only takes place when 
the tree is complete. Thus, the two steps in (35) need to be 'factored out' if the 
rule is to interact with the syntax of e*. A formulation incorporating these two 
changes is given in (36):
78 The translation of Ad-V as Ty(e) is further discussed in Section 3.3.1., below.
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(36) Semantic Interpretation of e*
Let a  be a lexical verb of Ty(e* ->  X) and ^ be an expression of 
Ty(e). Then a  can be partially resolved to Ty(e* ->  (e ->  X)). A 
translation of a!= is defined if 3a+, an adm issible 
augmentation of a  relative to 1= with types Ty(X) and Ty(e ->
X). Then tr(a^) = tr(a+)(tr(|)).
In (36), the typing reflects the e* approach. The semantic interpretation, on the 
other hand, is as given in McConnell-Ginet, in that the translation depends on 
there being an admissible augmentation of the verb. This can be more 
conveniently expressed by incorporating the semantic requirement into the 
transition rule for e*:
(37) e* Partial Resolution with Semantics
(n*... Fo(«), Ty(e* ->  X)}, U ... Fo(3), Ty(e) 0}
(nl*... Fo(a+), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  X)}, {n0... Fo(p), Ty(e) 0} 
where Fo(a+) is an admissible augmentation of Fo(a) relative to 
Fo(p)
Note that no reference needs to be made to the interpretation (translation) of 
the augmented verb since it is covered by the general semantic rule of 
function-application which is in LDSNL defined by the transition rule 
Elimination. This means that once the verb is augmented, its semantic 
interpretation is exactly like the interpretation of a normal predicate with 
respect to its argum ent. Since (37) makes reference to adm issible 
augmentations, this rule has to be part of the incremental semantics for e* 
developed here. It is in its original formulation repeated here (McConnell- 
Ginet 1982: 169):
(38) Admissible Augmentation (McConnell-Ginet 1982: 169)
Let a  be a verb in category X that translates into an n -order 
predicate denoting an n-ary relation R. Then a + is an 
admissible augmentation of a  in categories X and X/Y only if 
a + translates into an n/n+1-order predicate denoting R+ =
R U.§, where §  ^ R x Type Y. The augmented verb a + is 
admissible relative to £ GE Y only if S ^ R x Den(^) * 0 .
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Again, the categories have to be replaced by types:
(39) Admissible Augmentation for e* (first version)
Let a  be a verb of Ty(e* ->  X) that translates into an n -order 
predicate denoting an n-ary relation R. Then a + is an 
admissible augmentation of a  with Ty(X) AND TY(e ->  X) only 
if a + translates into an n/n+1-order predicate denoting R+ =
R U S, where § ^ R x Ty(e). The augmented verb a + is 
admissible relative to |  G Ty(e) only if § ^ R x Den(^) * 0 .
With this modification, the rule interacts with the transition rule for e*, so 
that the underspecification in e* is partially resolved by expressions of Ty(e) if 
the verb can be augmented with respect to that expression. With each step of 
application of the transition rule, i.e. with every new expression of Ty(e), the 
predicate is extended with an additional argument slot, which is filled with the 
expression of Ty(e) standardly under Completion. I give a sample derivation in 
the next subsection and, following that, discuss the implications of the 
adjustments made.
3.2. Sample Derivation
An example makes clear how the semantic rules work. Consider (40) and the 
derivation in (41):
(40) Sue was singing with Mary in the shower.
(41a) Tree for "Sue was singing
• (Tn(0), 7Ty(t)J 
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(sue’)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t) 0}
(Tn(01*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t)), Fo(sing’)}
At this stage, Sue has been assigned its proper place in the tree, and a node with 
the requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t) has been built. The DU of sing is still 
unattached, pending further input. The lexical actions from the entry for w ith  
result in a new argument node which is annotated with a prepositional feature 
and a requirement TODO Ty(e), which is fulfilled when Mary is introduced:
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(41b) Tree for "Sue was singing with Mary
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Ty(e), Fo(sue')} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(with_mary'), Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
{Tn(01*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))), Fo(sing')}
The tree in (41b) provides a suitable input to e* Partial Resolution, which now 
not only updates the underspecification of the location and the type value, but 
also records the semantic operation of augm enting the predicate. An 
instantiation of the rule in this situation is given below:
(42) e* Partial Resolution (instantiated as sing with Mary)
W  ... Fo(sing’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))l, Inin ... Fo(with mary'), Ty(e) 01 
loi*... Fo(sing,+), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))},
(oio Fo(with_mary’), Ty(e) 0}
where Fo(sing,+) is an admissible augmentation of Fo(sing’) relative 
to Fo(with_mary')
According to the rule, the predicate is updated with respect to location, type 
value, and formula value. The operation on the formula value follows from 
the semantic rule for e*, and can be expressed by lambda expressions. The step 
from Fo(sing') to Fo(sing,+) thus corresponds to the step from (43a) to (43b):
(43a) {Tn(01*), Ty(e* ->  (e -> t)), Fo(kx sing(x))}
(43b) {Tn(011*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), Fo(Xy Xx (sing(x) & sing+(y)(x)))}
As can be seen from (43), the e* semantic rule creates a new lambda term by
introducing a new argument slot. Both the original lambda expression and the 
derived lambda expression represent the meaning of the new verb. This 
follows from the definition of augmentation, which states that the meaning of 
the new verb is the union of the extensions of the augmented and the 
unaugmented verb. The final requirement is that the expression of Ty(e) 
which triggers the rule denotes something which can fill the new argument 
slot. From a model theoretic point of view, this means here that the model
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should contain a predicate Sing+(x)(y). It is in this sense that the semantics is 
extensional (only one model needs to be considered), which implies also that 
the semantics is completely static -  the semantic expression is evaluated 
directly against a given model. The implications of this interpretation, and the 
meaning of admissible, as used in admissible augmentation, are discussed 
below, so for the moment I assume that in this context, the augmentation is 
indeed admissible.
The following tree can thus be derived:
(41c) Tree for "Sue was singing with Mary
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(sue')} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), Fo(with_mary'), Ty(e) 0) • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
{Tn(011*), Ty(e* ->  (e -> (e ->  t))), Fo(sing,+)}
The introduction of the second adjunct, in the shower, develops the tree in a 
similar fashion, so that after the relevant actions the adjunct is integrated at a 
functor node. This situation then provides the input to another application of 
e* Partial Resolution to result in the following tree:
(41d) Tree for "Sue was singing with Mary in the shower
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(sue’)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), Fo(with_mary')/ Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Fo(in_the_shower')), • {Tn(Olll),
Ty(e) 0} ?Ty(e ->  (e -> (e ->  t)))}
{Tn(01H*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
Fo(Xz ky kx  (sing(x) & singly)(x) & sing++(z)(y)(x))J
This step is formally identical to the preceding one. The predicate has now 
been augmented twice so that the formula value includes three different 
predicates of three different arities. In the absense of further lexical input, 
Merge applies and the unfixed node can be incorporated into the tree. The
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application of Completion and Elimination then yields the following lambda 
expressions:
(41 e) Tree for "Sue was singing with Mary in the shower"
• {Tn(0), Ty(t), Fo(sing(sue') & sing+(with_mary')(sue') & 
sing++(in_the_sho w er’)(with_mary ’) (su e’)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(sue’)} • {Tn(01),
Ty(e ->  t),
Fo(Xx (sing(x) & sing+(with_mary)(x) & 
sing++(in_the_shower')(with_mary)(x))} 
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(with_mary'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)),
Fo(Xy Xx (sing(x) & sing+(y)(x) & 
sing++(in_the_shower')(y)(x)))}
/ \
• {Tn(OllO), Fo(in_the_shower’)), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Olll),
Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))),
Fo(Xz Xy Xx (sing(x) & 
sing+(y)(x) & sing+^zXyXx))}
This sample derivation shows how the rule for e* with semantics works, and 
that it results in an array of predicates with different arities, following the 
definition of augmentation. This treatm ent is incremental, in that the 
predicate is augm ented at every introduction of a Ty(e) expression, 
compositional, in that syntactic and semantic rules are defined in tandem, and 
extensional, in that the resulting expressions can be evaluated in a first order 
model by relating the ordered tuples denoted by the augmented verbs to the 
extensions of the relevant predicates. In the following section, I discuss some 
implications of the semantics for underspecified verbs developed here.
3.3. Discussion
As noted at the beginning of this section, I have assumed here that semantic 
interpretation can be assigned to natural language expressions directly, so that I 
could build on McConell-Ginet's work to develop a semantic rule for 
underspecified verbs. In this section, I discuss the rule developed in this 
section in the light of the LDSNL assumption that semantic interpretation is 
assigned to the propositional form derived, but not to the string directly. From 
this perspective, the notions of categorial range, entailment, and admissibility
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employed in the semantic rules for e* receive a different interpretation. 
However, it will also be shown that, rather than defining the semantics of e* in  
model-theoretic terms, the interpretation of underspecified verbs can be 
characterized more correctly as their contribution to the establishment of the 
proposition expressed, which is the topic of the following chapter.
3.3.1. Categorial Range
In the translation of McConnell-Ginet's Ad-Verb Rule into a semantic rule for 
e*, I have translated the original semantic type Ad-V as Ty(e), since I have 
assumed that PPs augmenting predicates are of Ty(e). The original type Ad-V 
does include PPs, in addition to adverbs, although McConnell-Ginet does not 
fully develop her original proposal to include PPs functioning as adjuncts. The 
type Ad-V fulfills a similar function to what I have analysed as the function of 
prepositions, in that it licenses an expression to be introduced into the verb 
phrase. However, I am here less concerned with the syntactic aspects of 
licensing, but rather with the semantic aspects of the analysis of verb 
modification discussed here. In particular, I am concerned with a possible 
objection to my translation of the Ad-V rule, namely that the semantic 
contribution of expressions of type Ad-V and Ty(e) expressions might differ, 
even though both expressions act as argument of verbs in the relevant cases 
discussed here. The semantic rule would thus not just increase the arity of the 
predicate, but also ensure that the augmentation is justified with respect to the 
categorial range of the expression with which the predicate is augmented, so 
that the translation of Ad-V to Ty(e) does not express adequately the 
contribution of the modifier. However, this objection is not justified, since the 
notion of categorial range in the case of verb modification is not precise, as I try 
to show in this section. The lack of precision is in fact part of a more general 
problem related to the semantic contribution of optional modifiers, which is 
also found in the analysis of Dowty (1979) discussed above.
The relevant point is that both McConnell-Ginet and Dowty assume that 
PPs, be it as functors or as arguments, can be analysed as specifying lexically in 
which ’thematic’ relation they stand to the expression they modify. The term 
thematic in this context is mine, and both authors handle this problem 
differently, but both imply that PPs and adverbs come with some information 
as to whether they relate to time, location, manner etc. For example, temporal 
adverbs for Dowty are members of a special category (TmAV), although no
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categories are proposed for other ways of modifying79. McConnell-Ginet 
assumes that expressions in the category Ad-V provide information about 
whether they refer to manner, or to ’addressee’, etc. Although this is not made 
precise, it is assumed in the ’two-step’ analysis of adverbial modification, 
where the additional argument slot is 'annotated' with an appropriate label, 
and a given verb-ad-verb expression is admissible if the modifier denotes a 
member of this particular type of modification. The absence of a more formal 
characterization of this information indicates to me the more general problem 
of incorporating into formal semantics what in syntax is often referred to as 
thematic roles. As already discussed in Chapter 2, I do not assume thematic 
roles here. Semantically, it seems doubtful to me whether it is possible to 
define the thematic contribution of adjuncts lexically, as seems to be tacitly 
assumed by Dowty and McConnell-Ginet. Rather, thematic information results 
from the meaning of the predicate, the preposition, and the object of the 
preposition, so that it seems plausible to view thematic information as 
something which can be inferred from the proposition expressed, rather than 
something which is lexically or syntactically ’primitive’ (cf. Ladusaw & Dowty 
1988). From this perspective, thematic information has no special status, but is 
part of the general phenomenon of inferential activity in utterance 
interpretation.
The argument presented in this section is thus that the type Ad-V cannot 
be lexically defined if it is to imply the contribution of thematic meaning, from 
which it follows that the translation of Ad-V as Ty(e) in the semantic rule for 
e*is justified. This in turn entails that augmentation of predicates is the 
semantic process by which optional Ty(e) expressions are introduced into the 
augmented verb as arguments, corresponding to the formalization of verbal 
underspecification with e*.
3.3.2. Entailments
The second point to be discussed with respect to the semantic rule for e* is the 
proliferation of predicates which results from the application of the rule. I 
have up to now assumed that McConnell-Ginet's motivation to encode in the 
semantics the fact that if John talks to Mary, he talks, is correct. This is formally 
expressed by having the extension of an augmented verb to be the set union of
79 The prominent place of temporal modification in Dowty (1979) I believe partly reflects the 
fact that tense, together with modality, are the best worked-out cases of possible world 
semantics, whereas there is no correspondingly developed possible world semantics of places, 
instruments, or 'accompaniment'.
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both the unaugm ented and the augm ented verb, together with the 
corresponding addition of lambda terms. However, as briefly hinted at in the 
discussion of Dowty's semantics, it is not clear how to model the combined 
effect of the lexical meaning of the verb, semantics, and pragmatics in these 
cases. From the perspective adopted in LDSNL, entailments like those encoded 
in the definition of admissible augmentation are not encoded in the semantics, 
but rather are analysed as inferences which can be derived from the eventual 
semantic representation, the propositional form. Given the overall Relevance 
theoretic perspective of utterance interpretation, the semantic rule as it stands 
would imply that all propositions which result from the application of the rule 
are in fact communicated and should contribute to the derivation of relevant 
inferential effects. Since this is very implausible, the inclusion of entailment 
relations into the semantic rule for e* is inappropriate.
Furthemore, even if it this theoretical objection is suspended, the 
analysis of entailments expressed in the definition of augmentation would still 
be problematic, for a more technical reason. According to the definition given, 
the inferences from (44a) to (44b), (44c) and (44d) are encoded in the semantics:
(44a) Sue was singing on her birthday with Mary in the shower.
(44b) Sue was singing on her birthday with Mary.
(44c) Sue was singing on her birthday.
(44d) Sue was singing.
However, the rule as it stands does not express the augmentation of the
unaugmented, initial predicate with the second and third adjunct, or the 
augmentation of the initially augmented predicate with the third adjunct80. 
This means that the following inferences are not encoded in the semantic 
representation of a sentence like (44a):
(45a) Sue was singing with Mary.
(45b) Sue was singing in the shower.
(45c) Sue was singing with Mary in the shower.
(45d) Sue was singing on her birthday in the shower.
On the assumption that the inferences in (45) are as valid as those in (44), there 
is no reason for not including them in the semantics. But it is not clear if the
80 It should be noted that in McConnell-Ginet's (1982) proposal Augmentation is not used 
recursively, so that this problem does not arise.
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rule could be modified to achieve this, since it would imply that already 
established augmentations have to be undone in order to recover the initial 
unaugmented verb. Even if such a rule could be formulated, it would 
complicate the interpretation process rather unduly. Thus, for both theoretical 
and technical reasons, it seems better to take the entailments out of the 
semantic rule for augmentation.
The modification of the definition of admissible augmentation to exclude 
entailments results in the version given below:
(46) Admissible Augmentation for e* (final version)
Let a  be a verb of Ty(e* ->  X) that translates into an n -order 
predicate denoting an n-ary relation R. Then a + is an 
admissible augmentation of a  with Ty(e ->  X) only if a + 
translates into an n+l-ary relation denoting S, where § ^
R x Ty(e). The augmented verb a + is admissible relative to 
£ E Ty(e) only if § £ R x Den(^) * 0 .
The changed rule defines the denotation of the augmented verb as the set 
resulting from the product of the original verb's denotation and the 
denotation of the adjunct. The e* semantic rule does not need to be changed 
since it now simply refers to the new rule of admissible augmentation. A 
corresponding derivation would proceed as the one presented above, but with 
only one lambda term for the formula value of the verb at each stage, which is 
increasingly 'enlarged'. The effect of the rule for the example discussed in the 
sample derivation above is that with the new version of augmentation, the 
formula value holding at Tn(0) after the application of Elimination would be 
(47a) rather than (47b):
(47a) Fo(sing++(in_the_shower’)(with_mary')(sue’))
(47b) Fo(sing(sue’) & sing+(with_mary’)(sue') &
sing+f(in_the_shower’)(with_mary’)(sue'))
With this version, the rule licenses the augmentation of a predicate of a given 
arity which results in an augmented predicate where the arity has been 
increased by one. This slimmed version of augmentation takes away some of 
the insights expressed in McConnell-Ginet's original rule. In effect, all that it 
says is that an optional argument is interpreted if an n-ary verb can be 
interpreted as an n+l-ary verb in a given model. In the next section, I turn to
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the question of the relevant models for this semantics, and the role of the 
denotation of optional Ty(e) expressions employed in the definition of 
admissible augmentation.
3.3.3. Admissibility
The last notion to be discussed in this section is the notion of admissibility. As 
discussed above, admissibility can not be defined by the categorial range of the 
optional Ty(e) expression, which are of the same type as arguments and do not 
contribute any thematic restriction. Admissibility is thus restricted only by the 
requirement that the augmented predicate can be asigned a denotation in a 
given model, that is, that a predicate with the appropriate arity is defined. So, 
for example, for the interpretation of the example sentence in the derivation 
above, a corresponding ternary predicate Sing<x, y, z> has to be defined in the 
model, otherwise the augm entation is not allowed, and no semantic 
interpretation can be assigned to the string. Given the semantics as defined 
here, the existence of an appropriate predicate in the model is tested at every 
application of augmentation, according to the assumption that syntactic 
operations are matched by corresponding semantic operations. However, the 
overall result would be the same if augmentation was defined as applying only 
after all input was scanned. The semantic rules for e* defined in this section 
then can be seen as the model-theoretic counterpart of the definition of e* 
proposed in the last chapter. Both syntactically and semantically, 
underspecified verbs derive predicates of varying arities. For a model-theoretic 
interpretation, this implies that predicates of varying arity have to be defined 
in the model against which the string is evaluated.
However, from the perspective of LDNSL, model theoretic interpretation 
is not assigned to the string directly. Rather, hearers build structured mental 
representations of content, corresponding to the proposition expressed by the 
utterance. During the process of structure building, hearers employ inferential 
abilities to derive the maximally relevant interpretation of the words 
provided. Thus the interpretation of underspecified verbs is achieved at the 
level of propositional form and is established with recourse to both the 
syntactic rules of the LDSNL model and freely available pragmatic processes 
contributing to the establishment of meaning in communication. Since, in this 
view, natural language is interpreted in conceptual structure, the question of 
denotations in a model is of secondary importance. In the following chapter, I 
thus turn to the question of how underspecified verbs contribute to the 
establishment of the proposition expressed.
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4. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter I have addressed the question of how the underspecified verbs 
of type e* can be semantically interpreted. This involved the discussion of 
proposals from the literature, and how these proposals relate to the perspective 
adopted in LDSNL. Three different approaches to the semantic analysis of verb 
modification have been discussed in detail; the proposal to treat verb modifiers 
as functors which take verb phrases as arguments as developed in Dowty 
(1979), the alternative analysis of McConell-Ginet (1982) where modifiers are 
treated as arguments of augmented verbs, and Minimal Recursion Semantics 
(Copestake et al. 1997) which provides underspecified semantic representations 
where predicate-argument structures can be semantically represented as scope 
dependencies. After discussing these analyses, I have developed a semantic 
analysis of underspecified verbs based on the analysis provided by McConnell- 
Ginet. The modified incremental transition rule e* Partial Resolution in 
conjunction with the appropriately adjusted definitions of semantic 
interpretation of e* and admissible augmentation provide a means to assign 
model theoretic interpretation to underspecified verbs. However, after 
discussing the analyis, the conclusion was drawn that the interpretation of 
underspedfied verbs can be better characterized as their contribution to the 
establishment of the proposition expressed. Pragmatic processes relevant for 
the interpretation of e* will accordingly be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Concep t s
1. Introduction
In the last chapter, I have explored several ways to formulate semantic rules 
for underspecified verbs. The formulation proposed provides a means to 
extend the arity of the predicate denoted by the verb, so that the introduction of 
a Ty(e) expression in the syntax is matched by the introduction of an argument 
slot in the semantics. Based on McConnell-Ginet (1982), I have proposed a rule 
where this process of argument adding is restricted by a notion of admissible 
augmentation. However, what does count as an admissible augmentation was 
left rather unspecified, especially since no ’thematic' information has been 
formally expressed. In effect, the rule relies on the assumption that predicates 
of varying arity are defined in a given model, which would for example have 
to include predicates like sing’(x), sing’(x, y), sing’(x, y, z), etc. The background 
here is that I have in Chapter 4 assumed that natural language expressions are 
mapped directly onto some model-theoretic interpretation. In this chapter, I 
drop this assumption, and discuss the Relevance Theoretic distinction between 
'logical form’ and 'propositional form' and how this distinction is interpreted 
in the LDSNL model (Section 2). Against this background, I introduce the 
notion of mental concept and the process of concept formation. The 
interpretation of e* can with the aid of these notions be analysed as an 
instruction to concept formation, which includes the enrichment of the 
predicate, and plays a role in context selection (Section 3). Section 4 concludes 
the theoretical part of the thesis and summarises the syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics of verbal underspecification.
2. Theoretical Background
The development of the arguments discussed in this dissertation so far reflects 
to some extent the major positions on knowledge of language found in the 
literature (cf. Kempson 1988a). Although e* is formulated within LDSNL, I 
have progressively focused on assumptions shared by alternative approaches -  
the formalization of e* as a syntactic rule was based mainly on syntactic 
evidence, within a restrictive model of tree building. Conceptually, this
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corresponds to Chomsky's position that the grammar of a language be specified 
by a set of psychologically plausible rules which generate ideally all and only 
the well-formed strings of a language81. Chapter 4 then introduced the further 
assumption that natural language expressions are systematically related to 
model-theoretic interpretation, an assumption not held by Chomsky, but 
characteristic of formal grammar approaches following Montague. The missing 
assum ption to distinguish LDSNL from both Generative and Formal 
Grammar is finally provided here, namely that knowledge of language, 
including syntactic and truth-conditional semantic aspects, is embedded in a 
representational theory of mind. This assumption links LDSNL to Fodorian 
(1981) cognitive philosophy and to the cognitive psychology developed in 
Relevance Theory (RT) (Sperber & Wilson 1986, 1995).
As has been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Relevance Theory 
assumes that interpretation of natural language sentences is established in 
conceptual structure. The interpretation of an utterance includes its associated 
propositional form, a mental repesentation, which is established with recourse 
to pragmatic, conceptual reasoning. As was pointed out earlier, pragmatic 
processes in utterance interpretation include reference assignm ent, 
disam biguation and conceptual enrichm ent. One reason for this 
representational assumption is the indexicality of a number of natural 
language expressions. Most prominently pronouns cannot be evaluated per se 
in a model, but their denotational content needs to be fixed by a value 
provided from the linguistic or non-linguistic context. Secondly, ambiguous 
lexical items are disambiguated in context. These two processes, reference 
assignment and disambiguation, are standardly assumed to be pragmatic in 
nature, yet to apply before a natural language string can be truth theoretically 
evaluated (cf. Carston 1988). In RT terms, the logical form, that is, the output of 
the grammar, needs to be pragmatically developed into a propositional form, 
which is the representation capable of truth theoretic evaluation (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986/1995).
But just reference assignment and disambiguation do not seem to be 
quite enough. Carston (1988) takes the English conjunction and  as an example 
and shows that pragmatic enrichment plays an equally necessary role in 
establishing the propositional form of an utterance. It is uncontentious that
81 Corresponds to some extent, that is. Psychologically plausible for Chomsky means that the 
grammar should reflect the fact that language is acquired, rather than learned, while for 
LDSNL psychologically plausible means that language is used by hearers to arrive at an 
interpretation. Furthermore, current Chomskian linguistics would not postulate 'rules’, but rather 
constraints. Yet, at the level of syntactic analysis Generative Grammar and LDSNL share a 
number of assumptions.
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and  on occasion means more than denoted by the corresponding logical 
connective. For example in (1) and  has a reading where the second action 
follows the first (and probably also a causal relation):
(1) She became an alcoholic and her husband left her.
The question for the temporal connotation of and  in (1) is whether this 
meaning is an implicature, that is, an inference from the literal, truth 
conditional meaning of and, which is independent of this inference, or 
whether the temporal meaning contributes to the truth conditions of (1). 
Carston (1988) argues that the latter is the case. Technically, the temporal 
meaning of and in (1) is an explicature, a case of pragmatic enrichment, which 
has to be derived in order to establish the propositional form of (1). That this is 
so can be seen from the interaction of explicatures with logical operators such 
as negation and disjunction (Carston 1988: 172/173):
(2) It is not the case that she became an alcoholic and her husband left
her, but rather that her husband left her and she became an 
alcoholic.
(3) Either she became an alcoholic and her husband left her or he left
her and she became an alcoholic; I'm not sure which.
If the temporal/ causal meaning ot and  was merely an implicature, then (2) 
should expess a contradiction (of the form (-i(P & Q) & (Q & P))), and (3) a 
tautology (of the form ((P & Q) v (Q & P))), which is intuitively not true. In 
contrast, the meaning of (2) and (3) can be adequately explained if it is assumed 
that the temporal /causal meanings of and  are explicatures which do contribute 
to the propositional form, since under this view it is those enriched 
propositional forms which can be meaningfully negated/disjoint in (2) and (3). 
Enrichment is thus, in addition to reference assignment and disambiguation, a 
pragmatic process which bridges the gap from logical form to propositional 
form.
Carston further argues that the proper theory to express this observation 
is Relevance Theory. Given that RT is a psychological theory, enrichment is a 
psychological process, in particular a non-demonstrative inferential process 
performed by the hearer and guided by the communicative principle of 
relevance82. This ensures that there is both a lower limit and an upper limit
82 See Chapter 1 for the discussion of these concepts.
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for the derivation of explicatures. The hearer is expected and entitled to derive 
as many explicatures as is justified given processing costs. In effect, the hearer 
infers enough to get a truth evaluable relevant propositional form and then 
stops.
Relevance Theory is intrinsically connected to the Fodorian concepts of 
mental representations and the language of thought (Fodor 1975, 1981). The 
linguistic module is taken as an input module which derives uninterpreted 
structures. These structures provide the input to the general reasoning faculty 
which ’translates’ logical forms into the language of thought. Cognitive effects, 
the result of processing an utterance, are computed in the language of thought. 
They include the establishment of new conclusions from interacting 
assumptions, the derivation of contradictions and the subsequent abandoning 
of previously held assumptions, and the confirmation of existing assumptions 
(Carston 1988: 168). The language of thought is thus inferential. Furthermore, 
given that truth conditions cannot be checked against a logical form, but only 
against an enriched propositional form, there is no direct relation between 
natural language and objects in the world. Rather, this relation holds between 
objects in the world and propositions, i.e. mental representations in the 
language of thought.
The LDSNL perspective on mental representations is conceptually very 
similar to the RT stance, but differs in detail. The difference concerns the 
notions of modularity and encapsulation. RT is, at least in principle83, 
committed to the Chomskian view of the language faculty as an encapsulated 
module (cf. Fodor 1981, Chomsky 1995). I take this here to mean 1) that the 
language faculty can be characterized as a computational system with rules and 
operations specific to language, not found elsewhere in the mind (in that 
sense, it is a proper module), and 2) that it can exclusively be so specified, that 
is, not only are there language specific rules, but also no other mental 
specifications (i.e. rules, operations, format of representations) have access to 
the language faculty -  the only interaction between the language faculty and 
other mental faculties obtains at (syntactically) designated interface levels (in 
that sense, it is encapsulated). In contrast, in LDSNL, the language faculty is not
83 I am hedging here since, despite the overall conception, there is little (no?) work in RT which 
models precisely the interaction between pragmatics and GB/MP LF configurations. In practice, i t 
seems to me that RT just runs off S-structure. Yet this is impossible given a sufficiently strong 
interpretation of encapsulation (such as I formulate in the next sentence) under which S-structure 
is a language faculty internal level of representation (or, in MP, not existent at all) and as such 
precisely not an interface level. Conversely, models of language where pragmatics or world- 
knowledge can interact with S-structure (or the respective corresponding level(s)) are not 
encapsulated in the relevant sense.
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encapsulated, i.e. 1) holds, while 2) does not hold. In particular, pragmatic 
reasoning -  non demonstrative inference -  applies during the process of tree 
construction (Kempson 1996). The output of the phonological parser is taken to 
build propositional forms directly, by an interaction of general reasoning and 
structure building rules. Although the language faculty can still be viewed as a 
Fodorian module (the rules are module specific), it cannot be characterized as 
encapsulated (there is no designated output, or interface level)84.
The view that structure building and pragmatic interpretation interact 
freely in utterance interpretation is motivated by the problem of anaphoric 
interpretation. A unified analysis of pronominal interpretation requires, 
according to the LDSNL position, both a representational conception of natural 
language, and the interaction of structure and pragmatics (Kempson 1996, 
Kempson et al. 1999)85. The problem is that the denotational content of 
pronominal expressions, in addition to their general context dependency, 
varies between different ’readings', i.e. apparently different discrete semantic 
requirements. Cases in point include bound-variable (4a) and E-type readings 
(4b), cross-sentential cross-reference (4c), and bridging cross-reference (4d) 
(examples from Kempson et al. 1999: 10):
(4a) Every girl worries that she might get pregnant.
(4b) Most girls passed with distinction. They had worked very hard.
(4c) Sue came in. She was pregnant.
(4d) The Smiths are very nice. He is a doctor.
84 Kay (1995) employs a different notion of module. Whereas I have characterized the 
difference between GB/MP and LDSNL as resulting from the notion of encapsulation, Kay 
invokes modularity per se. In his conception, GB/MP is modular, while Montague Grammar, 
Categorial Grammar, HPSG, and the model he describes in the article, Construction Grammar, 
are non-modular, because each grammatical element is associated not only with its formal 
properties, but also with the semantic and pragmatic information it 'encodes'. I think he is wrong 
on two counts here (even granting that one can apply the psychological notion of modularity to 
formal approaches like HPSG without further discussion); 1) syntactic information associated 
with English words or constructions seems to be domain specific information, irrespective of 
whatever else is encoded, hence the weaker notion of module (as opposed to encapsulated 
module) applies, 2) in Kay's conception, non-modularity results from the fact that information is 
encoded (as rules) which is regarded as 'pragmatic' (at least by Kay himself, presumably). But 
the interesting distinction here is of course not what one would think of as pragmatic, but, as is 
well-known from RT, the one between encoding and (non-demonstrative) inference. I think what 
Kay wants to argue is that conceptual and pragmatic operations interact freely with language 
specific information, that is, not, or not only, at a syntactic interface level. Again, to me, that is a 
non-encapsulation, but not a non-modular conception.
851 only give a brief summary of the argument here. For full discussion and more examples, cf. the 
references. Note also that pronominal construal is only the paradigm case, but that the same 
problem of context dependency extends to definite NPs and demonstratives.
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Furthermore, pronouns can be interpreted as discourse based anaphorical. This 
involves the establishment of a relevant context in which the pronoun can be 
uniquely identified. However, a purely semantic account of context selection 
(as in e.g. Situation Semantics, Barwise & Perry 1983) fails to identify the 
intended referent in a discourse situation with two boys and two dogs, and one 
of the boys holding one of the dogs too tightly (example from Kempson et al. 
1999:13):
(5) He's holding it too tightly.
The problem can be overcome once a level of syntactic representation is 
assumed, at which pronominal expressions are projected and interpreted with 
reference to pragmatic reasoning. This is perhaps even more clear with cases of 
indirect reference, as illustrated in the following example (from Kempson et al. 
1999:14):
(6) John had a heart attack right outside the hospital, and they refused 
to treat him without an insurance card.
There is no appropriate antecedent for the pronominal expression in the 
second clause. The interpretation of they rather involves the inferential steps 
that doctors work in hospitals, and that doctors treat heart attacks.
The conclusion from these and related data is that a purely semantic 
account of pronominal interpretation -  be it situations, dynamic binding 
(Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991, Chierchia 1995), or discourse representation 
(Kamp & Reyle 1993)86 -  fails to provide a unified characterization of 
anaphoric expressions. In addition, semantic accounts fail by the nature of the 
enterprise to address questions of syntactic restrictions on pronouns, such as 
resumptive pronouns and island constraints. The LDSNL solution to this 
problem is to postulate a representational level of structure building where 
interpretation is subject to considerations of relevance. I assume here that this 
conception is correct, and, furthermore, that it provides the most natural basis 
for understanding the interpretation of underspecified verbs, which crucially 
involves the pragmatic process of conceptual enrichment.
86 DRT, in contrast to the two other approaches, does postulate a level of discourse 
representation, and is thus dosest to LDSNL. However, in DRS this intermediate level is purely 
semantic and does not incorporate syntactic structure, which is assumed to be independent (the 
relation being established by translation rules).
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3. From Enrichment to Concepts
A central consequence of the Relevance conception of communication is that 
inferential reasoning plays a pervasive role in utterance interpretation, and 
that a code-model is insufficient for the explanation of natural language 
meaning. Correspondingly, pragmatic enrichment in the development of the 
proposition expresssed is the rule, rather than the exception in 
communication. Enrichment does not only apply to ’logical' words such as and  
in the example in the last section. Another example includes (Carston 1988: 
158):
(7) She gave him her key and he opened the door.
The utterance in (7) is to be understood such that whoever he is used the key 
she (whoever she is) gave him to open the door. To derive the proposition 
expressed for (7), the hearer has to fill in the pronouns with some suitable 
representations and enrich and  in the manner outlined above so as to get a 
stronger temporal reading. On the assumption that denials bear on what has 
been explicated (the propositional form), and not what has been implicated, (8) 
shows again that the temporal reading of and  is an explicature (Carston 1988: 
172):
(8a) No. He opened the door before she gave him the key.
(8b) No. He opened the door and then she gave him the key.
Now for the third process of enrichment, the hearer has to 'fill in' that it was 
the key she gave him that he used to open the door, to derive a propositional 
form like (9):
(9) [Ann] gave [Sean] [Ann's] key and[then] [Sean] opened the door
[with Anne's key]
The relevant bit here is the PP which is filled in as an explicature. That it is not 
just an implicature can be seen from the denials in (10):
(10a) No. He had his own key all the way through.
(10b) No. It wasn’t locked.
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What is being denied in (10) is not that Anne gave her key to Sean, but that 
Sean used that key to open the door -  (10a) says that he used his own key, (10b) 
says that he didn't use any key at all.
But is the representation in (9) the right way to think about these things? 
The difference between the and  case and the with the key case is that in the 
former, we enrich the meaning of the word and , whereas in (9) we enrich a 
formal ('logical') structure. Of course, if we wanted to encode the explicature 
communicated by (7), we would use a PP like the one filled in in (9). But are 
these two processes independent of each other? On the analogy with the 
enrichment of and, the target of the enrichment in (7) seems at least partly to 
be the meaning of open. In order to state that more clearly, we need the notion 
of concept.
3.1. Fodorian Concepts
Another notion of the Fodorian theory of mind is 'concept' (cf. especially 
Fodor 1998). It is this use of concept which is the intended meaning of saying 
that LDSNL formula values are, or address, concepts. For Fodor, concepts are 
atomic elements of the language of thought, which combine so that inferences 
can be stated (assuming that the operations of the language of thought are 
correctly characterized as inferences). Their main purpose within the Fodorian 
system is to develop an analysis of lexical meaning, which is, for Fodor, 
minimal. Words address concepts and concepts combine compositionally at 
the level of the language of thought. Fodor’s point is that there is no lexical 
semantics; that is, there is no meaningful level of analysis where it can be 
stated that kill 'means’ cause to die, or that bachelor 'means' unm arried  
m anS7. For Fodor, the meaning of kill is that it addresses the mental concept 
kill'. The inferences from (11) to (12) or (13) are inferences over propositions at 
the language of thought, not linguistic or conceptual inferences:
(11) John killed Bill.
(12) John caused Bill to be dead.
(13) Bill is dead.
The reason for not attributing any 'inferential roles' to lexical items, and 
therefore, according to Fodor, to concepts, is that it is impossible, so Fodor
87 Fodor's argument is thus directed against the lexical decomposition approach in Generative 
Semantics, but also against 'structural' linguistic analyses of lexical items as meaning components 
(cf. e.g. Lyons 1977).
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argues, to distinguish exactly which inferential properties are constitutive of 
word meaning and which are merely encyclopedic facts; or, in other words, 
which inferences are ’analytic’ (hence 'semantic') and which are 'synthetic' 
(hence 'world knowledge'). From this perspective, any attempt to sort out 
invariable or necessary parts of word meaning so as to put them into a lexical 
entry is futile. Furthermore, even if it were possible to find all relevant 
entailments for a given lexical item and define a word by them (e.g, again kill 
as really meaning something like 'cause to die', and nothing else), the 
consequence would be that there would only be a word kill, but no concept or 
other mental representation of kill’, which would make it impossible to think 
about killing. In order to avoid this consequence, all words for which 
entailments can be stated necessarily need to have an associated concept. Thus, 
the only meaning component of the lexical entry for kill is that it addresses the 
concept kill’88. In LDSNL, this is expressed as the formula value, while all 
other information found in lexical items, e.g. types, control, pointer 
movement is purely syntactic. However, in contrast to Fodor, LDSNL assumes 
with Relevance Theory a gap threatening to be a crevasse between linguistic 
form (words) and mental representation (concept). Fodor’s criticism of 
inferential roles is, from this perspective, valid for lexical items, but not for 
concepts. The broadly Fodorian view of concepts espoused by LDSNL, and the 
different conception of natural language content is discussed in the next 
section.
3.2. Relevance Theory Concepts
Recent work in Relevance Theory has addressed the idea of concepts, and the 
role concepts play in utterance interpretation (Carston 1996, Sperber & Wilson 
1997). Concepts can be thought of as storage points for information. Since 
concepts are entities at the language of thought, and since operations at the 
level of the language of thought are inferential, concepts have to interact with 
assumptions, that is, propositions (S&W 1997). Concepts thus aid in accessing 
'chunks of knowledge'. But are there only those chunks identified in the mind 
which we can access by a word? Sperber & Wilson (1997) argue that this cannot 
be correct. While lexical decomposition results in a situation where there are 
fewer concepts than words, Fodor argues that there is a concept for every 
(lexical) word. Sperber & Wilson take this line of thought further and propose
88 There is in addition psycho-linguistic evidence specifically against deriving k i l l  from 'cause 
to die' reported in Fodor (1973).
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that there are many more mental concepts than natural language words. The 
claim is trivially true, Sperber & Wilson argue, in the case of unstable and 
ineffable concepts -  there are far more perceptual stimuli which we can 
discriminate, and yet do not have a word for them. Similarly, there is a good 
possibility that we form individual idiosyncratic concepts, e.g. for a particular 
kind of pain which annoyingly recurs, without having a word for them. Yet in 
a more interesting sense the claim is also true for stable, effable concepts. In 
fact, according to Sperber & Wilson, it follows from the RT assumption that 
communication involves not only decoding but inference in the construction 
of meaning.
One of the examples discussed in Sperber & Wilson (1997: 116) is the use 
of tired in the following dialogue:
(14) Peter: Do you want to go to the cinema?
Mary: I’m tired.
Since Mary has committed an act of ostensive communication, and 
furthermore Peter is entitled to assume that her utterance has some bearing on 
his question, he is invited to use his inferential abilities to derive a relevant 
answer. He might go through the following steps of reasoning (1997: 116):
(15a) Mary is tired.
(15b) Mary's being tired is a sufficient reason for her not to want to go to
the cinema.
(15c) Mary doesn’t want to go to the cinema because she is tired.
Peter uses (15b) as an implicit premise to derive (15c) as an implicit conclusion. 
It appears that the explicit content in (15a) is complemented by (15b) and (15c) at 
the implicit level. However, as Sperber & Wilson (1997: 117) point out, that is 
not quite correct -  Peter cannot soundly infer (15b) and (15c) from the ’explicit’ 
content that Mary is tired, because the fact that Mary is tired is not in itself 
strong enough to warrant the inferential process. Rather, the process of 
implicit inference must be accompanied by a process of enrichment at the level 
of explicatures. In order to derive (15c) with (15b), Peter has to enrich the 
concept of Mary's tiredness, just being tired as such is not enough. Peter can 
assume that Mary wanted to convey that she is tired enough for not wanting to 
go the cinema. This is of course a much more specific concept than just being
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tired, but it the one which is needed to derive the relevant interpretation of 
Mary's answer. Sperber & Wilson describe the underlying reasoning process as 
one of parallel adjustment: "expectations of relevance warrant the derivation 
of specific implicatures, for which the explicit content must be adequately 
enriched" (1997: 117). In this sense, there are many more concepts than words, 
since in general, concepts result from a process of enrichment on a given 
occasion. Complementarily, given the pervasiveness of enrichment in 
utterance interpretation, the literal direct map from a word to a concept is a 
rather exotic event, a borderline case of the general process where concepts 
result from contextual fixing. The Relevance theory characterization of 
concepts thus differs from the Fodorian conception in that words are taken to 
be only loosely associated with concepts. The establishment of the actual 
concepts on which the interpretation of the utterance is built is subject to 
pragmatic reasoning. But after the process of enrichment, the concept does play 
a crucial part in inference, and can be described with reference to its inferential 
role. Thus, Fodor's arguments against inferential roles is correct for lexical 
items, which provide the hearer with an instruction to built a concept, but not 
for concepts as constituents of the language of thought. Mental concepts do 
have inferential roles, but they cannot be stated in the lexicon since words do 
not in general address concepts directly. As can be seen from the example 
discussed here, it is in fact exactly inferential roles which are essential for the 
process of constructing the occasion specific concept, say tired2i  from the word 
tired, since the process is driven by the derivation of implicatures, which are 
inferences. With this analysis of words and concepts in mind, I now return to 
the interpretation of underspecified verbs.
3.3. Concepts Addressed by Underspedfied Verbs
With the analysis of concepts discussed in the preceding section, the role of 
underspecified verbs in interpretation can be characterized more precisely. 
Consider again the case in (7) (repeated here):
(7) She gave him her key and he opened the door.
I assume that the context for (7) is rich enough that the pronominal 
expressions can be interpreted, in particular that the people talked about are 
Keith and Karen. The second clause in (7) then has a representation like (16) 
before completion:
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(16) Tree for "... he opened the door
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(keith’)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), Fo(the_door'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
{Tn(011*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), Fo(open')}
The tree in (16) is a semantic tree. More specifically, the tree is a representation 
of the process of how the hearer establishes the proposition expressed -  there 
is, as a matter of principle, no ’logical form’. So if ’with her key' is an 
explicature, that is, part of the proposition expressed, it should be assigned a 
place in the semantic tree89:
(17) Tree for "... he opened the door.
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(keith’)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(the_door’), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
• (Tn(OllO), Fo(with((karen')'s key’)), • {Tn(Olll),
Ty(e)} ?Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
{Tn(0111*), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), Fo(open’)}
Assuming a context where the hearer derives an interpretation of (7), 
consistent with the expectation of optimal relevance, which includes the 
implicatures 'keith didn't have a key for the door', and 'the door was locked’, 
the concept addressed by open has to be enriched in the manner indicated in
(17), namely as including the information that the opening involved the use of 
Karen’s key. Given that we know that concepts are enriched, and that we want 
to model a process of enrichment, what (17) shows is that the concept open’ is 
enriched to opening_(that_particular)_door’ with information from the 
concept addressed by the object, and further to opening_(that_particular)_ 
door_with_(that_particular)_key' by building the explicature into the complex 
concept. Too many concepts? Well, no, given that there are infinitely more 
concepts than words, and that concepts are the only entities we want to
89 The genitive here remains unanalysed.
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postulate at the language of thought, all these concepts play a role in the 
interpretation of (7). Upon hearing (7) the hearer is entitled to derive an 
occasion specific, possibly, in fact probably, complex concept strong enough to 
be used to derive sound inferences. If necessary for the derivation of 
implicatures, the final complex concept is established, and it is this complex 
concept which is being negated in (10).
But now that we know what a TP' does which is not there, namely to aid 
in concept formation, it is easy to reconstruct what a PP does which is in fact 
there: it is an instruction for concept formation90. The syntactic optionality of 
PPs (and NPs) behaving otherwise as arguments, which I have modelled as e*, 
the intuition that VP-modifiers behave semantically as modifying the verb, 
modelled as admissible augmentation, the 'unexpressed PP’ as explicature -  it 
all falls into place nicely once the analysis includes complex concepts to be 
constructed on the fly. The picture that emerges is that verbs provide an 
instruction for concept formation in the way all other formula values do. 
However, in addition to this general underspecification, verbs also explicitly 
encode that the particular concept to be constructed depends on any further 
information provided by the speaker91. Optional expressions of Ty(e) in the 
VP, i.e. those introduced via e*, function as constraints on the general 
instruction of concept formation. Given the syntax and semantics of e*, it 
follows that the constructed eventual concept which is built into the 
proposition expressed is indeed of varying arity, as outlined in the preceding 
chapter. On the further assumption that concepts are storage points for sets of 
assumptions, Ty(e) expressions can be seen as providing filters on context 
selection. They aid in constructing the relevant contextual assumptions 
associated with the eventual constructed concept.
In order to show in detail how this process works, I discuss in the 
following sections pertinent work in Relevance theory which discusses the
90 The reason for starting with 'unencoded' as opposed to encoded NP's/PP’s is that these cases 
are more extensively discussed in the RT literature than the pragmatics of the verb phrase. 
However, the argument from inferred to encoded enrichment I propose in this section seems sound 
tome.
9 1 1 don't want to daim that this encoding is exclusive to verbs. I am concentrating on verbs here 
since verbal underspedfication is the topic of this thesis. A natural extension of this work would 
be to consider other construction types. As just one example, a correspondingly underspedfied type 
for nouns, e.g. Ty(e* ->  cn), might fruitfully be employed for adjectival or genitive modification 
in the noun phrase, particularly given similar processes of enrichment as for example in 
'bridging' cases:
( i) I was trying to get out of the car but the door was locked
Enrichment in (i) is needed to construct the car's door from door in the second clause. In fact, the 
case of k e y  in the example discussed above is similar.
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process of concept formation more fully, so as to provide my final analysis of 
underspecified verbs in Section 4.
3.4. Processes of Concept Formation
The process of concept formation I have invoked in the preceding section is, as 
already indicated, based on work in Relevance theory. In the following two 
sections, I discuss in more detail the process of enrichment as it has been 
formulated in RT. Firstly, I present another example (from Wilson & Sperber 
1999) of how enrichment interacts with inferential effects, and secondly, I 
discuss (based on Carston 1996) how the process of enrichment can be 
characterized as interacting with encyclopedic information.
3.4.1. Concept Formation with eat
Wilson & Sperber (1999) discuss enrichment in the context of truthfulness, in 
particular with respect to the question of the role of the ’literal truth' of (the 
proposition expressed by) an utterance in communication. Wilson & Sperber 
argue that there is no need for notions like truthfulness or literal truth in 
communication (as for example expressed by Grice’s maxim of quality), but 
rather that whatever notions of truthfulness would be required can be better 
explained by the principle of relevance. Wilson & Sperber first point out that 
even for clear cases of violation of truthfulness in communication, as for 
example in metaphor or fiction, it is not entirely clear how the non-truthful 
meaning can be recovered from any postulated literal true meaning. 
Furthermore, literally false information is much more common than just 
these obvious cases. Notably loose talk cannot be analysed as any overt 
suspension or flouting of truthfulness, yet what is said in loose talk is literally 
false. The solution to this problem, according to Wilson & Sperber, is to 
substitute the problematic notions of literalness and truthfulness by the well- 
defined RT notions of explicature and relevance respectively. I am here in 
particular interested in literalness and explicature92, which relates to the points 
raised already above, since, according to Wilson & Sperber (1999), there is no
92 The argument concerning the point of truthfulness runs in broad outline as follows. Wilson & 
Sperber note Grice's statement that "false information is not an inferior kind of information; it is 
just not information? (1989:371). Since hearers have justified expectations of the relevance of an 
utterance, and since relevance is (can be) achieved by improvement of knowledge, hearers have 
justified expectations of relevant information, which is, by being information, true information. 
Hence the notion of truthfulness can (could) be defined by Relevance, which is the more (and 
only) basic notion. For full details, see Wilson & Sperber (1999: 32).
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significant level of literalness in utterance interpretation, because all 
interpretation involves a process of meaning construction. What is of 
particular interest is that two examples are discussed in detail. The first one 
involves the utterance "Holland is flat" in the given context of a planned 
cycling holiday. The utterance is false if flat is taken literally, but in the context 
the hearer can enrich the concept flat’ to mean something like ’good terrain for 
cycling since there are no steep hills’. This example, similar to the example 
involving and discussed above, involves the enriching of a concept addressed 
by a single word, albeit a lexical, rather than a ’logical’ word. It is the second 
example discussed in Wilson & Sperber (1999) which is even more interesting 
in the present context, since it involves a verb. The context of the example is a 
situation where Lisa visits her neighbours the Joneses who are just about to 
have supper. The following dialogue ensues (example from Wilson & Sperber 
1999:15):
(18) Alan Jones: Do you want to join us for supper?
Lisa: No, thanks. I've eaten.
Lisa’s answer "I’ve eaten" could here be analysed to mean literally something 
like ’Lisa has eaten something at some point in time within a time span 
ending at the time of utterance*. But clearly Lisa means something more 
specific than that, namely that she has eaten that evening, and that she has 
eaten something which might reasonably be regarded as being equivalent to 
supper. Wilson & Sperber (1999: 17) sketch how Alan might derive an 
interpretation of Lisa's utterance which achieves adequate contextual effects. 
The process is sketched as a table, with the interpretive hypotheses he builds 
given on the left, the basis for these hypotheses on the right, which I represent 
in the format given in Wilson & Sperber (1999: 17):
(19a) Lisa has said to Alan Decoding of Lisa’s utterance
"I have eaten"
(19b) Lisa's utterance is optimally Expectation raised by the
relevant to Alan recognition of Lisa's utterance
as a communicative act, and 
the acceptance of the 
presumption of relevance it 
automatically conveys
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(19c) Lisa's utterance achieves
relevance by explaining her 
immediately preceding 
refusal of Alan’s invitation 
to supper
(19d) Having eaten supper on a
given evening is a reason 
for refusing an invitation 
to have supper that evening
Expectation raised by (19b) and 
by the fact that such an 
explanation would be most 
relevant at this juncture
First assumption to come to 
Alan’s mind which, together 
with other appropriate 
premises, could satisfy 
expectation (19c). Accepted as 
an implicit premise of Lisa’s 
utterance
(19e)
(19f)
Lisa has eaten supper this 
evening
Lisa does not want to eat supper 
with us because she has eaten 
supper this evening
First enriched interpretation 
of Lisa’s utterance as decoded 
in (19a) to come to Alan's 
mind which, together with 
(19d), could lead to the 
satisfaction of (19c). Accepted 
as Lisa’s explicit meaning
Inferred from (19d) and (19e), 
satisfying (19c) and accepted as 
an implicit conclusion of 
Lisa's utterance
Sperber & Wilson point out that their representation of Alan's thought process 
in (19) is of course only an approximation -  his hypotheses are formulated in 
the language of thought, so that the English sentences in (19) are just rough 
paraphrases. Furthermore, the thought processes are not necessarily in the 
sequence given in (19), but rather, interpretation is carried out on-line, starting 
before the utterance is over, and "interpretive hypotheses about the explicit 
and implicit content are developed in parallel, and stabilise when they are 
mutually adjusted, and jointly adjusted with expectations of relevance" (1999: 
17). Given these assumptions, what (19) shows, then, is how by using 
interpretive hypotheses, Alan derives both the explicit meaning of Lisa’s 
utterance (in (19e)) and the implicit conclusion (19f). Further ’w eak’ 
implicatures can be derived from (19f) and further world knowledge, the 
example given by Wilson & Sperber being 'Lisa might accept an invitation to 
supper another time'. However, the purely encoded part of the utterance in 
(19a) is not in itself taken to be the meaning of the utterance at any stage in the 
interpretation process. One of the claims in Wilson & Sperber (1999) is that, 
given that pragm atic enrichm ent is always involved in utterance
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interpretation, there is no justification for postulating underlying hidden 
constituents in the encoded part of the utterance; the step from (19a) to (19f) is 
an inferential process which narrows down the time span encoded by the 
present perfect, and which provides 'supper' as the relevant 'object' of eating. 
Therefore, the encoded part of the utterance does not provide any restrictor 
variable for the temporal interpretation, nor an empty variable in object 
position. The process of enrichment runs purely on the concepts activated by 
the words in the string -  Alan is "using the concept of eating, which Lisa’s 
words have activated in his mind, and narrowing it down to the concept of 
eating supper, which helps him to construct a relevant-as-expected 
interpretation of Lisa’s utterance" (1999: 19). The same reasoning applies to 
other possible hidden constituents, as for example in (20) and (21) (Wilson & 
Sperber 1999:19):
(20) "I've often been to their parties, but I’ve never eaten 
anything" [there]
(21) "I must wash my hands: I’ve eaten" [using my hands (rather than, 
say, being spoon-fed)]
The 'locative' and 'instrum ent/m anner' interpretations indicated in the 
square brackets are pragmatically derived. There is no m otivation for 
postulating an underlying thematic slot.
The example discussed here shows more clearly than the enrichment of 
and' or flat', that the enrichment of concepts in context interacts with verbal 
subcategorization, since in the case of eat, similar to the example with open, 
the enrichment involves the postulation of an optional NP. Syntactically and 
semantically, eat in this example can presumably be treated as intransitive, 
even if this means that the denotation of the verb is not truth-theoretically 
interpretable by decoding only93. Taken literally, eat' in this example would 
then be undefined, but the force of Wilson & Sperber’s argument is that 
literalness cannot be properly defined in the first place: "However, we have 
argued that a notion of literalness has no role to play in a theory of language 
use. All utterances involve a process of meaning construction" (Wilson & 
Sperber 1999: 29). In this example, the enrichment is conceptually mandatory 
in order for the hearer to arrive at the proposition expressed, it involves the 
enrichm ent of the concept eat' to eating_supper’, or in fact to 
eating_supper_this_evening'.
93 On the assumption that there is only the binary predicate eat' in the model.
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Given the interpretation of e* so far, the analysis of this example from 
the perspective adopted here differs slightly from the analysis given by Wilson 
& Sperber. While I agree with the view that the enrichment is pragmatic and, 
in this particular example, mandatory, LDSNL assumptions about syntax and 
semantic representations lead to a different analysis of the structural 
representations involved in the enrichment process. For me, the particular 
enrichment of eating discussed here is an e* case, where enrichment interacts 
directly with the logical tree derived from the words in the utterance. Recall 
again that LDSNL trees represent vehicles for interpretation, which are subject 
to pragmatic processes in general, and might encode the need for, or the 
possibility of further enrichment. Since underspecified verbs do indeed 
explicitly encode the possibility of further enrichment, and since the final 
concept derived in the proposition expressed in this example is the ternary 
predicate eat27', the enriched constituents are part of the process of eliminating 
the inherent underspecification, as would be corresponding overt NPs94. Thus, 
with e*, the semantic tree derived for Lisa's uttering Tve eaten' corresponds to 
the enriched representation in (19e):
(22) Tree for "I've eaten"
• (Tn(0), Fo(((eat(this_evening))(supper))(lisa)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(lisa), • {Tn(01), Fo((eat(this_evening))(supper)),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(supper), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), Fo(eat(this_evening)),
Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), Fo(this_evening), • {Tn(Olll), Fo(eat),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The bold face font for formula values in (22) is meant to indicate that these are 
properly enriched and constructed concepts, rather than instructions for 
concept formation. It should be borne in mind that these are occasion specific 
concepts, so that Fo(eat) does not mean the  concept of eating, but rather this 
particular concept of eating which I have earlier labelled eat27'. The tree in (22) 
reflects the two observations that hearers build semantic trees directly, without 
S-structure or LF (a basic LDSNL assumption), and that the the tree in (22) is
94 The only difference between overtly expressed and inferred Ty(e) expression being the degree 
of responsibility taken respectively by speaker and hearer (cf. Carston 1996), further discussed 
below.
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the first enriched interpretation of Lisa’s utterance and thus her explicit 
meaning, as argued by Wilson & Sperber. It also naturally models Wilson & 
Sperber's argum ent that literal meaning has no place in utterance 
interpretation, since all structures prior to the tree in (22) are explicitly 
incomplete structures (by virtue of e*) and thus there is no way to model literal 
meaning, which is as it should be. Notice that any differences between the 
view proposed here and Wilson & Sperber's view is not about pragmatics or 
enrichment, but about the nature of syntax, since here the link between 
structure building and pragmatically determined interpretation is made 
explicit, while the relation is less explicit in Relevance Theory. However, I 
agree with Sperber & Wilson that there is no need for hidden constituents in  
the syntax, such as, for example, the thematic slots mentioned with respect to 
examples (20) and (21) above. It is precisely because I model verbal 
subcategorization as both underspecified and available for pragm atic 
enrichment that any ('hidden') thematic requirements from the verb are 
unnecessary. Further information such as regarding objects, means, location or 
accompanyment can and will be expressed if and when necessary, that is, when 
licensed by relevant inferential effects in the process of enrichment. Since this 
process is context dependent, it can not be stated as a context-independent 
requirem ent of subcategorization defined as a particular fixed type 
specification. Analogously, overtly encoded Ty(e) expressions are aids to the 
hearer in constructing the requisite concept, and they are interpreted according 
to the communicative principle of relevance such that the proposition 
expressed and inferential effects achieve optimal relevance. Implications of 
this view will be summarized in Section 4, but notice that this characterization 
gives us what was missing from Chapter 4, namely a general characterization 
of the interpretation of predicates with varying arity, since, under the 
assumption that truth-conditional content is not assigned to natural language 
strings directly, but rather to the mental representation of the proposition 
expressed, 'verb modification’ of Chapter 4, that is, concept construction in this 
chapter, is, as a case of enrichment, subject to the principle of relevance.
In this section, I have discussed an example of pragmatic enrichment 
discussed in Wilson & Sperber (1999). I have shown that their argument 
against the role of literalness in utterance interpretation can naturally be 
expressed by e* under the LDSNL assumption that words are projected on 
semantic trees directly. The relevant level of representation in utterance 
interpretation is the level of propositional form. This representation is derived 
by hearers by taking both information from words and inferentially derived 
information together to built a semantic tree corresponding to this proposition.
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During the process of building semantic trees, underspecification is resolved, 
and in the case of underspecified verbs, concepts are formed which do have 
specific inferential roles and a fixed arity. The process of enrichment discussed 
illustrates the role of Ty(e) expressions in concept formation and thus provides 
a natural explanation for the interpretation of e* also in cases where Ty(e) 
expressions are in fact encoded.
Before finally summarizing these results, I discuss more closely possible 
processes of enrichment with particular reference to Carston (19%).
3.4.2. Concept Formation and Encyclopedic Information
Carston (1996) discusses the relationship between two processes of contextual 
concept formation, enrichment and loosening. Enrichment cases include the 
example discussed in the preceding section, where the lexically encoded 
meaning of eating is enriched to eating supper. Enrichment is characterized by 
the fact that the enriched concept entails the lexical concept: the set of attributes 
of the enriched concept is a subset of the attributes of the lexical concept95. 
With loosening, on the other hand, the relation between the constructed 
concept and the lexical concept is not as clear. In some cases, the loosening is 
the opposite of enrichment, in that the attributes of the lexical concept 
constitute a subset of those of the constructed concept. An example for this is 
bald' in (23):
(23) I love bald men.
Assuming that the lexical concept bald' refers to total hairlessness, the 
constructed concept includes all men in such condition, but also men with 
(sufficiently) little hair. In other cases, however, the constructed concept may 
exclude some attributes of the lexical concept. In the case of flat' in Holland is 
flat, mentioned above, the lexical meaning of flat is not fully included in the 
new concept. Another example is the case of metaphoric use in (24) (Carston 
1996:73):
(24) Bill is a bulldozer.
95 Carston (1996) formulates these relations as relations between extensions, so that the subset 
relation may hold between individuals in the extension of the predicate. I use attributes here as 
a more neutral term without implying a particular semantic analysis of the meaning of concepts.
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The constructed metaphorical concept bulldozer’ in (24) includes among 
others, and in contrast to the lexical concept, the attribute human', so that not 
all attributes of the loosened concept are also attributes of the lexical concept, 
i.e. there is no subset relation as with the enrichment cases.
Carston (1996) argues that despite this difference, both enrichment and 
loosening can contribute to the proposition expressed, that both processes are 
potentially necessary to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker’s intended 
meaning.
With enrichment, as said above, the constructed concept comprises a 
subset of the attributes of the lexical concept. One of the examples discussed by 
Carston is the concept bachelor' constructed from the utterance in (25) in a 
context where the speaker has made it clear that she wants to settle down and 
have children (1996: 63):
(25) I want to meet some bachelors.
The ad-hoc concept constructed in (25) would include young, beautiful, eligible, 
unmarried men, but not, for example, the pope. So, everything which qualifies 
as a constructed bachelor' is also a lexical bachelor', but not vice versa. In this 
sense optional modification of verbs is a case of enrichment96, so I concentrate 
on enrichment cases, rather than loosening cases here.
Taking both loosening and enrichment to be potentially relevant for 
establishing the proposition expressed offers new perspectives on how these 
processes can be characterized. One important question in this context is 
whether enrichment necessarily involves the construction of an ad-hoc 
concept in the sense of an operation on the attributes of the lexical concept. On 
the analogy of metaphor, a case of loosening, the answer is no. Carston 
discusses the ('standard') Relevance theory account of the metonymic and 
metaphoric predications in (26):
(26a) Maria is a divine voice.
(26b) Maria is a nightingale.
In these cases, it is not necessary to construct a new ad-hoc concept: "the 
properties whose predication of Maria the speaker endorses can be accessed 
directly from stored information concerning divine voices and nightingales
96 Cf. the discussion of the semantics of e* in the last chapter, in particular McConnell-Ginet’s 
intuition that an augmented verb retains the extension of the unmodified verb.
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[...]. An array of implicatures is thereby constructed and a fully propositional 
form at the explicit level need never be entertained" (Carston 1996: 83). On the 
analogy of loosening and enrichment, there is the possibility that some 
enrichment cases could be analysed in a similar fashion. For example "an 
utterance of 'John's a bachelor’ in the context of a discussion of Mary's desire 
to get married could implicate that John is heterosexual, youngish, eligible for 
marriage, etc, without the setting up of a new address /label for the narrowed 
ad hoc concept bachelor'" (1996: 83). This is because bachelor has a rich 
encyclopedic entry including a number of assumptions which cluster together 
to delimit a stereotype. This would lead to the possibility that only some cases 
of enrichment need to be built into the propositional form, while others, like 
the bachelor case, do not have to be built in, since "the intended interpretation 
can be derived without them (by an encyclopedic sorting process)" (Carston 
1996: 84). However, invoking encyclopedic entries does not necessarily imply 
that no concept is being built. By assuming that explicatures, like implicatures, 
can be communicated more or less strongly, the building of ad hoc concepts 
becomes part of the hearer's responsibilty:
"Just exactly what concept is the hearer of [... ] 'Bill is a bulldozer’ 
expected to construct out of the lexical concept bulldozer? The 
construction process is constrained by the information stored in the 
individual hearer’s encyclopedic entry for bulldozer and by his bid 
for an interpretation consistent with optimal relevance. But this 
leaves a degree of leeway so that the ad hoc concept actually 
constructed is to that degree the hearer's responsibilty. ... 
Explicatures are communicated with varying degrees of strength; a 
conceptual range is endorsed by the speaker without any specific 
concept in that range being given full endorsement. ..." (1996: 87).
The process here sketches concept formation as an interplay between 
encyclopedic information and expectations of relevance. The choice of 
encyclopedic information is occasion specific and hearer dependent, and thus 
falls within the range of meaning construction discussed in the preceding 
section. Before discussing Carston’s position with respect to the argument 
developed here, it should be noted that she includes cases of verb meaning in 
the range of enrichment processes. Although not discussed in detail, the 
following example is found (Carston 1996: 63):
(27) Mary cut the cake.
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The enrichment here is of the concept addressed by cut: "In the case of [(27)], it 
is not any old severing of the fibres of the cake that would be communicated in 
most contexts but rather a particular mode of cutting; comparison with 
different objects of cutting makes this apparent, for instance grass, hair, cloth, 
flesh , etc." (1996: 63). That is, the meaning of cut is subject to the same 
principles of meaning construal as is the meaning of bachelor97.
The main point of interest in the preceding discussion is that Carston 
postulates a clear link between enrichment and encyclopedic sorting. If 
enrichment is viewed purely as a process of narrowing down denotations, the 
extensional semantics for e* provided in the last chapter would probably be all 
that is needed. The inclusion of encyclopedic entries, however, opens the 
possibility of operating with richer meaning representations. It is this latter 
option which I pursue here, leaving extensional denotations, with reference to 
the preceding chapter, out of the picture in this chapter.
Intuitively, the argument I explore here is that, for example, cut provides 
the hearer with an instruction to access a number of assumptions stored under 
the encyclopedic entry cut’ (where cut' is an expression of the language of 
thought), as in (28):
(28a) "Mary cut
At this stage, very little can be constructed, but certain assumptions are 
'activated', may be 'Mary spent some time cutting’, 'Mary was awake and 
probably reasonably concentrated’, 'Mary used an instrum ent suitable for 
cutting’, 'Mary was in danger’. All of these assumptions are more or less 
tentative, although the context (i.e. the expectation to derive contextual effects) 
even here favours some assumptions over others, say knowing that Mary is a 
two year old child, rather than a grown-up neighbour. Furthermore, 
assumptions activated by a concept are more or less relevant for determining 
truth conditions, which is good since it is not obvious that (28a) has truth 
conditions98. In any case, what I want to avoid here is any detachment between 
analytic and synthetic truth, since by making concepts a set of world knowledge 
assumptions, the set should be construed rather liberally. The next piece of 
information, the concept addressed by the cake, does in principle the same
97 Similarly, Wilson & Sperber (1998: 109) mention examples with open, contrasting open the 
b o ttle  with open the washing machine and comment: "It seems reasonable to conclude that a word 
like 'open’ is often used to convey a concept that is encoded neither by the words itself nor by the 
verb phrase 'open X"'.
98 Depending of course on the predicates in the model.
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thing: it provides access to a number of assumptions, things (we think) we 
know about cakes, possibly 'cakes are sweet', ’cakes are expensive’, ’I don’t like 
cake’, ’cakes cause tooth ache’:
(28b) "Mary cut the cake"
However, the activated assumptions from Mary cut serve as context for the 
assumptions addressed by the cake, so they are here selected according to the 
principle of relevance with reference to contextual effects derivable from 
combining them. In a given context, the enrichment of cake’ may favour the 
assumptions that Mary cut a real cake, rather than a blow-up toy one, or that it 
was ready to serve, rather than deep-frozen. However, the concept addressed
has also an effect on the concept addressed by the verb. That is here, it provides
further information about which assumptions activated by cut are being 
communicated. Of the ones listed above, ’Mary was in danger’ is probably out, 
while ’Mary was reasonably concentrated’ might be maintained. Furthermore, 
Mary probably used a knife (in particular a knife suitable for cutting cake with) 
rather than a lawnmower. Of course, without any particular context, this 
assumption is rather w eak", but on the assumption that it is potentially 
communicated, it should be part of the activated assumptions. In particular, I 
propose that this assumption is part of the assumptions addressed by the 
constructed concept cut, that is, it is part of the enrichment process of cut. In 
this way, the difference between (29a) and (29b) can be characterized as a 
difference in ’speaker commitment’:
(29a) Mary cut the cake.
(29b) Mary cut the cake with a knife.
In both cases, the enriched concept of cut includes an assumption that Mary 
used a knife suitable to cut cakes with100. However, in (29b), this assumption is 
explicitly communicated so that the hearer is completely justified in taking this 
assumption to be both meant by the speaker, and to be relevant, while in (29a), 
the responsibility of the hearer is much greater; there is no guarantee that the 
assumption is relevant (and in most contexts it is probably not), nor a
99 In particular, it is doubtful whether it is an explicature, but recall Carston’s distinction 
between strong and .weak explicatures, and her observation that cut* is enriched in the presence of 
a particular object. This particular enrichment seems plausible to me, cf. the corresponding cases 
lawnmower, scissors/dippers, long sdssors, sharp knife/scalpel for the objects grass, h a ir , c lo th , 
f le s h .
100 Which also involves an enrichment of knife' in (24b).
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guarantee that it is meant. However, the speaker can assume that the 
assumption is arrived at (if it is arrived at at all) by 'default'. In other words, if 
it is not meant, it should be explicitly cancelled:
(30) Jamie: Where's the cake?
Fran: Mary has just cut it!
Jamie: Can I have a piece then, please?
Fran: No. She cut it with the lawnmower!
In (30), Jamie can safely assume that Mary cut the cake with a suitable knife, 
that the cake still exists, and that it is sliced nicely into pieces. However, all 
these inferential effects are cancelled after Fran’s second use of cut, this time 
differently enriched. Under the view proposed here, this results from the 
hearer’s responsibility in meaning construction and the speaker’s different 
means of communicating assumptions. Of course, Fran's just saying that Mary 
cut the cake is not optimally relevant; she should have forseen that Jamie will 
run into unjustified cognitive effort (involving a lot of belief revision). But the 
important and general point is that the lack of relevance results from the 
particular concept formation, not from, say, untruthfulness101.
There are, then, two aspects of the interpretation of underspecified verbs. 
While part of the interpretation process results in the building of a specific 
concept to be built into the proposition expressed, the second part plays a role 
in context selection. In particular, an underspecified verb accesses a set, or 
maybe a number of sets of ('encylopedic') assumptions stored in long-term 
memory, which may cluster together as prototypes, or ’defaults'. However, 
since the instruction to create 'verbal' concepts102 explicitly encodes the 
possibility that further modifying information might be provided, the access is 
'tentative', in that, abstracting away from other contextual information, no 
assum ption is actually m aintained as part of the interpretation. The 
introduction of Ty(e) expressions under e* then provides further assumptions, 
which act as a filter on the assumptions provided by the instruction from the 
verb. Since increasing Ty(e) expressions is always a process of enrichment103, 
the process of filtering can be viewed as monotonic, since with each step of
101 Which would amount to saying that one can't cut cakes with lawnmowers, but given that one 
can cut with lawnmowers in general (and grass in particular), this would mean that there are two 
words cut, one for cakes, one for grass, i.e. a rather unwarranted postulation of ambiguity.
102 That is, a particular species of predicate. Again, the restriction to verbs here is probably too 
narrow.
103 As assumed both in Relevance (e.g. Carston 1996: 62/63), and by McConell-Ginet (1982) as 
discussed in the preceding chapter.
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enrichment involving the introduction of Ty(e) expressions, a subset of 
assumptions is selected. The interpretation of underspecified verbs then 
involves both the enrichment of the concept addressed and its place in the 
proposition expressed, including the eventual concept's arity, and the selection 
of assumptions accessed during this process in interaction with other 
contextual information. Both processes are driven by Relevance considerations 
and involve non-demonstrative inference. However, the possibility of 
enrichment is explicitly encoded in the syntactic information provided by the 
verb.
4. Summary and Discussion
After discussing the syntax and semantics of e* in the preceding chapters, I 
have in this chapter discussed the role of relevance in utterance interpretation, 
and introduced the notions of concept and propositional form. The LDSNL 
position with respect to these notions is that hearers construct semantic, i.e. 
propositional representations directly, and that pragmatic processes may apply 
at any stage in the process of tree building. This includes the process of 
pragmatic enrichment, which plays a pervasive role in the establishment of 
the particular concepts used to built the propositional form, since lexical words 
merely project a requirement to construct concepts. From this perspective, the 
notion of a syntactic level with some notion of literal meaning defined over 
words as a representation of what is said plays no role in the process of 
utterance interpretation. Against this background, I have discussed cases of 
enrichment involving concepts addressed by verbs, and have argued that, to 
the extent that the enrichment is necessary to derive the proposition expressed, 
the process has to be modelled as contributing to the tree building process 
defined in LDSNL, since trees are taken to be representations of the 
propositional form. By analogy with enriched constituents of the propositional 
form, I have proposed that constituents in the verb phrase introduced by 
lexical items fulfill an identical role; they help to construct the concept 
addressed by the verb. The process of enrichment relevant for e* determines 
the role of the concept in the propositional form, and provides filters for 
context selection. In this final section, I discuss some implications and 
consequences of this analysis, before developing an analysis of applied verbs in 
Swahili based on this notion of concept formation.
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4.1. Sample Derivation
I begin the discussion by providing a sample derivation which now includes 
the full analysis of verbal underspecification developed here.
In a context where I am just coming home from the shops on a Saturday 
morning expecting my parents in law to come over for lunch later on, my wife 
informs me about the whereabouts of our seventeen year old son Trevor:
(31) Trevor is baking in the kitchen.
The relevant tree structure after the introduction of bake is as follows:
(32a) Tree for "Trevor is baking
• (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(trevor), • {Tn(01) ? Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)}
{Fo(X.x bake(x)')/ Ty(e* ->  (e ->  t))}
Since the identity of Trevor is salient, the formula value introduced by Trevor, 
Fo(trevor’) can be resolved immediately to Fo(trevor). The lexical specification 
of bake introduces the underspecified type specification and the instruction to 
construct a relevant concept. A set of assumptions is latently activated and 
tentative interpetive hypotheses can be built with respect to the constructed 
concept trevor. Note that I have not analysed bake here as lexically transitive, 
introducing an object node (with possibly a pronominal Fo(upro) value)104. Nor 
is it necessary in this example to enrich such a node. Given the context, the 
inferential effects I derive from (31) concern my need to use the kitchen for 
sorting the shopping and preparing lunch. But I also know that if Trevor is 
baking, it probably involves the use of some utensils and some foodstuff, 
resulting in a fair mess. From this I can start to worry whether I have enough 
time to clean the kitchen, whether I can find everything I need, whether I can 
even put my shopping bags somewhere. The question what it is that Trevor is 
baking, or intends to bake (note that the imperfect leaves the progression of the 
event open) is irrelevant in this context. However, the next Ty(e) expression is 
necessary to derive these inferential effects:
104 In view of the analysis presented here, the analysis of optional arguments as lexical 
ambiguity proposed in Chapter 3 is in need of motivation. A brief discussion of lexicalization 
patterns is offered in the following chapter, but a fully worked out analysis remains to be done.
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(32b) Tree for 'Trevor is baking in the kitchen
• (Tn(0) ? Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(trevor), • (Tn(Ol) ? Ty(e ->  t)}
Ty(e)} / \
♦ {Tn(OlO) • {Tn(Oll) ? 
Fo(in_the_kitchen), Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))} 
Ty(e)}
{Fo(X.yXx bake(y)(x)’), Ty(e* -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The introduction of the PP leads to the partial resolution of the underspecified 
type licensed by relevance105, namely by the fact that in order to achieve 
optimal relevance, the information from Fo(in_the_kitchen) has to be built 
into the proposition expressed. In the absence of further input, and in view of 
the fact that a concept for bake’ can be constructed which yields an optimally 
relevant interpretation for (31), I can take the completed tree in (32c) as the 
proposition expressed:
(32c) Tree for 'Trevor is baking in the kitchen"
• {Tn(0), Fo(bake(in_the_kitchen)(trevor)), Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(trevor), • (Tn(01), Fo(Xx bake(in_the_kitchen)(x)), 
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010) • (Tn(Oll),
Fo(in_the_kitchen), Fo(kykx bake(y)(x)),
Ty(e)} Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
The process of enrichment of Fo(bake') affects both the arity of the eventual 
concept and the particular assumptions taken to be communicated by the 
eventual concept bake, which in this case do not include the object of baking, 
but only those which are needed to derive the relevant contextual 
implications, including that the kitchen is dirty. As this derivation shows, in 
the interpretation of e*, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors conspire in 
the establishment of the proposition expressed.
105 This licensing might correspond to the notion of admissible augmentation discussed in the last 
chapter.
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4.2. Pragmatic Motivation
The motivation for the syntax and semantics of e*, as detailed in the relevant 
chapters, follows both from LDSNL assumptions and proposals in the 
literature. The interpretation of e* as an instruction for concept formation 
developed in this chapter makes use of the independently provided notions of 
propositional form, concepts, and enrichment developed in Relevance theory 
and LDSNL. In this section I offer a brief discussion of the relation between 
these notions as developed in Relevance theory and the way I have used them 
for e*.
With respect to overall perspective, the e* analysis is in clear accordance 
with Relevance theory. The analysis highlights both the role of the hearer in 
communication and the importance of her inferential abilities in deriving 
meaning from words. It makes use of the process of parallel adjustment of 
enrichment and inferential effects, and it characterizes enrichment as a process 
which affects both the propositional form and context selection. The main 
difference between what I take to be the standard Relevance position and the 
LDSNL perspective underlying my proposal is the relation between linguistic 
knowledge and pragmatic reasoning. For the analysis of e*, I have to assume 
that these different cognitive abilities are not clearly divided -  the process of 
tree building modelled by e* is directly related to inferential effects. However, I 
don't think that this perspective makes Relevance theory weaker; little, as far 
as I can see, really depends on LF, in the same way that little depends on the 
notion of what is said. Both notions might be important in special social 
circumstances, but neither of them has much to offer for the understanding of 
how hearers derive meaning from words. What is important are general 
structure building processes for natural language input, and principles for the 
resolution of inherent underspecification, constituting, as it were, virtual 
conceptual necessity. I think on the whole, there is good pragmatic motivation 
to think about verbal underspecification in the manner outlined here.
4.3. A Note on the Interpretation of e* and LINK
This section is concerned with the question of formalization, although this 
question is, albeit from a slightly different perspective, discussed more fully in 
the Chapter 7. Here I mainly point out that the interpretation of e* cannot be 
expressed more formally than I have expressed it here. That is, while there are 
comparatively simple formal statements regarding the syntax of e* (the 
definition of the type and the corresponding transition rules) and the 
corresponding lexical actions, the bulk of the explanation is left to the more
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psychological mode of explanation of Relevance theory. In particular the 
principle of relevance cannot be formally expressed in the absence of a clear 
formal definition of cognitive effort and contextual effects, and the calculation 
of the balance between the two. There is, however, one structural reflex of 
concept formation, namely the difference between e* and LINK mentioned in 
Chapter 3. This is the structural expression of which concept is being narrowed. 
Thus in the ambiguous case in (33), the hearer has to decide which concept is 
being enriched:
(33) Jane saw the toys from the bathroom
If the PP is introduced by e*, the concept addressed by see is narrowed, while 
the LINK operation provides further information for the identification of 
toys106. A similar observation holds for the iteration of identical 'thematic' 
information as in the following examples107:
(34a) Marx was bom in a little shed in Trier.
(34b) Marx was bom in Trier in Germany.
(34c) Marx was bom in Trier in Bonn.
(34d) Marx was bom in Trier in a little shed.
(34e) Marx was bom in Germany in Trier.
Both (34a) and (34b) are fine since the first PP aids in constructing bom (which I 
take to be an active verb here), while the second PP modifies the common 
noun of the first PP. (34c) is odd since the concept of bom constructed with the 
first PP cannot be easily narrowed by incorporating the second PP. Similarly, 
Trier cannot be easily modified by in Bonn. Both options fail since they clash 
with the world knowledge information that Trier and Bonn are different 
towns. (34d) and (34e) are interesting in that they seem to have an 
'afterthought' flavour. One possible analysis is that the LINK operation (at 
least here) requires a subset relation to hold between the modified and the 
modifier. Construing LINK as a 'reduced relative’ here would yield a 
representation where the unlikely 'Trier is in a little shed’ and the wrong 
(given world knowledge) 'Germany is in Trier' are construed. Rejecting this 
analysis, the hearer might then construe in a little shed and in Trier as e* cases. 
The problem with this is that the concept bom has already been construed as
106 Under the LINK analysis provided by Swinburne (1999).
107 Which are originally I believe from Rodger Kibble. (34b) (and (34e)) are true.
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having occured in a location, so that contextual assumptions are taken to 
include those which are warranted by being born in Trier or Germany 
respectively. The inclusion of further, more specific information would 
potentially lead to more inferential effects, so that the context selection at this 
stage involves an unnecessary step. If this line of reasoning is correct it would 
explain why (34d) and (34e) sound more odd than (34a) and (34b). However, I 
do not explore the interaction between LINK and e* any further.
4.5. Free Pragmatic Processes versus Encoding
The final question to be addressed here is possibly the most interesting one. It 
is the analysis and status of true, obligatory arguments. I have been concerned 
here with a general explanation of the interpretation of verbs and verb phrases, 
within which underspecification is a key ingredient. Under the view proposed 
here, all expressions of Ty(e) in the verb phrase receive the same 
interpretation, namely as contributing to concept formation. Optionally 
introduced expressions are licensed by the principle of relevance. Given that 
this is a completely general and free pragmatic process, fixed subcategorization 
requirement is from this perspective exceptional, rather than the rule. There 
are a number of factors in determining the ’obligatoriness’ for overt 
complements, including the saliency of the potential enrichment, as well as 
the actual predicate:
(35a) ?Everybody was asked to contribute to the departmental fund, so
John gave.
(35b) ?Everybody was asked to contribute £10 to the departmental fund,
so John gave.
(35c) *?They established a departmental fund and John gave.
(35d) They established a departmental fund and John contributed.
But a number of verbs seem to resist any form of enriched interpretation 
substituting the overt object(s):
(36a) *Mary walked to the window and closed.
(35a) *Jamie put.
(35b) *Fran set.
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Verbs like close, pu t and set have to be analysed as requiring two overtly 
expressed Ty(e) expressions. A technical statement to the effect that some Ty(e) 
expressions are obligatorily required to be overtly expressed can be formulated 
with recourse to the lexicon. I have here assumed that constituents of the 
language of thought have a type value such as, for example, Ty(e). However, 
given the partly syntactic nature of these types, and given that the surface 
syntax of natural language differs from the syntax of the language of thought -  
in particular the notion underspecification rests on this assumption -  this 
assum ption m ight turn  out to be too strong. In order to analyse 
subcategorization, type values might thus be taken as syntactic expressions of 
tree growth, while the corresponding language of thought types are like 
natural language types except for the fact that they cannot fulfill 
subcategorization requirements. Since this difference is, under the view 
proposed here merely a difference in overt encoding, the types can be 
distinguished by the fact that syntactic types are provided from the lexicon, 
whereas language of thought types are provided from general reasoning.
As pointed out above, the fact of subcategorization is surprising for this 
analysis. The solution sketched here is thus only a technical stipulation 
without much conceptual content. As for the reason for why there should be 
subcategorization, I offer two hypotheses. As a first hypothesis, one might 
think of verbs requiring objects as addressing concepts somehow 'weakly'. 
W ithout further information, no concept can be constructed out of the 
information from close alone, even with the aid of general reasoning. But this 
hypothesis sounds rather stipulatory to me. A second approach would be to 
think of strict subcategorization as some form of grammaticalization whereby a 
free pragmatic process becomes more structurally expressed in the grammar,
i.e. here the lexicon, so that the general instruction to construct a concept 
becomes an encoded instruction to construct a concept with recourse to at least 
one/two Ty(e) expressions. The point is taken up again in the next chapter, 
where some examples for such a lexicalization process are discussed, but a 
more comprehensive analysis remains to be formulated. Thus the conclusion 
is that while the process of concept formation is completely general, strict 
subcategorization has to be stated as a lexical requirement.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter concludes the theoretical part of this thesis, in which I have 
developed an analysis of verbal underspecification within LDSNL, building on 
the architecture provided by the framework and motivating the analysis by
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recourse to basic assumptions embraced in LDSNL about the nature of 
language and the process of utterance interpretation. The analysis shows that 
underspecification is not only found in the expression of long distance 
dependencies, but also in the expression of basic predicate-argument structure, 
at the heart of syntax. Predicate-argument structure is, according to the analysis 
proposed here, established only at the level of propositional form and involves 
general inference patterns in the construction of mental concepts guided by the 
principle of relevance. The analysis thus supports the view that natural 
language understanding can be characterized as an incremental structure 
building process which interacts with general reasoning throughout.
The following two chapters explore aspects of the analysis formulated 
here. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of applied verbs in Swahili based on the 
notion of concept formation, while Chapter 7 discusses possibilities of 
implementing aspects of the analysis from the perspective of computational 
linguistics.
Chapter 6
Applied Verbs in Swahili
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I have discussed how underspecified verbs contribute 
to the establishment of the proposition expressed in the process of utterance 
interpretation, and concluded that underspecified verbs encode lexically the 
possibility for conceptual enrichment. Underspecified verbs address a concept 
which accesses a set of assumptions. The introduction of optional Ty(e) 
expressions provides an aid in filtering the assumptions tentatively accessed 
and in strengthening the concept addressed by the verb. Concept formation is 
thus related to complementation in that the eventual arity of the particular 
constructed predicate is established, and that possibly additional Ty(e) 
expression are incorporated into the predicate. The construction of an occasion 
specific concept from a lexical concept may thus imply a change in valency, but 
it does not do so necessarily.
In this section, I review this analysis in the fight of new data. I develop an 
analysis of applied verbs in Swahili which shows that applied verbs provide an 
instruction to construct an occasion specific concept, in particular a concept that 
is stronger them that which could have been constructed from the related base 
verb. In other words, applied verbs instruct the hearer to derive additional 
contextual effects from the proposition expressed. The argument developed 
thus crucially involves the hypothesis developed so far, and results in the 
formulation of an alternative to analyses reported in the literature.
2. Applied Verbs in Swahli: Introduction
Applied verbs are a characteristic of most Bantu languages. They are part of a 
system of verbal extensions which includes causative, passive, and neutro- 
passive amongst others. Traditionally, the applicative has been analysed as 
extending the valency of the base verb so that a new object can be introduced. 
The effect can be seen in the examples from Swahili in (l)108:
108 All data in this chapter have been collected over a number of years in Hamburg, London, and 
Zanzibar. The following less familiar morphological tags are used: SCCL1 = subject concord class
204
Chapter 6: Applied Verbs in Swahili 205
(la) A-li-andik-a barua
SCCLl-PAST-write-FV letter 
'S/he wrote a letter’
(lb) A-li-mw-andik-i-a shangazi barua
SCCL1-PAST-OCCLl-write-APPL-FV aunt letter 
’S/he wrote a letter to the aunt'
As can be seen in (la), the verb andika, ’write', is used with one object in its 
transitive use, but appears with two objects in its applied form in (lb). The 
examples given in (1) illustrate the prototypical use of applied verbs, namely 
the introduction of a ’beneficiary’ object. Applied verbs can be formed from 
transitive verbs as in (1) as well as from intranstive verbs as in (2):
(2a) A-li-tembe-a
SCCLl-PAST-walk-F V 
’S/he had a walk’
(2b) A-li-m-tembel-e-a rafiki yake
SCCLl-PAST-OCCLl-walk-APPL-F V friend his 
'S/he was visiting her/his friend’
The intransitive verb tembea, 'walk, promenade, stroll’, when in its applied 
form can be used with a direct object to mean ’visit’.
The thematic functions of applied verbs include, next to beneficiary, 
instrument and place109:
(3) A-li-andik-i-a barua kalamu
SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter pen
'S/he wrote a letter with a pen’
(4) A-li-andik-i-a barua meza
SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter table
’S/he wrote a letter on the table'
However, although the examples in (3) and (4) involve applied verbs, I will 
argue below that there is a difference in the structure projected from (1) and (2)
on the one hand, and (3) and (4) on the other.
1; OCCL1 = object concord class 1; SITU = situational tense; APPL = applicative morpheme; FV = 
final vowel; the morphological analysis follows Schadberg (1992).
109 Speakers strongly prefer instrument applicatives to locative applicatives, part of the reason 
for which I try to explain in the analysis proposed here.
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Applied verbs are thus morphologically marked verbs which are related 
to corresponding base forms by a process which traditionally has been described 
as an increase in valency. The corresponding construction type is referred to as 
applicative construction, which equally has been characterized as involving a 
change in valency. A brief summary of previous analyses of applied verbs is 
given in the next section.
3. Previous Analyses
Analyses of Bantu applicative constructions have been proposed from several 
theoretical perspectives. The vast majority of these is concerned with 
benefactive applicatives and the analysis of cross-linguistic extraction patterns. 
Since I am here concentrating on one language, I discuss a variety of uses of the 
applied verb in Swahili, so that the emphasis is different than in most 
previous analyses. I thus discuss previous work only briefly.
Bresnan & Moshi (1993) and Alsina & Mchombo (1993) provide an 
analysis of applicative constructions, based on data from Chichewa and 
Kichaga, in the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar. Part of the analysis 
is concerned with establishing universal hierarchies of thematic roles, while 
the main point is to establish the correct linking relationships between 
elements of the LFG levels of representation function and argument structure 
(f-structure, a-structure). The analysis is lexical, since lexical operations change 
subcategorization information.
Within the GB/MP framework analyses have been proposed by inter alia 
Baker (1988), Marantz (1993), Nakamura (1997). The analyses share the idea that 
applicative constructions involve movement, in particular of the head of an 
additional constituent (i.e. an ’abstract’ preposition) to the head of the verb. 
Variations of this analysis include incorporation, adjunction, and feature 
checking. The data discussed are mostly from Chichewa, or from Kimenyi's 
(1980) work on Kinyarwanda. Although thematic roles are often employed in 
GB/MP analyses, Marantz (1993) proposes that deep structure (D-structure) is 
sensitive to richer semantic event structure, so that syntactic projections reflect 
how speakers construe particular situations.
Finally, Shibatani (1996) develops an analysis of cross-linguistic 
applicative constructions, including data from Chichewa (i.e. from Alsina & 
Mchombo 1993), which is formulated in Construction Grammar and is based 
on the idea that applicative constructions are formed by projecting transitive 
verbs on a prototypical ’give’ construction, which is a language particular 
lexical schema which encodes both semantic and syntactic information.
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Applied verbs can be formed in a given language according to how similar, in 
the relevant sense, the respective base verbs are to the ’give’ construction. 
Construction grammar is similar to LDSNL in that lexical instructions project 
rich syntactic structure, but LDSNL does not employ grammatical prototypes or 
schemata.
In summary, both syntactic and lexical analyses of applied verbs have 
been proposed from several perspectives. Despite differences in formalization 
and basic assumptions, almost all previous formal analyses of applied verbs in 
Bantu agree on the fact that applicative constructions imply an increase in 
valency vis-a-vis the base verb. In addition, the majority of analyses proposed 
are illustrated with data originally presented in the LFG or Relational 
Grammar literature110.
4. Preliminary Assumptions
As discussed above, previous analyses of the applied verbs in Bantu languages 
have concentrated largely on examples of the applied verb where a benefactive 
object is introduced. Furthermore, most analyses assume that the applied 
function expresses a change in valency, and try to capture the syntactic aspect of 
this. In this section I discuss and justify some assumptions I make about 
Swahili verbs, about the representation of the applicative morpheme, and 
about the status of lexicalized forms of applied verbs, which will be used in the 
analysis presented in the following section.
4.1. Swahili as e* Language
In this section I present evidence for assuming that the e* analysis developed 
in Chapter 3 holds for Swahili. This means that verbs encode lexically an 
underspecified type, and that optional Ty(e) expressions have to be licensed by 
a preposition or by a locative case marker, in addition to a few cases of 
adverbial nouns (e.g. jana, ’yesterday’, usiku  'at night’).
In general, optional Ty(e) expressions have to be licensed:
(5a) A-li-fik-a usiku pamoja na Sudi
SCCLl-PAST-arrive-FV night with and Sudi 
'S/he arrived with Sudi at night'
110 In addition, traditional grammar analyses are available for many Bantu languages. For 
Swahili, see e.g. Sacleux (1909), Ashton (1947).
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(5b) *Alifika usiku Sudi
(in the relevant reading; fine as 'Sudi arrived at night’)
(6a) A-li-andik-a barua kwa kalamu nyekundu
SCCLl-PAST-write-FV letter with pen red 
'S/he wrote a letter with a red pen’
(6b) *Aliandika barua kalamu nyekundu
(7a) A-li-nunu-a vitabu kwa bei rahisisi soko-ni
SCCLl-PAST-buy-FV books with price easy market-LOC
'S/he bought books cheaply at the market'
(7b) *Alinunua vitabu bei rahisisi soko
The example in (5a) shows the modification of the predicate with usiku, which 
is self-licensing111, and Sudi, which is licensed by the complex preposition 
pamoja na. In (6a) kalamu nyekundu is licensed by kwa, which also licenses bei 
rahisi in (7a). Soko in (7a) is licensed by the locative suffix - h i112. I thus assume 
that verbs in Swahili are underspecified, and that optional Ty(e) expressions 
need to be licensed.
A lexical entry for andika thus looks like:
(8) Lexical Entry for andik
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(andik'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e -> t))), 
make(<do>), put(Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The lexical entry specifies the actions of a transitive e* verb, as outlined in 
Chapter 3. The formula value gives Fo(andik'), rather than andika, since the 
final -a is part of the inflectional morphology113.
The corresponding tree structure after the actions specified in the lexical 
entry for andika have been performed is given below:
111 Nominal adverbials such as usiku might be analysed as modifying a time variable 
introduced with every propositional formula, and thus be LINKed.
112 All of the forms which license Ty(e) expressions are historically nominal; k w a  and, more 
transparently, pamoja show locative noun classe agreement. The suffix -n i is argued by Samsom & 
Schadeberg (1994) to result from a grammaticalization process with in i, ’liver’ as source.
1131 continue to use the citation form with - a suffix in the running text.
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(9) Tree for "Aliandik
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e -> t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), ?Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t)}
(Tn(01*), Fo(andik'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
As expected, the verb is unfixed, and the current node is Tn(010). Note that the 
formula value of the DU at Tn(00) is Fo(upro), indicating that the subject 
marker in Swahili is pronominal; no overt subject NP need to be encoded. 
However, if a postposed subject is scanned, the two formula values may be 
combined by Merge, so that a lexical subject will occupy the subject node114. 
The contribution of the final vowel -a relates to tense, mood and polarity, and I 
ignore it throughout. The scanning of a Ty(e) expression in this situation leads 
to the fulfillment of the requirement TODO Ty(e) holding at Tn(010) and, in 
the absence of further lexical input, the tree can be completed by applications of 
Merge, Completion and Elimination.
I assume that the assumptions made here are correct throughout this 
chapter. In the next section, I develop a possible analysis of applied verbs 
within the general outline given here, which follows the assumptions made in  
previous analyses of applied verbs. An alternative proposal is developed in the 
following section.
4.2. A Syntactic Analysis of the Applicative Morpheme
First I assume that the applicative morpheme has its own lexical entry, and 
that it functions to introduce a new node. Such a putative analysis of applied 
verbs implies that the applicative morpheme functions in a way similar to 
prepositions and locative morphemes, in that it licenses the introduction of an 
additional Ty(e) expression.
The following lexical entry for the applicative morpheme -IL- reflects this 
approach115:
114 See Bresnan & Mchombo (1986,1987) for an analysis of Bantu subject and object markers as 
pronouns.
115 The surface form of the applicative morpheme is subject to phonological processes, one of 
which is discussed in more detail below; in die abstract form -IL-, -I- indicates a vowel subject to 
vowel harmony, while -L- indicates an underlying consonant / l /  which surfaces when followed 
by a historically high vowel; cf. Schadeberg (1992).
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(10) Putative Lexical Entry for -IL-:
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN go(<uo>), make(<di>), put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))),
?<do>Ty(e)),
go(<ui>), go(<d0>)
ELSE put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
The entry distinguishes two cases; if the applicative morpheme follows a 
transitive verb, the condition will be TODO Ty(e), as shown in the tree above, 
and the actions in the THEN clause will be performed. If, on the other hand, 
-IL- follows an intransitive verb, the actions under the ELSE statement will be 
performed. Since the morpheme has a fixed position in the morphological 
verbal template, it always follows the verbal base, so that if there is no task 
TODO Ty(e), the applicative morpheme is preceded by an intransitive verb. 
Ditransitive verbs cannot take the applicative morpheme. Note that here is 
another advantage of underspecified verbs; without e*, intransitive verbs 
would fulfill the requirement TODO Ty(e ->  t) directly, so that the applicative 
morpheme could no longer build new argument nodes.
With this lexical definition of the applicative morpheme, the tree in (9) 
could be continued as (11):
(11) Tree for "Aliandiki...
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), ?Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t),
?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), 
?<do>Ty(e)}
(Tn(01*), Fo(andik'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The introduction of the two modal statements at Tn(Oll) results in the 
building of a new pair of nodes by Prediction after the requirement at the 
current node has been fulfilled; the predicate andika will then turn out to be 
(minimally) ternary. Whether or not the introduction of the second object is 
registered at th6 unfixed node depends on whether e* Partial Resolution is 
operative, but since this rule has been introduced mainly for the discussion in 
Chapter 4 ,1 assume here that e* is resolved by Merge. Note that I have not
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introduced any thematic information, nor any other requirement on the kind 
or order of Ty(e) expressions, for the reasons given earlier.
The lexical entry for -IL- defined in this section follows the analyses 
discussed in Section 3 in assuming that the applicative morpheme introduces a 
new Ty(e) expression, and that it encodes a syntactic operation. Although in 
the solution sketched here, there is a lexical entry for -IL-, the contribution of 
the morpheme is analysed as being purely syntactic. This follows from the fact 
that the building of tree structure in LDSNL is to a large extent lexically driven. 
The crucial point is that -IL- is analysed as a separate morpheme with its own 
particular lexical actions. In contrast, I will develop an analysis below where 
-IL- does not have its own lexical entry, but is found under the entry of the 
verb with which it is associated.
4.3. Phonological Evidence against a Lexical Entry for -Hr
The syntactic analysis of applied verbs sketched in the preceding section was 
based on the assumption that -IL- has a separate lexical entry. However, this 
assum ption is disconfirmed by phonological evidence regarding the 
domainhood of -IL-.
With respect to the overall perspective of the model of utterance 
interpretation outlined in Chapter 1, the assumption that the applicative 
morpheme has a separate lexical entry is doubtful. Recall that it was claimed 
that the role of phonology in utterance interpretation is to divide a continuous 
input stream into phonological domains to provide lexical access. For the 
analysis developed here so far, which has been illustrated mainly w ith 
examples from English, phonological evidence was not needed. In the case of 
applied verbs discussed here, however, phonological domains are important, 
since the phonological evidence indicates that -IL- is not a separate domain. 
The relevant evidence comes from vowel harmony; the quality of the vowel of 
the applicative morpheme is determined by the vowel in the verbal root:
(12a) ham-a ’move from' ham-i-a 'move to'
(12b) fik-a ’arrive’ fik-i-a 'reach, stay’
(12c) nuk-a ’stink’ nuk-i-a 'smell nice’
(12d) sem-a ’speak’ sem-e-a 'speak about'
(12e) omb-a 'beg' omb-e-a 'ask on behalf
As can be seen from the data in (12), the applicative morpheme surfaces as [i] 
after the stem vowels /a / ,  / i / ,a n d  /u / ,  while after /e /  and f o / ,  the applicative
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morpheme surfaces as [e]. The underlying phonological structure of applied 
verbs can be represented as follows:
(13) Schematic Representation of Swahili Applied Verbs
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i
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0
(A) ====> (I)
The first three skeletal positions (Xi to X3) correspond to the verbal root which 
consists of one nuclear (N) and two onset (O) constituents, corresponding to 
two consonants (C) with an intervening vowel. The applicative morpheme 
corresponds to the skeletal positions X4 and Xs, and is lexically associated with 
a phonological element (I) as nucleus, and an empty expression as onset. The 
vowel harmony can be analysed as the spreading of the element (A), if present, 
from the nucleus of the root to the nucleus of the suffix116. From the 
perspective of lexical access, the structure in (13) is evidence for assuming the 
following phonological domains for applied verbs:
(14) [[CVC]IL]
This is an instance of analytic morphology where both the verbal root [CVC] 
and the complex form as a whole, that is the applied verb, are phonological 
domains, but where crucially the suffix is not a separate phonological domain. 
The phonological evidence thus disconfirms the syntactic analysis sketched 
above; the applicative morpheme does not provide lexical access because it 
does not constitute a phonological domain. Rather, from the phonological 
evidence it follows that information from the applicative is accessed under the 
entry of the verb with which it is found.
4.4. Lexicalized Forms
In view of the apparently general and uniform syntactic function of the 
applicative morpheme, the view that it can only be accessed from the entry of 
the verb with which it combines seems to be surprising. However, given the
116 For a fuller discussion of Government Phonology analyses of Swahili vowel harmony and 
Bantu vowel harmony more generally, see Cobb (1997), Kula (1997), and Marten (1997).
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function of lexical rules in the LDSNL model, an analysis which incorporates 
the phonological evidence can be modelled, since, as pointed out previously, 
structure building is largely driven from the lexicon. In fact, an analysis could 
be developed in which schematic lexical entries for transitive and intransitive 
verbs are defined which include optionally one of the two clauses given in the 
entry for -IL-, above. While I think that this approach is basically correct, so that 
I will develop an analysis along these lines in what follows, the perspective 
that the applicative morpheme is lexically associated with its verb provides a 
good starting point to consider more data.
There are in Swahili, and in most Bantu languages, a num ber of 
lexicalized applied verbs. Although these data have been mentioned, they 
have not been included in analyses of applicative constructions in Bantu. In 
fact, Port (1981) argues that analyses of applicative constructions should not 
include lexical forms, since a generalization would be lost. I believe the 
opposite is true. For a full understanding of the function of applied verbs, 
lexicalized forms provide very good evidence, especially in view of the fact that 
a lexical analysis of applied verbs is supported by independent evidence.
Lexicalized applied verbs are verbs marked with an applicative 
morpheme, but which fail to introduce a Ty(e) expression. Two different 
groups can be distinguished.
There are a number of word pairs expressing movement or motion, 
where the apparent base verb and the applied verb are not distinguished with 
repsect to their valency:
(15a) kimbia ’run from' kimbilia ’run to'
(15b) geuka ’turn to’ geukia 'turn to'
(15c) hama  'move from' ha mi a 'move to'
(15d) nuka  'stink ' nukia  'smell sweet, nice'
The pairs in (15a) to (15c) are transitive, while the pair in (15d) is intransitive. 
The semantic relation appears to be one of opposition.
Another group of applied verbs has a lexicalized or idiomatic reading 
under which the difference in valency between base form and applied form 
disappears:
(16a) fika 'arrive' fik ia 'stay'
(16b) tembea 'walk' tembelea 'walk about, promenade’
(16c) to ka . 'come from’ tokea 'come from’
(16d) vua 'take off (clothes)' vulia 'take off clothes'
(16e) vaa 'wear (clothes)’ valia 'dress up (in clothes)'
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An illustration of the last example is given below:
(17a)
(17b)
(17c)
(17d)
The sentences in (17) show the difference between the non-idiomatic and the 
idiomatic readings of vaa, 'wear’. In (17a), the transitive base form is used with 
one object, kanzu, a piece of clothing, while in (17b), the applied form is used 
with the additional benefactive object m toto, 'child'. The sentence in (17c), 
with the applied form and only one object is unacceptable in the non-idiomatic 
reading. In contrast, in (17d) the applied form is acceptable under the idiomatic 
reading with only one object, nguo za rasmi, which here enforces the idiomatic 
reading.
The examples in this section show that some applied verbs can be 
regarded as fully or partly lexicalized, because they express a specific lexical or 
idiomatic meaning. In addition the examples considered here appear to be 
lexicalized because they do not increase the valency of the base form. This state 
of affairs seems again to favour a lexical over a syntactic analysis; while in a 
syntactic analysis, both a general rule and the blocking of the rule for particular 
lexical items in particular contexts have to be stated, in a lexical analysis all 
information relevant for the interpretation of applied verbs is found in the 
lexicon. In the next section, I develop a lexical entry for the verb vaa, seen in
(17).
4.5. Sample Lexical Entry for vaa
The lexical entry for vaa has to specify a rule for three different cases; the 
transitive use of the base form, the di-transitive use of the applied form, and
Juma a-li-va-a kanzu
Juma sccLl-PAST-wear-FV kanzu
'Juma was wearing a Kanzu'
Juma a-li-m-val-i-a m toto  kanzu
Juma SCCL1-PAST-OCCL1-wear-APPL-FV child kanzu
'Juma was dressing the child in a Kanzu’
?Juma a-li-val-i-a kanzu
Juma SCCLl-PAST-wear-APPL-FV kanzu
Int.: Juma was wearing a Kanzu
Juma a-li-val-i-a nguo za rasmi
Juma SCCLl-PAST-wear-APPL-FV clothes GEN official
'Juma was dressed up in official/formal clothes'
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the idiomatic transitive use of the applied form. A lexical entry for vaa can 
thus be defined as follows:
(18) Lexical entry for va
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(va’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), putfFofvali1'),
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)),
make(<di>), put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))), 
?<do>Ty(e)),
go(<ui>),
make(<do>) put(?Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(vali2'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The complex lexical entry in (14) licenses three different set of lexical actions. 
The first set comprises the actions needed for the transitive use, the second set 
is the process performed for the applied form in the non-idiomatic reading. 
Finally, the third set of actions expresses the idiomatic meaning of the applied 
form. The two formula values of Fo(vali) distinguish between the two 
different readings by means of a numerical superscript. Although the entry 
looks rather long, all three cases have to be covered, which is achieved by the 
entry. What this entry implies, and I think this is correct, is that three different 
tree continuations are developed in parallel, one for each set of actions. Recall 
that the phonological parsing results in two domains; one for the base verb and 
one for the applied verb, so that both forms are accessed lexically. However, at 
the time when the lexical entries are scanned, it is not clear which one will 
eventually be used. In a situation like this, it follows from basic LDSNL 
assumptions about incrementality as discussed in Chapter 3, that all possible 
continuations be represented. I discuss this point further below.
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4.6. Lexicalization of Relevance
As has been pointed out above, lexicalized applied verbs like the ones 
discussed here have not received much attention in the literature, on the 
grounds that these forms are not productive. But that argument does not quite 
go through. While it is correct that lexicalized forms are not productive, it still 
needs to be explained, at least in outline, what the underlying pattern of the 
lexicalization process is. Note that the lexicalized forms are not simple lexical 
forms, characterized by an arbitrary relation between sound and meaning. 
Rather, the term lexicalization implies that lexicalized applied verbs are frozen 
forms which took part in a productive process at some time in the past. This 
means that one can sensibly ask which productive process has been lexicalized. 
The problem for an analysis of applicative constructions as valency changing 
operation is that it predicts that applied verbs should be lexicalized with their 
appropriate increased valency. But this prediction is, at least on the face of it, 
not borne out by the data presented here. The problem for valency changing 
analyses of applied verbs is thus not that lexicalized applied verbs are not 
productive, but rather that it is not the postulated productive process which 
appears to have been lexicalized. Proponents of the valency changing analysis 
are thus forced to either ignore lexicalized applied verbs, or to assume that in  
the process of lexicalization the main characteristic of the productive process, 
the additional object, somehow disappeared.
Here I try to develop an alternative hypothesis, which builds on the 
notion of concept formation. In particular, I explore the idea that applied verbs 
encode an explicit instruction for concept formation. Under this hypothesis, 
applied verbs instruct the hearer to construct a concept which is sufficiently 
different from the concept that would be constructed from the base form in the 
given circumstances. This does not mean that two concepts are constructed and 
then compared. Rather, this is a process of strengthening the concept addressed 
by the base verb plus the instruction that more contextual implications have to 
be derived. Note that both the base form and the applied form are lexically 
accessed, so that the set of contextual assumptions addressed by the base from is 
tentatively entertained also when the applied form is scanned, which, 
however, adds the instruction to construct a different, 'stronger' concept.
From this perspective, the lexicalized sense of the applied form valia can 
be characterized as follows. Consider again the contrast between the base form 
and the idiomatic applied form:
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(19a) Juma a-me-va-a nguo za rasmi
Juma SCCLl-PERF-wear-FV clothes GEN official 
'Juma was wearing official clothes'
(19b) Juma a-me-val-i-a nguo za rasmi
Juma SCCLl-PERF-wear-APPL-FV clothes GEN official
'Juma was dressed up (wearing official clothes)'
The applied form in (19b) does not differ in valency from the base form in 
(19a). Rather, two different concepts are addressed. The difference between (19a) 
and (19b) can be described as follows; in (19a) the hearer is instructed to 
entertain the proposition that Juma was wearing official clothes, while in (19b), 
the hearer is instructed not only to entertain the proposition that Juma was 
wearing offical clothes, but to derive additional contextual effects such as, for 
example, that he had dressed with great care and effort, possibly had spent a lot 
of money on the clothes, or maybe that he had a particular reason for wearing 
the particular official clothes he was wearing. Note that typical uses of the 
lexicalized applied form valia have an object which denotes special clothes, 
rather than everyday garments, which facilitate the derivation of inferences 
such as those mentioned above. The difference between (19a) and (19b) is that 
in (19b) a stronger concept is addressed.
On the assumption that the characterization of the difference between 
(19a) and (19b) offered here is correct, it appears that the lexicalized form valia 
encodes a particular process of (former) conceptual enrichment vis-a-vis the 
base form. This means that before the idiomatic sense of valia was lexicalized, 
the form encoded an instruction for concept formation. In the following 
section, I develop the hypothesis that this is also the function of applied verbs 
in present day Swahili.
5. Applied Verbs as an Instruction for Concept Formation
In this section, I develop the ideas introduced in the preceding section, and 
formulate the hypothesis that applied verbs instruct the hearer to strengthen 
the concept addressed by the base verb so as to derive sufficiently more 
inferential effects. I show that it is this instruction which is the basic unifying 
meaning of applied verbs, and that the syntactic facts can be regarded as 
following from this basic meaning. At the end of the section I propose a 
formalization of this hypothesis by defining a disjunctive lexical entry, which, 
however, reflects the conceptual claim only partly. The following section 
provides an evaluation of the argument presented.
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5.1. Pragmatic Licensing
In the discussion of lexicalized applied verbs above, I have noted that the 
lexicalized form valia is prototypically used with an object denoting ’special', 
rather than ordinary clothes, which, I have proposed, facilitates the derivation 
of additional contextual effects. A similar observation can be made with respect 
to the productive use of applied verbs. Consider the following examples:
(20a) Salma a-li-ka-a kiti-ni
Salma SCCLl-PAST-sit-FV chair-LOC 
’Salma was sitting on a chair'
(20b) #Salma a-li-kal-i-a k iti
Salma SCCLl-PAST-sit-APPL-FV chair
’Salma was sitting on a chair’
(20c) Salma a-li-kal-i-a kiti cha u v iv u
Salma SCCLl-PAST-sit-APPL-FV chair GEN laziness
’S/he was sitting on (in) a comfortable chair'
The example in (20a) shows the intransitive use of kaa, ’sit’, with a locative 
marked adjunct. In (20b), the applied form kalia is used, which does indeed 
license the introduction of the unmarked object kiti. However, in the present 
context, the contrast between (20b) and (20c) is the relevant one. Both sentences 
are grammatical, but (20b) is, in a 'neutral' context, infelicitous, in contrast to 
(20c), which differs from (20b) in that a more specific object is used. In view of 
the hypothesis developed here, the interpretation of these data is that an object 
like chair gives just not enough contextual information to construct, in the 
absence of any other contextual information, a concept which is sufficiently 
stronger than the one constructed from kaa in (20a), since there is nothing 
particular about sitting on a chair; it is what one normally does. In contrast, the 
object in (20c) provides enough information to build a strengthened concept 
which may license additional contextual effects such as, for example, that 
Salma was sitting lazily, slumped back, eyes half-closed, that she didn't intend 
to get up in the near future, that she wasn't nervous. The (weakest) conclusion 
to be drawn from the example discussed here is that applied verbs not only 
introduce objects, but also that the use of applied verbs is subject to 'pragmatic 
licensing'; they need enough contextual information so that a strengthened 
concept can be constructed.
A similar example is given below:
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(21a) Bi Sauda a-li-kat-a mkate kwa kisu
Ms Sauda SCCLl-PAST-cut-FV bread with knife 
'Ms Sauda cut bread with a knife'
(21b) #Bi Sauda alikatia m kate kisu
Ms Sauda SCCLl-PAST-cut-APPL-FV bread knife
'Ms Sauda cut bread with a knife’
The example in (17a) shows the transitive verb kata, 'cut' with the object 
mkate, 'bread', and the PP kwa kisu, 'with a knife’. The corresponding applied 
verb in (17b) licenses the introduction of kisu  as an object, but the sentence is 
infelicitous in a neutral context. The applied verb can be used for example in a 
situation where the bread is in some way unsuitable for being cut with knives 
(e.g. the sort of bread which is broken, not cut, or may be dried, hard bread), or 
when the state of the sliced bread gives reason to wonder how it was cut. In 
(21c), proper contextualization is, imperfectly, expressed by adding a 
demonstrative pronoun to the first object:
(21c) Bi Sauda alikatia m kate huo  kisu
Ms Sauda SCCl-PAST-cut-APPL-FV bread this knife
'Ms Sauda cut this bread with a knife'
Relevant contextual effects might include that Bi Sauda doesn't know how to 
cut bread properly, or that the kitchen is now full of crumbs, or that the knife is 
now probably blunt. Given the appropriate context, all those inferences could 
also be derived from (21a), but the use of the applied verb indicates that some 
occasion-specific contextual effects need to be derived, so that the use of the 
applied form in (21b) without sufficient context is inappropriate.
The examples in this section have shown that the use of applied verbs 
requires the derivation of additional contextual effects, i.e. that the concept 
constructed from the applied verb be stronger than the concept addressed by 
the base verb. Since in the examples considered here, the applied verb also 
licenses the introduction of an additional object, the examples only provide 
evidence for the conclusion that applied verbs require pragmatic licensing, in 
addition to their syntactic quality as increasing the valency of the base verb. 
From the perspective adopted in this thesis, however, this conclusion is 
suspicious, since it implies that syntax and pragmatics operate independently 
of each other. Rather, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the introduction of 
Ty(e) expressions contributes to the process of concept formation. It is thus 
natural that applied verbs license the introduction of Ty(e) expressions, since 
they carry an explicit requirement to construct a specific (i.e. strengthened vis­
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a-vis the base verb) concept, for which additional information from additional 
Ty(e) expressions might be provided. On the other hand, if a sufficiently strong 
concept can be constructed without information from additional Ty(e) 
expressions, they should not be licensed. In other words, applied verbs, in the 
analysis developed here, should license an additional Ty(e) expression, but 
they should not require more Ty(e) expressions than (independently) required 
by the base verb. That is, applied verbs may change the valency of the base verb, 
but they do not do so necessarily.
5.2. Concept Formation and Valency
In order to show that the hypothesis developed in the last section is plausible, 
it needs to be shown that productive, non-lexicalized applied verbs do not 
necessarily require one more object than the corresponding base verb, in 
particular in contexts where a sufficiently strengthened concept is constructed 
without the licensing of an additional Ty(e) expression. In this section, I discuss 
examples which show that this prediction is borne out117.
Consider the following data:
(22a) Bi Asha a-li-andik-a barua kwa kalam u
Bi Asha SCCLl-PAST-write-FV letter with pen 
’S/he wrote a letter with a pen’
(22b) Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-a barua kalam u
Bi Asha SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter pen 
'S/he wrote (in) a letter with a pen'
(22c) Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-a barua kwa kalam u
Bi Asha SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter with pen
’S/he wrote (in) a letter with a pen’
The example in (22a) shows the transitive base form andika, ’write', with one 
object and the PP kwa kalamu, ’with a pen’, while (22b) shows the applied 
form andikia with two objects, so that this sentence is subject to contextual 
requirements, discussed below. However, the interesting example in the 
present context is (22c), where the applied form is used as a transitive verb, 
namely with one object and one PP. It is example (22c) which shows the 
dependency of valency changing on concept construction; under a syntactic
117 Here and in the following examples, the description of inferential effects is rather 
impressionistic, as reconstructed from field notes and with the provision that contextual effects 
are more occasion specific than indicated here. A more formalized analysis of these and similar 
data with respect to contextual appropriateness remains to be done.
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analysis of applied verbs, (22c) should be ungrammatical. Both examples of the 
applied verb carry a specific instruction for concept formation; if, in a given 
context, the neccessary additional contextual effects can be derived without the 
information from additional Ty(e) expressions, no change of valency is 
necessary, as in the case of (22c). If, on the other hand, contextual effects are 
derived by including information from another Ty(e) expression, its 
introduction is licensed, as in (22b). Thus, all examples in (22) instruct the 
hearer to entertain the proposition that Bi Asha wrote a letter with a pen, but 
(22b) and (22c) require the derivation of additional contextual effects. In (22b), 
these might include that Bi Asha did not use a typewriter, or that, given her 
hand writing, the letter is illegible, while in (22c), possible contextual effects are 
that the letter is personal, or that, if it is a long letter, her hand must be painful 
now. Thus, these examples show that, rather than syntactically encoding a 
change in valency, applied verbs encode an instruction for concept formation, 
in particular the instruction to strengthen the concept addressed so as to derive 
more contextual effects than licensed by the base form.
While the example discussed above involved an ’instrumental’ Ty(e) 
expression, the following examples show the same paradigm with an optional 
’locative’ expression118:
(23a) Bw Msa a-li-andik-a barua m eza-ni
As in the preceding example, (23a) shows the transitive use of andika, here 
with a locative marked optional Ty(e) expression, m ezani, ’on the table’. The 
applied form is used with two objects in (23b); note that the second object, 
meza, is not marked with the locative suffix -ni. Again, the last sentence (23c)
118 In general, ditransitive applied verbs are better with instruments than with locatives. Of 
the examples shown here, (23c), i.e. the transitive use of the applied is strongly preferred to 
(23b). As discussed here, the acceptability of applied form depends on an appropriate context. In 
addition, the locative suffix -n i might well be bleached, so that its syntactic function is 
indeterminate. For the present discussion, it is the acceptability of (23c) that is the important 
point.
Mr Msa SCCLl-PAST-write-FV letter table-LOC 
’Mr, Msa wrote a letter on the table'
(23b) ?Bw Msa a-li-andik-i-a
Mr Msa SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV 
'Mr. Msa wrote a letter on the table'
barua m eza  
letter table
(23c) Bw Msa a-li-andik-i-a
Mr Msa SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV 
'Mr. Msa wrote a letter on the table'
barua m eza-ni 
letter table-loc
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is the most interesting one, since the applied verb is used, as the transitive 
verb, with one object only, and thus provides evidence against a syntactic 
analysis of applied verbs as encoding a change in valency. The additional 
inferential effects required by (23b) and (23c) can be characterized analogously to 
the preceding example; for (23b) they might include that the family had lunch 
on the floor, or that the table cloth needs changing, while for (23c), they might 
include that Bw Msa did not, this time, write his dissertation on the table, or 
that he was writing very concentratedly, or for a long time.
Note that this analysis requires both underspecified verbs and parallel 
parses, since all Ty(e) expressions are integrated into the verb, and since 
adjuncts may precede objects119:
(23d) Bw Msa a-li-andik-i-a meza-ni barua
Mr Msa SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV table-LOC letter 
’Mr. Msa wrote a letter on the table’
The example in (23d) is identical to (23c) except for the order of locative adjunct 
and object. In order to derive the relevant contextual effects, all Ty(e) 
expressions have to be considered.
As a final example of the relation between concept formation and 
valency, consider the following examples involving the verb pika, ’cook':
(24a) M pishi a-li-pik-a jiko -n i
cook SCCLl-PAST-cook-F V kitchen-LOC 
The cook was cooking in the kitchen'
(24b) M pishi a-li-pik-i-a jiko-n i
cook SCCLl-PAST-cook-APPL-F V kitchen-LOC 
The cook was cooking in the kitchen'
In (24a), pika is used intransitively with the locative adjunct jiko-ni, 'in the 
kitchen', in the same way as in (24b), where, however, the applied form pikia is 
used. As in the previous examples, the concept constructed from pikia has to 
be stronger than the one constructable from the base form, thus including for 
example that the cook was cooking extensively, or habitually in the kitchen.
The examples discussed in this section show that concept formation may, 
but does not necessarily involve an increase in valency. The syntactic effect of 
applied verbs thus follows from the fact that they encode an instruction for 
concept strengthening. The data thus also provide evidence against proposals
119 The word order facts are not clear, though. In addition, the corresponding example with an 
instrumental is unacceptable.
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which analyse applied verbs as syntactically increasing the valency of the base 
verb. Before considering the formal aspects of the analysis developed so far, I 
discuss applied verbs used with human objects.
5.3. Human Objects
The majority of examples discussed in the preceding sections involved applied 
verbs with locative and instrum ental Ty(e) expressions, but not with 
benefactives. In contrast, most previous analysis have mainly been concerned 
with applied verbs with an additional benefactive object. This is, I believe, one 
of the reasons for why the hypothesis developed here departs from the 
common assumption that applicative constructions involve an increase in  
valency, since it is examples like the ones discussed so far which show clearly 
that applied verbs encode an instruction for concept strengthening, and that 
syntactic facts follow from that. However, applied verbs with benefactive 
objects do indeed imply a change in valency, as shown by the following 
examples (from the beginning of this chapter, repeated here):
(25a) A-li-andik-a barua
SCCLl-PAST-write-FV letter 
'S/he wrote a letter’
(25b) A-li-mw-andik-i-a shangazi barua
SCCLl-PAST-OCCLl-write-APPL-F V aunt letter 
’S/he wrote a letter to the aunt’
(25c) * A-li-andik-i-a barua kwa shangazi
SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter to aunt 
'S/he wrote a letter to the aunt'
As illustrated in (25), with a benefactive object, applied verbs invariably show 
an increase in valency with respect to the base form.
For the present analysis the question is then why benefactives should 
differ from instrumentals and locatives. The first point to be raised in order to 
explain this fact is the objection to thematic roles, already discussed earlier in 
this thesis120. I have used the notions of locative and instrumental in this 
chapter as useful descriptive terms, but they did not play a role in the analysis. 
The contrast can thus not be phrased with reference to the thematic role 
benefactive. Rather, I believe it is more correct to construe a contrast between 
human and non-human referents, so that the question really is; why do
120 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1., and Chapter 4, Section 3.3.1.
Chapter 6: Applied Verbs in Swahili 224
applied verbs with a human object invariably show an increase in valency. 
Thus phrased, the question can be answered with two statements. First, hum an 
objects are invariably morphologically marked on the verb in Swahili; and 
second, constructing a concept which involves an additional human referent is 
sufficiently stronger than the concept constructable from the base verb. The 
first point is discussed in more detail in this section, while the second is briefly 
discussed in the next section, although I take it to be uncontentious.
Syntactic objects can be morphologically marked by means of a 
morpheme prefixed to the verb:
(26a) A-li-on-a kisima
SCCLl-PAST-see-FV well 
’S/he saw a well’
(26b) A-li-ki-on-a kisima
SCCLl-PAST-OCCL7-see-FV well
’S/he saw the well’
The example in (26a) shows the transitive verb on a, ’see’, with object, but 
without object marker. In (26b) the object marker is found in the verbal 
template; -ki- agrees in class with the object. The characterization of the 
difference between (26a) and (26b) as involving definiteness, as implied in the 
glosses, is at best an oversimplification. However, the point here is that the 
object marker in examples such as in (26) is generally optional, in contrast to 
human objects:
(27 a) A-li-mw-on-a Sudi
SCCLl-PAST-OCCLl-see-F V Sudi
'S/he saw Sudi’
(27b) *Aliona Sudi
(27 c) A-li-mw-on-a
sccLl-PA ST-ocCLl-see-FV  
'S/he saw her/him '
As can be seen from the contrast between (27a) and (27b), with objects denoting 
human referents, the object marker is required121. As can also be seen, the 
object marker precedes the verb, in contrast to the full NP. Finally object 
markers can be used as incorporated pronouns, since the sentence in (27c) is
121 See Wald (1993) for an analysis of the role of human and non-human object markers in 
Swahili.
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fine122. I assume here that the (human) object marker fulfills a requirement 
TODO Ty(e), in the same way as the subject marker discussed above. I also 
assume that Swahili inflectional morphology does provide lexical access, in 
contrast to derivational morphology, i.e. that the object prefix does have a 
lexical entry, in contrast to the derivational suffix -1L-.
Thus a sample derivation of the sentence in (27a) proceeds as follows:
(28a) Tree for "A-li-
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • (Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
This parse stage is achieved after subject marker and tense morpheme have 
been scanned. The next step is the introduction of the object marker:
(28b) Tree for "A-li-mw-
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t) 0}
/
• {Tn(010), Fo(upro), Ty(e)}
As can seen in (24b), the object marker builds a new argument node which is 
annotated with a pronominal formula value of Ty(e), and moves the pointer 
back to the VP node. At this stage, the verb is scanned and introduced at an 
unfixed node:
(28c) Tree for "A-li-mw-on-a
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(011), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
(Tn(01*), Fo(on’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
At this stage, the derivation could end (cf. (27c), above), but there is further 
input, namely Sudi. Given the characterization of the (human) object marker 
as building a Ty(e) node, the corresponding analysis of (human) NPs is that
122 Cf. again Bresnan & Mchombo (1986,1987).
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they are lexically introduced at unfixed nodes with the weak requirement that 
they be fixed in the tree, that is below Tn(0):
(28d) Tree for "A-li-mw-on-a Sudi
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(Upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
(Tn(01*), Fo(on’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
{Tn(0*), Fo(sudi'), Ty(e)}
The unfixed node Tn(0*) can be fixed at Tn(010) by Merge under the further 
assumption that meta-variables such as Fo(upro) are defined such that they can 
be replaced by conceptual formula values such as Fo(sudi')123. With two 
applications of Merge, the derivation is thus completed.
The difference between human and non-human objects can thus be 
characterized by the fact that human objects are introduced into the derivation 
before the verb, whereas non-human objects are in general introduced after the 
verb.
From the point of view of concept formation as encoded in applied verbs, 
this means that at the time the instruction is registered, there is already one 
potentially optional Ty(e) expression in the tree; all that is required is to check 
whether a suitably strong concept can be constructed by including an additional 
human entity into the concept, which is, as I have assumed earlier, generally 
the case. Thus the implicational relation between applied verbs with human 
objects can be explained by independent syntactic facts of Swahili, without 
recourse to thematic roles, and while maintaining the general analysis of 
applied verbs as encoding an instruction for concept formation.
In the next section I turn to the question how this hypothesis can be m ore 
formally expressed.
5.4. Lexical Entry and Sample Derivations
In this section, I develop lexical entries for applied verbs and show the relevant 
tree transitions.
123 For an analysis of pro-drop language along the lines sketched here, see Kempson, Edwards & 
Meyer-Viol (1998). I do not go into full details of such an analysis here.
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However, the formalization does not fully express the hypothesis 
developed here. Ideally, following what has been said so far, the valency of a 
given applied verb would in an obvious way result from the process of concept 
strengthening. But the way I have defined verbal underspecification and the 
contribution of verbs to tree building does not offer a way to state this 
elegantly. In addition, there is no easy way to state the process of concept 
formation more precisely124. As already indicated, I thus assume that lexical 
entries specify parallel parses, so that conceptual enrichment results effectively 
in disambiguation. On the other hand, the advantages of a lexical, as opposed 
to a syntactic approach still hold, so that the formalization proposed in this 
section is still to be preferred over the syntactic analysis of -IL- sketched in 
Section 4.2.
The lexical entry for andika  can thus tentatively be defined as follows:
(29) Lexical entry for andik (first version)
IF ?Ty(e ->  t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(andik'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(andikIL1'),
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
make(<di>), put(?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t)),
?<di> Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
make(<do>) put(?Ty(e))
ELSE abort
The entry specifies actions for the base form, which are the actions for 
transitive verbs. The second set of actions is relevant for applied forms with 
human objects. Since the argument node of the VP node has already been built 
and filled, the lexical actions from andikIL1 need to build the corresponding 
functor node, and the argument node of that node.
With the lexical specifications given, I consider now a sample derivation 
of (30) (= (21b), above):
124 In the following chapter, I discuss ways in which this could be done at least in principle.
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(30) A-li-mw-andik-i-a shangazi barua
SCCLl-PAST-OCCLl-write-a ppl-FV aunt letter 
’S/he wrote a letter to the aunt'
In (30), the applied form of andika, 'write', is used with an human object in
addition to the object of the base form. I assume that the derivation proceeds as
in the preceding derivation of a lint wo na up to the introduction of the verb:
(31a) Tree for "A-li-mw-
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/
• {Tn(010), Fo(upro), Ty(e)}
At this stage, the object marker has built the argument node Tn(010). Scanning 
triggers the lexical statements of the applied form, and the following tree 
results:
(31b) Tree for "A-li-mw-andik-i
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/
{Tn(0110), ?Ty(e) 0} 
fTn(01*), Fo(andiklL’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
The next word, shangazi, 'aunt', is assigned to an unfixed node, following the 
analysis outlined above, and the final word barua, 'letter', fulfills the 
requirement TODO Ty(e):
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(31c) Tree for "A-li-mw-andik-i-a shangazi barua
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OO), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Ol), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(OlO), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
/ \
{Tn(OllO), Fo(barua'), {Tn(Olll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))} 
Ty(e)}
{Tn(01*), Fo(andiklL’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
(Tn(0*), Fo(shangazi'), Ty(e)}
As before, two applications of Merge complete the tree.
Next, consider the example in (32) (= (18b), above):
(32) Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-a barua kalamu
SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter pen
'Bi Asha wrote a letter with a pen'
The first difference is that there is a lexically overt subject in (32). I assume that 
the subject is assigned to an unfixed node and merged with the pronominal 
formula in a similar way as lexically overt objects. With this in mind, the tree 
at the introduction of the verb looks as follows:
(33a) Tree for "Bi Asha a-li-
• {Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• (Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
{Tn(0*), Fo(bi_asha'), Ty(e)}
The lexical actions necessary at this step are not yet defined in the lexical entry 
above, but I assume that actions from the lexicon result in the following tree:
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(33b) Tree for "Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• (Tn(OlO), ?Ty(e) 0} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))}
(Tn(0*), Fo(bi_asha’), Ty(e)}
{Tn(01*), Fo(andiklL’), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e -> (e ->  t)))}
The introduction of barua, 'letter', results in the fulfillment of the requirement 
at Tn(010), and by applications of Completion and Prediction in the pointer 
movement to the new functor node. All of these latter actions result 
ultimately from modal statements introduced from the lexicon. This can be 
seen when the lexical rules are defined below.
(33c) Tree for "Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-
• (Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
/ \
• {Tn(00), Fo(upro), Ty(e)} • {Tn(01), ?Ty(e ->  t)}
/ \
• {Tn(010), Fo(barua'), Ty(e)} • {Tn(Oll), ?Ty(e -> (e ->  t))}
/ \
• {Tn(0110), ?Ty(e) 0} • fTn(Olll),
?Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))}
{Tn(0*), Fo(bi_asha'), Ty(e)}
(Tn(01*), Fo(andiklL’), Ty(e* ->  (e -> (e -> (e ->  t)))}
The final word scanned is then kalamu, 'pen', which duly fulfills the 
requirement holding at Tn(Olll), so that the tree can be completed.
As a final example, consider the transitive use of andikia, 'write', in (34) 
(= (18c), above):
(34) Bi Asha a-li-andik-i-a barua kwa kalam u
SCCLl-PAST-write-APPL-FV letter with pen 
'S/he wrote (in) a letter with a pen’
I do not give a tree here, since the derivation parallels the derivation of a 
normal transitive verb. However, the form has to be represented in the lexical 
entry.
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The final lexical entry for andika is given below:
(35) Lexical Entry for andik (final version)
IF ?Ty(e -> t)
THEN make(<d*>), put(Fo(andik'), Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)), 
put(?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(andikIL1')/
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e -> t)), 
make(<di>), put(?Ty(e -> (e ->  t)),
?<di> Ty(e -> (e ->  (e ->  t)))), 
make(<do>) put(?Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(andikIL2'),
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t))))), 
go(<u*> ?Ty(e -> t)),
make(<di>), put(?Ty(e -> (e -> t)), ?<do>Ty(e),
?<di> Ty(e ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e ->  t)) 
make(<do>), put(? Ty(e))
OR make(<d*>), put(Fo(andikIL3’),
Ty(e* ->  (e ->  (e ->  t)))),
go(<u*> ?Ty(e -> t)),
put(?<d!> Ty(e ->  (e ->  t))), 
make(<do>), put(?Ty(e))
The final version of the lexical entry thus specifies four different sets of actions, 
for the transitive use of the base form, for the applied form with human object, 
for the applied form with two non-human objects, and for the transitive use of 
the applied form, in that order125. Note that the first and the last set of actions 
are identical except for the formula value.
125 There is in addition an intransitive use of the base form:
(i) ni-li-mw-on-a a -k i-a n d ik -a
1 .SG. -PAST-OCCLl-see-FV SCCLl -SITU-write-FV
1 saw her/him reading’
I have ignored this use in the lexical entry above, but it might easily be added.
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The formulation of the lexical entry in (35) provides rules for all four 
readings oiandika  discussed in this section. The first sub-entry can be accessed 
separately, when the base form oiandika  is introduced into the tree. However, 
if an applied form is scanned, all four sub-entries are activated. Since the 
entries specify different tree continuations, four different trees are built. The 
role of pragmatic inferencing is, under this view, reduced to disambiguation, 
in a context where there is in fact very little evidence that applied verbs are 
ambiguous. I have thus chosen to present a descriptively adequate analysis of 
applied verbs in Swahili, rather than proposing a conceptually more 
interesting, but, probably less explicit analysis which relies heavily on the 
notion of concept formation without a clear link between this process and the 
formal model provided by LDSNL.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed the argument that applied verbs in Swahili 
encode an explicit instruction to construct an occasion-specific concept which is 
stronger than a concept constructed from the base form in that more contextual 
effects need to be derived. Both the process of strengthening and the derivation 
of additional contextual effects are quite general pragmatic processes and 
interact freely with contextual information. In order to show that this 
hypothesis is plausible, I have adduced phonological evidence indicating that 
the applied verb provides lexical access both to the base form and the applied 
form, but not to the applicative morpheme. Further evidence was presented 
from lexicalized senses of applied verbs which show that applied verbs are not 
necessarily of a higher arity than their corresponding base form. The next step 
was to show that productive uses of applied verbs which do change the valency 
of the base verb are in need of pragmatic licensing, which provides a 
sufficiently rich context to derive additional contextual effects. The final step in 
the argument was to show that applied verbs can be used without any change 
in valency provided that an appropriately strong concept can be constructed 
from the context w ithout the information provided by optional Ty(e) 
expression. The evidence considered shows that the instruction for concept 
formation is the basic unified meaning of applied verbs, and that an increase in  
valency is a possible, but not a necessary syntactic reflex of concept formation. I 
then have turned to potential counter-evidence in the form of applied verbs 
used with human objects, which always display a change in valency. I have 
argued that this fact results from independent syntactic properties of Swahili, 
namely that human objects are obligatorily marked by an object marker
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prefixed to the verb. This means that human objects precede, rather than 
follow the verb, so that they are naturally incorporated into the process of 
concept formation. The introduction of a representation of a person into a 
constructed concept provides enough contextual effects for this process to 
reliably happen. Finally, I have proposed a formalization of this hypothesis in 
the form of a complex disjunctive lexical entry, but I have noted that the 
formalization does not express the generalizations captured adequately.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussion in this chapter. 
First, the analysis of the relation between concept formation and valency 
proposed in this thesis has been supported. Swahili applied verbs constitute 
evidence for the importance of this relation, since the process of concept 
formation has been shown to have an effect on complementation. Concept 
formation may, but does not necessarily, imply a change in complementation, 
although it does always imply that the eventual arity of a given concept is 
fixed. The formalization of this relation as underspecified type values for verbs 
has proven to be correct, although m atters of implementation remain 
outstanding.
The analysis proposed in this section contributes in addition to the study 
of Swahili and Bantu languages more generally. The argument developed 
provides an alternative to the view that applicative constructions are 
sufficiently analysed as encoding a change in valency, which has been proposed 
on various occasions in the literature. More specifically, the analysis shows 
that contextual factors need to be addressed even when analysing apparently 
purely syntactic data. The role of pragmatic licensing, and more generally of 
contextual assumptions is an area where more research is needed, and I am 
quite aware of the fact that the treatment here is cursory at best. In more than 
one respect, the hypothesis developed here needs to be tested against more and 
more detailed data, not so much, in my view, with respect to grammaticality, 
but w ith respect to acceptability. However, I believe that basically, the 
hypothesis is correct.
Finally, the analysis shows the need to provide a more explicit link 
between the LDSNL system and pragmatic processes relevant for the 
construction of meaning in context. The case of Swahili applied verbs 
illustrates clearly that the process of structure building as modelled in LDSNL 
is thoroughly intertwined with the process of concept formation explored in 
Relevance Theory. Yet there is currently no explicit interface to state this 
relation. While, on the one hand, the model of utterance interpretation 
developed in LDSNL appears to be too structural to incorporate non­
demonstrative inference, the analysis of concept formation in Relevance
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Theory is not structural enough to be incorporated into LDSNL trees. From the 
point of view adopted here, it would be useful if the relation could be stated 
more explicitly. In the following chapter, I discuss some preliminary steps in 
that direction.
Chapter 7
Aspects of Implementing Concept 
Formation
1. Introduction
At the end of the preceding chapter, I have noted that there is no explicit 
formalism which might be employed to model the link between the process of 
structure building described in LDSNL, on the one hand, and the pragmatic 
process of concept formation, on the other. The analysis of applied verbs in  
Swahili provided a good example for the different aspects of concept 
formation. Under the analysis proposed in the last chapter, applied verbs 
encode an instruction for concept formation which may, but does not 
necessarily, involve a change in valency. Yet it is only this latter effect which is 
clearly reflected in LDSNL, as a change in type of the verb and the 
corresponding tree structure. In this chapter I offer a brief discussion of how a 
framework might be developed which could express the relation between 
concept formation and valency changing. The overall perspective adopted in 
this chapter is the perspective of computational linguistics; the question of 
formalization has thus here also a practical aspect. I introduce and discuss two 
proposals which model context sensitive inference and reasoning with 
uncertainty. In particular, work in Generative Lexicon Theory has addressed 
the question of the context sensitivity of word (including verb) meaning and 
thus might be employed for articulating the processes of pragmatic 
strengthening. However, as the following discussion shows, the theory does 
not provide the necessary resources nor sufficient conceptual clarity to offer a 
serious possibility for modelling concept construction. I then introduce an 
alternative to Generative Lexicon Theory developed by Hunter & Marten 
(1999) which represents world knowledge as a classical logic augmented with 
default rules, and discuss how this approach could be employed to provide a 
more explicit link between the LDSNL model and contextual reasoning. 
However, the discussion is very preliminary, and gives an outline of the 
system developed, rather than a specific implementation.
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2. The Generative Lexicon
Generative Lexicon Theory (GLT) is one recent formulation of lexical 
knowledge. It is part of a wider trend in (computational) linguistics to analyse 
lexical knowledge not as an ideally minimal set of knowledge specifying only 
basic syntactic and maybe thematic information, but rather to think of lexical 
items as more structured, for example as being related by semantic relations 
modelled as feature structures, or as specifying certain aspectual information 
(cf. e.g. Sag & Szabolcsi 1992, Pustejovsky & Boguraev 1996). In this section, I 
introduce GLT as formulated in Pustejovsky (1995), contrast it with e*, and 
discuss an extension of the theory proposed in Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe 
(1996) and Lascarides & Copestake (1998). This amended version is again 
evaluated with respect to concept formation as employed in e*.
2.1. Generative Lexicon Theory
GLT as originally formulated by Pustejovsky (1995) proposes that information 
provided by lexical items is much richer than standardly assumed. In 
particular, GLT argues that the lexicon of a given natural language cannot 
simply be characterized as a list of items with only syntactic and minimal 
semantic information, for three reasons (1995: 39):
1. Words can be used creatively; they assume new senses in novel contexts.
2. Word senses are not atomic; they overlap and refer to other senses of the 
word.
3. A single word sense can have multiple syntactic realizations.
The creative use of words is found, for example, with the adjective fast (1995:
44/45):
(la) a fast boat
(lb) a fast typist
(lc) a fast book
(Id) a fast driver
(le) a fast decision
(If) a fast motorway
The meaning of fast varies according to the noun it modifies, thus, 
Pustejovsky argues, giving rise to at least four different lexical entries (1995: 
44/45):
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(2a) fasti: to move quickly
(2b) fast2: to perform some act quickly
(2c) fast3: to do something that takes little time
(2d) fast4: to allow for driving a vehicle quickly on it
(ie. the motorway)
There is seemingly no principled end to such a list, nor any way to relate one 
sense to another. Pustejovsky (1995: 45/46) presents the examples in (3) as being 
indicative of a similar problem; since a lexical entry for w ant would have to 
include at least the ones found in (4):
(3a) Mary wants another cigarette.
(3b) Mary wants a beer.
(3c) Mary wants a job.
(4a) wanti: to want to smoke
(4b) want2‘. to want to drink
(4c) want3: to want to have
Again, an increase in NP objects of want would lead to an increase in lexical 
entries (in addition  to entries required due to varying syntactic 
complementation).
The probem of overlapping of different word senses can be seen with
bake:
(5a) John baked the potatoes.
(5b) John baked a cake.
The verb bake, along with cook and fry, is, according to GLT, ambiguous 
between a ’change-of-state’ and a 'creation1 reading; in (5a), the activity of 
baking changes the state of the object, potatoes, from cold to hot (and 
not_really_edible to edible), while in (5b), the object is the result of the activity 
-  it did not previously exist. However, according to GLT, these two senses are 
not clearly distinguishable, even in context, since one sense is included in the 
other, and since the actual activity is not distinguished by the different objects. 
Thus, even if one were to allow many different senses, the postulation of two 
senses for bake here would obliviate their partial overlap.
Finally, Pustejovsky observes that a single form can participate in a 
number of syntactic realizations, corresponding to different senses (1995: 51):
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(6a) Madison Avenue is apt to forget that most folks aren't members of
the leisure class. (factive reading)
(6b) But like many others who have made the same choice, he forgot to
factor one thing into his plans: Caliphobia.
(non-factive reading)
(6c) As for California being a state being run by liberal environmental
loonies, let's not forget where Ronald Reagan came from, 
(embedded question)
(6d) What about friends who forget the password or never got it?
(concealed question)
(6e) He leaves, forgets his umbrella, and comes back to get it.
(ellipsed non-factive)
By simply postulating several entries for forget, both the relation between 
complement type and reading, as well as the common 'core meaning' of the 
verb are not expressed.
Thus, Pustejovsky concludes that the only way for a list-lexicon to deal 
with these phenomena is the postulation of an infinity of different senses for a 
single lexical item, which is not only unintuitive and cumbersome, but also 
fails to capture any structure or systematicity between several senses, both 
semantic and syntactic.
In contrast, GLT designs lexical entries which are structured, and thus can 
encode different senses, and which allow for the generation of novel senses in 
composition. That is, the different readings of bake (as in (5)) result from the 
complex lexical entry of the verb and from information encoded in the lexical 
entry of the object. It is this process of generativity, devising new senses by 
composition, by which GLT proposes to meet the demands of accounting for 
creativity, overlap of senses, and multiple syntactic realizations.
In order to achieve this, GLT introduces four levels of lexical semantic 
representation (1995: 61):
• argument structure
• event structure
• qualia structure
• lexical inheritance structure
Argument structure states in a standard way number and type of logical 
arguments, with the addition of 'shadow' and 'default’-arguments, different
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types of semantically necessary, but syntactically optional arguments. Event 
structure encodes aspectual lexical information, similar to, but more refined 
than, a simple event-variable. Qualia structure is probably the most novel (and 
controversial) idea in GLT, and it is also the structure with the most 
complicated internal structure. Qualia structure values encode information 
about what the lexical item is (refers to), what it consists of, what it is made of, 
and what it is used for. The relation among lexical items is encoded in the 
final structure, lexical inheritance, which expresses hyponymy and other 
lexical relations on a particular lattice structure. Information from individual 
lexical items is related to the lexical inheritance structure via the qualia and 
formal structure values of the lexical item. Similar to HPSG, values of 
predicates can be co-indexed to indicate feature unification. This particular 
selection of features is partly motivated by the claim that the information 
included in the entries is relevant for speakers’ knowledge of language; it is 
claimed to play a role in grammar which distinguishes it from (other) world 
knowledge126.
The lexical entry for bake thus looks as in (7) (1995: 123) (shared features 
are indicated by underlined numerals, rather than the more conventional 
numerals in boxes found in Pustejovsky):
(7) \ bake ]
| EVENTSTR = \ Ei = ea : process ] |
| { HEAD = ej J |
I
ARGSTR = f ARGl = 1 f animate_ind ] )
| [ FORMAL = physobj J |
| ARG2= 2 f mass ] |
[ [  FORMAL = physobj J J
QUALIA = f state_change_lcp ]
I AGENTIVE = bake_act(ei, 1, 2) J j
The entry illustrates possible values to the three structures of lexical 
inform ation encoded in lexical entries (the fourth structure, lexical 
inheritence, serves as ontological backbone which helps interpret the values of 
the FORMAL parameter). The event structure value identifies 'baking' as a
126 Which seems to imply that, unless thinking is construed as being dependent on language, some 
information is being duplicated since for example the observation that one can eat cakes is part of 
the lexical meaning of cake, but surely we know that independent of the word cake, so that both 
the lexical item and the world knowledge include this statement.
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process, the headedness value is exploited for complex event structures and is 
here of minor importance. Argument structure makes the verb transitive and 
places further restrictions on the arguments127. The qualia structure values, 
finally, identify bake as belonging to the 'change of state' 'lexical-conceptual 
paradigm' (lcp), over which generalizations over verb-classes can be stated. 
'Agentive' means that the (saturated) predicate involves some 'bringing 
about'. In GLT, this is the only lexical entry for bake. The claim is now that 
objects such as potatoes or carrots leave the inform ation from bake 
unmodified, but that objects like cake 'shift' the reading of bake to a resultative 
or 'create' reading. That is, apparently different senses of the verb really arise 
from interaction with the lexical specification of (object) NPs, in particular by 
co-composition of qualia values. The process is triggered from NPs like cake 
(1995:123):
(8) \ cake
I ARGSTR \  ARGl = x:food_ind
[ D-ARGl = y:mass J
| QUALIA = f CONST = y ] |
| | FORMAL = x | |
| | TELIC = eat(e2,z,x) | |
[  [  AGENTIVE = bake_act(ei, w, y) J J
The 'D-ARG' (i.e. default argument) indicates that cakes are made from stuff 
which can optionally be expressed as an oblique argument as 'bake a cake 
from/with flour'. This is taken up in the qualia structure, where CONST states 
that cakes consist of (are constituted by) the stuff encodable as a default 
argument, dough, maybe, or flour, or chocolate (but, not apparently, raisins, 
which are count). FORMAL encodes most directly what the word actually means, 
namely food (by feature sharing with ARGl), and this value can be found again 
at the lexical inheritance structure to give the embedding in the lexical net. 
TELIC means function, here that one eats cakes, while AGENTIVE indicates how 
the cake comes into existence, namely by baking. Note that the AGENTIVE value 
has the same predicate as bake, and that the distribution of the variables are
127 There is actually some mismatch here between what is given in the typed feature structure 
and what, in my reading of the surrounding text, should have been in there; ARG2 should 
probably be a default or shadow argument to include sentences like 'John was baking in the 
kitchen'; furthermore, it is unclear why ARG2 is 'mass' here, since, as discussed below, the 
default reading of bake tor Pustejovsky is the baking of things like potatoes, hence it should be 
'count'. It is my impression in general that given that GLT is a formal account of lexical structure, 
the formalization is often surprisingly opaque, an impression shared by Fodor & Lepore (1998).
Chapter 7: Aspects of Implementing Concept Formation 241
such that the eating event involves an as yet unknown eater (z) and the food 
variable from ARGl (x), but that baking involves not (x) in object position, but 
(y), the variable bound as 'mass' in D-ARGl -  that is, the act of baking does not 
involve the cake, but rather the stuff out of which it is made. Now the 
combination of bake w ith  a cake results in the following semantic 
representation (1995: 125):
(9) f bake a cake
EVENTSTR = f Ei = e i : process ]
I e2 = *2 : state |
| RESTR = <a |
[ HEAD = ei J
ARGSTR = f ARGl = 1 f
I I
| ARG2= 2 f
I I
I I
| D-ARGl = 3
I
animate_ind ] j
FORMAL = physobj J |
artifact ] |
CONST = 3 | |
FORMAL = physobj J |
\ material ] |
[ FORMAL = mass J J
QUALIA = f create_lcp ]
| FORMAL = existfe^ 2) |
[  AGENTIVE = bake_act(ei, 1,3) J
Amongst other details, the object results in a modified qualia structure which 
makes the VP (not the verb, incidentally) a member of the 'create' lcp. 
Furthermore it states that there are two events, one, the AGENTIVE value, 
involving the baker and the dough, and a second one, the FORMAL value, 
which is a stative event (cf. event structure value for E2) at which the second 
argument, the cake, exists. Of interest are that several semantic intuitions are 
captured at the interrelated but distinct lexical levels; thus the resulting state of 
existence can be read off from the event and the qualia structures, while the 
interplay between argument and qualia structures allows for a mismatch 
between syntactic and semantic structure -  a cake is the syntactic direct object, 
but is not a member of the extension of bake_act in the QUALIA.
GLT has highly structured lexical information for members of all parts of 
speech, and claims with those to provide a principled explanation for different
Chapter 7: Aspects of Implementing Concept Formation 242
(for GLT, lexical) meanings of words in context, accounting for a large range of 
readings, as well as for why certain readings are impossible, without the 
necessity for multiple lexical entries.
2.2. Similarities and Differences between GLT and e*
It is fairly obvious that the GLT conception of the lexicon differs radically from 
everything that I have discussed here, both with respect to the basic theoretical 
background and to the particular formalization. None of the information 
Pustejovsky locates in lexical entries is found in the lexicon assumed in 
LDSNL, and a range of information is not expressed in the system at all. This is 
partly because the GLT conception clashes with Fodorian concepts, a modified 
version of which is part of the Relevance theory stance on concepts which I 
have adopted here. Thus, in the conception assumed here, there are no 
inferential roles associated with lexical items, which are, as pointed out earlier, 
instructions for concept formation. Other than these instructions, the LDSNL 
lexicon does not encode (lexical) semantic information, while GLT postulates 
rich semantic information in the lexicon. Furthermore, GLT employs feature 
structures both for the representation of information within lexical items, as 
well as for the lexical inheritance structure. Lexical inheritance structure 
models lexical semantic relations as sets of features which are represented in a 
tree-like structure such that a more general term is higher in the tree, and all 
lower nodes inherit the features from the more general node. The role of 
features and feature unification in LDSNL has been discussed in Chapter 4, but 
it is worth noting that LDSNL does not employ features in relation to concepts, 
nor in effect for concept combination128. The overall theoretical approach in 
GLT is generative in the sense that the infinite set of word meanings is 
attempted to be modelled by a finite set of features which can be recursively 
combined, although this claim is never fully spelled out. Theoretical 
differences notwithstanding, there is a sense in which GLT does provide an 
alternative to e*, which involves however some preliminary adjustments. 
Since words as such do not mean anything in the RT/LDSNL conception, 
lexical entries in GLT have to be re-interpreted as conceptual senses in order to 
compare the two approaches. Under this interpretation, what GLT is modelling 
is in effect part of the process of concept formation. After all, both GLT and 
RT/e* share the assumption that open  means different things according to
128 In the sense that, as pointed out above, semantic combination is restricted to function- 
application, which can of course be represented as feature unification.
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context. The question is then whether the formalization proposed by GLT can 
be employed for the more formal characterization of at least part of the process 
of concept formation which was left unformalized in the last chapter. One 
immediate restriction in this move is that, while GLT might help to formalize 
concept formation, it does not, as it stands, help with e* -  there is no treatment 
of adjuncts, nor of ditransitive verbs. The only examples discussed are 
transitive verbs which change their meaning with respect to their object. The 
notion of shadow and default arguments is not discussed in sufficient detail to 
develop an account of e* out of it. However, even given these restrictions, 
there are problems with GLT.
2.3. Concept Formation as Feature Unification: Generative Concepts
The problem with taking GLT as a basis for conceptual enrichment is 
somewhat the inverse of the problem of taking it as a theory of lexical 
semantics -  while the entries are too rich for the lexicon, they are too poor for 
concepts. Since the GLT entries, though rich, are restricted to information 
which is ’grammatically relevant’, only some contextual differences in word 
meaning are expressed. Thus for example, since the difference between the 
change of state and the create senses of bake is partly tied to the m ass/count 
distinction of the (D-aigument of the) object, there is no difference between (10) 
and (11):
(10) John was baking a cake.
(11) John was baking a bread.
While the concepts involved here are probably similar, there still is the 
possibility to construe them differently on occasion; for example, the baking of 
bread might involve more preparation and time, different ingredients, 
different tools, etc. than the baking of cakes129. Yet this difference is not 
expressed in GLT, which in fact predicts that the two senses of bake are 
completely identical.
On the other hand, since the creative reading results from the unification 
of qualia values, in particular only from those where the object's qualia value 
explicitly states that the object is created by baking, all other cases fall under the
129 A nice way to make bread is to use sour dough baked on low heat in a wood fired stone oven. 
This doesn’t work for cakes.
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change of state reading, which is provided in the verb's entry. Thus, the 
meaning of (12) and (13) come out as the same:
(12) John was baking a potato.
(13) John was baking a flower.
But, as in the examples above, there are contexts where the baking of potatoes 
might differ from the baking of flowers. Furthermore, the change of state 
reading should be available for objects which are made by baking:
(14) John was baking a pizza.
In a context where the pizza is deep-frozen, the bake has no creative meaning, 
but given the way qualia structures unify, this reading is not obtainable, unless 
an ambiguity between pizzas and deep-frozen pizzas is postulated, which is 
what GLT is trying to avoid.
All the examples discussed so far point to problems with GLT which the 
theory according to its own aims should be able to handle. More general 
problems of this approach, as for example discussed in Fodor & Lepore (1998), 
include that GLT specifies just an arbitrary subset of world knowledge we have 
about things in the world, rather than about words. In principle, according to 
this criticism, there is nothing to be gained from writing the fact that cakes are 
made by baking into the lexicon. Another criticism, raised in Hunter & Marten 
(1999), concerns the use of typed feature structures for the representation of this 
kind of knowledge; feature unification as used in GLT does not support any 
logical reasoning, all lexical items have to be fully specified and be assigned a 
place in the feature hierarchy. Furthermore, context sensitivity has to be 
specified in advance as the presence or absence of particular features. In this 
sense, the system is completely unsuitable for modelling concept formation in 
the sense described in the last chapter.
The lack of context sensitivity and inferendng in GLT has been addressed 
by Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe (1996) and Lascarides & Copestake (1998). 
They provide a conditional logic which models commonsense entailment and 
which interacts with the senses provided by GLT130. Under this view, the 
novel senses of GLT, derived by feature unification, are default predicates 
which are part of the meaning of the sentence in which they occur. The second 
step of interpretation takes these typed feature structures as input and
130 This work is discussed more extensively in Hunter & Marten (1999) and Wilson (1999).
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combines them into a model of discourse processing in which notions of 
discourse coherence (e.g. ’elaboration’, ’contrast’) are defined. The combination 
of GLT with discourse processing is exploited to provide an interpretation of 
default senses. A default sense can be checked against the world knowledge 
base. For the pizza example in (14) above, for example, the default information 
that John created the pizza results from the lexical information that pizzas are 
created by baking. The world knowledge base then might specify that baking 
deep frozen pizzas implies merely a state of change. This information is more 
specific (pertaining to more specific pizzas) than the information about pizzas 
in general. Now the conditional logic specifies that more specific information 
overrides more general information, and thus the default interpretation does 
not survive under embedding into the discourse, and bake is (again) 
interpreted in its change of state sense. In the absence of contradicting or more 
specific information, lexical defaults are taken over into the discourse. The 
model thus provides a means to combine the lexical senses from GLT with 
world knowledge and furthermore offers some indication of how the two 
interact.
There are, however, still problems with this enriched version of GLT. 
First, the model inherits the problems of GLT noted above, namely that the 
different senses are not fine grained enough to distinguish different occasion 
specific concepts; different concepts with identical features (such as examples 
(10) - (13) above) are not distinguished at the discourse level, at least not if the 
defaults survive131. Secondly, this conception implies a rather unintuitive 
division of labour between lexical features and default reasoning; in the pizza 
example, the information that pizza baking (usually) means creating the pizza 
is lexical, while the information that baking a deep frozen pizza (usually) 
means changing the state of the pizza is part of the world knowledge, but the 
kind of information conveyed by the two statements is intuitively rather 
similar. A more general problematic point is the claim that default reasoning 
together with principles of discourse coherence replaces the notions of 
relevance and cognitive accessibility, so that the amended GLT model is taken 
to provide a genuine alternative to psychological or pragmatic models of 
natural language interpretation (cf. Lascarides & Copestake 1998, Wilson 1999), 
a point which I briefly discuss in the next section132.
131 If the default interpretations are overridden, more information might be included, depending 
on the world knowledge base. In order to model enrichment in the sense assumed here, defaults 
would always be overriden and thus be pointless.
132 There are also a number of potential problems associated with the use of conditional logic 
with defaults for this kind of reasoning, which might be better formalized by employing default 
logic; cf. Hunter & Marten (1999:30/31) for further discussion.
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In conclusion, it appears that GLT, even when adjusted and amended, is 
not very suitable to model the process of concept formation relevant for the 
interpretation of e*. The approach suffers, from the perspective adopted here, 
from a fundamental misconception of the notions of lexical and world 
knowledge which results in counter-intuitive analyses and a general lack of 
clarity about what precisely is being claimed. In the next section, I discuss how 
these problems can be overcome.
3. Reasoning with World Knowledge
In this section I discuss work reported in Hunter & Marten (1999). Before doing 
so, however, I briefly clarify what this work is trying to do. As noted above, 
Lascarides & Copestake (1998) view their work as an alternative to purely 
pragmatic explanations. In contrast, the work discussed here takes a slightly 
different angle -  a (potentially) computationally implementable statement of a 
theoretical explanation is an application of the latter to another domain 
(computers). In that sense it is not intended to provide an alternative, but 
rather a translation. For example, the substitution of the notion of accessibility 
by the notion of default is justified if, in the domain of computers, default 
corrresponds more or less to what accessibility is in the domain of the mind. 
Hence the point here is to formalize the analysis of the last chapter with a view 
to implementing it on a com puter133. However, this is a preliminary 
discussion and a number of disclaimers apply. In the work reported here, 
Hunter & Marten assume that reasoning applies to the output of the parser, 
that is, an account is given of how world knowledge interacts with predicates 
of varying arity, but not of how these predicates are formed. However, the 
dynamics of this process could possibly be added into the picture at a later stage. 
Furthermore, there is no prioritization of assumptions, that is, the notion of 
relevance remains unanalysed in the version discussed here. The work thus is 
mainly concerned with modelling reasoning with world knowledge and e*- 
like predicate argument structures under the assumption that lexical items 
address concepts. Consequently, all reasoning with linguistic structures is 
located in the world knowledge, which means in particular that it is open to 
logical inferencing and does not run over typed-feature structures. As a further 
contrast to GLT, Hunter & Marten represent world knowledge as statements in 
default logic (as opposed to conditional logic) which incorporates classical first- 
order logic and provides an expressive and clear format for stating context
133 There might of course be a 'back-flow' from applied linguistics to theoretical linguistics.
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sensitive reasoning134. I first introduce the system of Hunter & Marten (1999) 
and discuss it with respect to the theoretically motivated analysis of concept 
formation in the subsquent section.
3.1. A Default Logic Approach for Natural Language and World Knowledge
In the system described in Hunter & Marten (1999), the output of the parser is 
represented as function symbols which are translated into the logical language 
with recourse to world knowledge so that information from the parser and 
contextual default reasoning interact. Semantic information is represented as 
'concepts', where a concept is a term of the logical language and accesses a set of 
logical statements (i.e. 'assumptions’), although the actual set accessed is at 
present left unspecified. Both these representations are part of the logical 
language (the world knowledge) expressed by default rules, so that the term 
accessing the set of assumptions may be part of assumptions in the set135. 
Reasoning with the output of the parser and world knowledge is characterized 
as comprising three related activities; commonsense checking, commonsense 
inferendng, and commonsense explaining. I introduce the formal architecture 
of Hunter & Marten with reference to these activities in what follows136.
Commonsense checking establishes whether a given output from the 
parser is consistent with word knowledge facts. The notions of normal and 
unusual information can be checked with reference-to a (arbitrary) subset of 
default rules which might be called Normality default rules. For example, the 
idea that buttering toasts is usually done with a knife can be expressed with the 
following default rule:
(15) Butter(X, the toast) : Butter(X, the toast, with(a knife))
Butter(X, the_toast, with(a_knife)
The rule in (15) is a default rule. It states that, given Butter(X, the_toast) (i.e. 
the expression to the left of the colon, the 'precondition'), and furthermore 
given that Butter(X, the_toast, with(a_knife)) (i.e. the expression to the right of 
the colon, the 'jusitfication') is consistent with world knowledge, then 
Butter(X, the_toast, with(a_knife)) (that is now the expression under the line,
134 Cf. Reiter (1980) for a description of default logic
135 Cf. also Rips (1995) for a similar conception of psychological concepts.
136 All examples in this section are from Hunter & Marten (1999), to which the reader is also 
referred for formal definitions of the notions introduced here and further discussion.
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the ’consequent’) can be inferred137. The rule is stated over expressions of the 
logical language, not over the output of the parser directly. It is thus a piece of 
world knowledge, expressing an aspect of what (most) people know about 
buttering toasts. With reference to this rule, the sentence in (16) can be checked, 
which Hunter & Marten assume is represented as (17) after parsing:
(16) John buttered the toast with a knife.
(17) butter(John, the_toast, with(a_knife))
The first step in the interpretation of (17) is to translate the 'lexical' function 
symbol butter (lower case) in (17) into the world knowledge predicate Butter 
(upper case), which is formally achieved by the world knowledge predicate 
Holds applying to the output of the parse:
(18) Holds(butter(X, Y, Z )): Butter(X, Y, Z)
Butter(X, Y, Z)
The Translation default rule in (18) effectively states that the lexical predicate 
butter can be interpreted as the conceptual predicate Butter if it is consistent 
with the world knowledge to do so. Furthermore, commonsense inferences 
can be stated over the output from parsing using Holds. For example:
(19) Holds(butter(X, Y, Z)) & PartOf(X, X') & PartOf(Y, Y’) &
Human(X’) & Food(Y’) : Holds(butter(X, Y)
Holds(butter(X, Y))
The Facilitation rule in (19) allows the inference from the three place function 
symbol butter to the two place function symbol butter under the assumption 
that subject and object are human and food respectively, and that the inference 
is consistent with world knowledge. Holds then translates the inferred 
expression into a world predicate:
(20) Holds(butter(X, Y)): Butter(X, Y)
Butter(X, Y)
137 Technically, the inference is valid if no inconsistencies result with respect to the inferences 
derived, not with the total set of assumptions. It is presently left open which assumptions 
constitute relevant world knowledge.
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Now the inferred expression in (20) can be used as a precondition of the 
Normality rule in (15). The information in (17) is thus not only consistent w ith 
the world knowledge, but can also be seen as redundant in the sense that the 
same information can be inferred by Normality rules.
Before proceeding, I briefly point out what this system of reasoning 
representation does. The model introduced by Hunter & Marten assumes that 
all semantic information is located in the world knowledge, which is 
represented as a (large) set of first-order logic statements and default rules. The 
output of the parser is taken to be uninterpreted. Interpretation is provided by 
taking this output, that is here predicate-argument structures of varying arity, 
and relating it to the predicate symbols which are in the world knowledge. 
Given the complete generality of the system, both enrichment (as in (15)) and 
inferences (as in (19)) can be stated. Although the system requires a large 
number of individual statements and rules, it has the advantage that steps of 
interpretation are explicitly and clearly statable. The following discussion 
includes further examples of how world knowledge interacts with natural 
language representations.
The example considered above involved information consistent with 
world knowledge. The following example, in contrast, is unusual:
(21) butter(John, the_toast, with(a_spade))
By using Translation rule (18), the lexical predicate is translated into a world 
predicate:
(22) Butter(John, the_toast, with(a_spade))
Furthermore, by the rules in (19) and (20), the proposition in (23) can be 
inferred from (21):
(23) Butter(John, the_toast)
The assumption in (23) can in turn be used with the Normality default rule in
(15) to give (24):
(24) Butter(John, the_toast, with(a_knife))
Under the assumption that the world knowledge includes the information 
that (22) and (24) are contradictory, the information in (21) can be flagged as
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unusual with respect to world knowledge. Note that the system merely 
indicates why (21) is unusual, but does not imply any resolution, which has to 
be stated separately. This contrasts with the GLT position where principles 
regulate the interpretation of defaults, e.g. in this example, the default 
inference (if it was arrived at) would be suppressed given that with a spade is 
part of the sentence. The aim here is more modest, since inconsistency is 
checked, but not resolved.
Commonsense explaining involves deriving new predicates, either 
world knowledge predicates or Holds inferences, so that commonsense 
inferencing as in (19) above can be seen as an instance of commonsense 
explaining. Another instance of commonsense explaining involves term 
substitution. By using term substitution, function symbols can be replaced by 
other, possibly more complex, function symbols, which might be more 
meaningful in a given context. That is to say, substitution licenses the 
translation of one predicate into another, or possibly several other predicates if 
doing so is consistent with world knowledge. For example, for the n-ary 
function symbol flies(ai, ..., a j ,  where a \, ..., a n are terms, the following 
substitutions might be useful:
(25a) Sub(flies(ai,..., a n), moves(through_the_air(ai,..., a n)))
(25b) Sub(flies(ai,..., a j ,  moves(through_a_trajectory(ai,..., a j ) )
(25c) Sub(flies(ai,..., a n), moves(quickly(ai,..., a n)))
(25d) Sub(flies(ai,..., a j ,  moves(swiftly(ai,..., a n)))
Which one of possible substitution rules is appropriate is of course context 
dependent. Consider the examples in (26) and (27):
(26) flies(this_helicopter, to(the_island))
(27) flies(time, like(an_arrow))
These two examples can be rewritten using substitution with the following 
default rules (where T stands for zero or more further term variables):
(28) PhvsicalObiect(X) : Sub(flies(X, T), moves(through the air(X, T)))
Sub(flies(X, T), moves(through_the_air(X, T)))
(29) -■Aircraft(X): Sub(flies(X, T), moves(quicklv(X, T))) 
Sub(flies(X, T), moves(quickly(X, T)))
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Application of these rules (and assuming the relevant world knowledge facts, 
e.g. PhysicalObject(this_helicopter)) results in the commonsense explanation 
of (26) and (27) as (30) and (31):
(30) moves(through_the_air(this_helicopter, to(the_island)))
(31) moves(quickly(time, like(an_arrow)))
As these examples show, term substitution thus provides another means of 
using default inferences in reasoning with parsed natural language strings and 
world knowledge. It should be noted that there is considerable overlap between 
substitution and Holds inferences; the information provided by (30) and (31), 
for example, could equally have been arrived at by a default rule using the 
Holds predicate. This adds to the expressivity of the system, which can be 
constrained according to application.
To summarize, the system advocated in Hunter & Marten aims at 
providing a clear logic based formal account of how general reasoning interacts 
with output from parsing, in particular with predicate-argument structures of 
varying arity. The system is formulated in Default Logic, so that steps of 
inference are represented as default rules which license the commonsense 
checking, inferendng, and explaining of logical input structures, while being 
able to express context sensitivity and uncertainty. The underlying assumption 
is that natural language expressions address concepts, that is expressions of the 
logic, and that all interpretation is inferential, expressible in the system. The 
approach thus overcomes the problem of postulating two distinct levels of 
interpretation, such as feature structures and conditional logic in GLT, a 
division which is poorly motivated. The system is furthermore very 
expressive, since it offers several ways to derive particular information and can 
as such be suitably restricted given the need of particular applications.
3.2. Discussion
The system of Hunter & Marten outlined in the preceding section does not 
provide a formal analysis of concept formation. However, there are a number 
of traits which make it an attractive starting point for the development of such 
an analysis. As the examples discussed above show, the system handles 
examples similar to the enrichment cases discussed in the preceding chapter. 
For example, the enrichment of a constituent, that is the inference from (32) to
(33) is expressible:
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(32) John buttered the toast.
(33) John buttered the toast with a knife.
Similarly, the inference from (34) to (35):
(34) John buttered the toast with a fork.
(35) John buttered the toast.
Furthemore, by substitution, (36) can be translated to (37):
(36) John buttered the toast.
(37) John applied an even layer of butter to the toast.
These three inferences are stated w ithin one system of knowledge 
representation, which is capable of formalizing context sensitive and uncertain 
reasoning. By using explicit facilitation and translation rules, inferences can be 
incrementally added or retracted according to context. Furthermore, 
prototypical information can be represented by individually specified 
normality defaults. The expressive power thus exceeds typed feature structures 
and lattice theoretic representations, and provides a better means to represent 
processes of general reasoning. Even without a full prioritization of rules, I 
believe an at least approximate formalization of the interpretation of e* can be 
achieved with this system.
In order to employ this system for providing an LDSNL interface to 
general reasoning, a number of assumptions have to be modified. Thus, in 
order to model the contextual aspects in the establishment of argument 
structure, the default rules have to interact with LDSNL trees during the parse, 
not after the parse is established. This extension is, given the overall 
architecture, feasible; note that default rules can be used with predicate and 
term variables, and that inferences from, for example, binary to ternary 
predicates are possible. This modification, in conjunction with suitably defined 
normality statements, could be used, at least in principle, to model what counts 
as extra inferential effects, which are required by Swahili applied verbs. 
However, the first task is to implement a notion of prototypical attributes for 
verbs (i.e. their lexical 'denotation') together with a set of, necessarily artificial, 
relevant contextual default rules. One particular quality of the system which 
might be employed in modelling reasoning with e* is the relation between 
substitution and Holds, noted above. Substitution licenses the manipulation of 
predicate symbols; in a given context, one predicate can be replaced by another.
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Hold, on the other hand is employed for the derivation of inferences from 
predicates. As noted above, there is overlap between substitution and Holds, 
which, if appropriately implemented, could be used to model the relation 
between concept strengthening and contextual effects. Under this analysis, 
substitution of a term is possible if it results, in conjunction with world 
knowledge, in the increase in Hold inferences. However, the first step for using 
the system is to build a conceptual knowledge base, which specifies a set of 
assumptions and rules associated with a given predicate, and how this set 
depends on contextual information, including information provided by other 
predicates in the tree.
In summary, then, the system described by Hunter & Marten (1999) 
models reasoning with predicates of varying arities, as implied by the e* 
analysis developed here, and in addition provides a format for analysing the 
role of world knowledge in interpretation. Thus while the default logic model 
does not provide an analysis of the interpretation of e*, it does, I believe, 
provide the necessary basic architecture.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed aspects of the formalization of the 
interpretation of e*. While no such account has been developed, I have 
contrasted the typed feature structure based approach taken by GLT with the 
logic based approach taken by Hunter & Marten (1999), in particular with 
respect to the question of whether either approach could serve as a basis to 
model pragmatic concept formation as employed in the analysis of e*. The 
conclusion of this chapter is that, given a sufficiently expressive 
characterization of world knowledge, such an analysis might be feasible.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
1. Introduction
In this chapter I present a summary of the thesis and offer some concluding 
remarks.
2. Summary
In this thesis I have argued that subcategorization information provided by 
verbs is underspecified. Verbs may specify how many Ty(e) expressions, which 
I have argued include NPs and PPs, they minimally require in order to derive 
an expression of Ty(t), a proposition, but they are in general flexible with 
respect to how many Ty(e) expressions can optionally be introduced into the 
verb phrase. This view is supported by linguistic evidence which shows that 
arguments and adjuncts behave alike in a number of respects, so that in these 
cases the only difference between arguments and adjuncts is the obligatoriness 
of the former and the optionality of the latter. I have argued that an analysis of 
VP adjunction which treats the adjunct as a functor which takes the verb or the 
VP as argument does not adequately explain this fact, and that furthermore 
such a putative analysis is problematic from the point of view incrementality, 
which requires that unfolding tree structure is built in a step-by-step fashion 
and that no tree structure once established can be undone. It was shown that an 
Adjunction analysis implies the restructuring of trees, so that it is not a 
possible analysis within the overall LDSNL model. I have provided an 
alternative solution, which introduces an underspecified type value into the 
LDSNL system:
(1) Definition of (e* ->  t)
(e* ->  t) =def. ((t) v (e* ->  (e ->  t))}
The definition of the underspedfied type value e* states that verbs with such a 
type can be used with any number of Ty(e) expressions, since the 
underspedfied type can be recursively resolved by introducing an additional
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Ty(e) expression. The introduction of the notion of underspecification into the 
type specification of verbs is motivated also by the fact that structural 
underspecification is employed in the LDSNL system for values of the tree 
-node and formula values so that the solution follows from the overall 
assumptions of the model. The definition of e* for verbs extends the notion of 
underspecification, which is used in the LDSNL system mainly for the analysis 
of preposed constituents, to the analysis of predicate-argument structure. In 
chapter 3, I have shown how this underspedfied type can be employed for an 
analysis of VP adjunction which does not involve tree restructuring and 
which transparently expresses the relation between verbs and adjuncts as being 
parallel to the relation between verbs and arguments, since the verb can be 
seen to act as a functor for both arguments and adjuncts. The analysis has been 
described in detail, and I have shown how underspedfied verbs contribute to 
the process of tree building, and how they interact with the LDSNL system. I 
have provided sample derivations for adjunction and adjunct extraction, and 
provided necessary lexical instructions. One of the consequences of this 
approach is that prepositions are analysed as functioning to build Ty(e) nodes, 
that is, as licensing the introduction of Ty(e) expressions into the tree, thus 
functioning like case marking in languages with a case system. I have 
provided the necessary lexical instructions for prepositions and have justified 
this view with respect to alternative analyses of prepositions.
After having provided the LDSNL formalization of underspedfied verbs, 
I have turned to the question of the contribution of underspedfied verbs in the 
process of utterance interpretation. I have discussed relevant work from the 
formal semantics literature and proposed a formulation of a rule of semantic 
interpretation for underspecified verbs, based on the analysis in McConnell- 
Ginet (1982), which models the incremental extensional interpretation of e*. 
However, this analysis assumes that model-theoretic interpretation is assigned 
directly to natural language expressions, a view which is argued in LDSNL to 
be wrong. I have presented this argument and shown that the semantic rules 
do not provide an adequate explanation of the role of underspedfied verbs in 
utterance interpretation. In the context of this discussion I have introduced the 
Relevance theoretic notions of pragmatic enrichment and concept formation, 
which show that natural language expressions quite generally do not address 
fully spedfied concepts, that is expressions of the language of thought, but 
rather provide an instruction for the hearer to construct an occasion-spedfic 
ad-hoc concept which serves to derive particular occasion-spedfic inferential 
effects. I have argued that from this perspective the role of Ty(e) expressions in 
the verb phrase can be seen as an aid for the construction of the eventual
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concept addressed by the verb, so that verbal underspecification can be analysed 
as the overt syntactic reflex of the possibility to enrich concepts addressed by 
verbs under inclusion of information provided by optional Ty(e) expressions. 
The process of concept construction thus results in the establishment of the 
eventual meaning of the concept addressed by the verb, which includes the 
establishment of the eventual, occasion-specific arity of the predicate. This 
analysis shows how instructions from words, structural syntactic processes, and 
pragmatic inference interact in the process of utterance interpretation.
In Chapter 6, I have provided an analysis of applied verbs in Swahili, 
which have often been analysed as involving a process of valency changing, in 
that an additional Ty(e) expression is introduced. The argument developed in 
this thesis is that applied verbs instruct the hearer to built a stronger concept 
than a possible concept built from the base verb, so that additional inferential 
effects can be derived. I have argued that the instruction for concept formation 
may result in the introduction of an additional Ty(e) expression, but that this is 
not necessary. From this perspective, the syntactic facts follow from the 
underlying meaning of applied verbs, which is essentially pragmatic. I have 
presented evidence for this view and argued that it provides a better 
explanation of the facts than analyses which view applied verbs as only 
encoding a change in valency.
In the final chapter I have briefly discussed how the process of concept 
formation which plays a central role for the interpretation of underspecified 
verbs could be more formally stated. I have contrasted two approaches for 
representing conceptual and world knowledge and have argued that a logic 
based approach is more adequate than a typed feature structure based approach. 
I have then pointed out how a logic based approach to reasoning with natural 
language and world knowledge could be employed to provide an interface 
between the LDSNL system and a model of contextual reasoning, and how 
such a formalization might be used to model the conceptual aspects of the 
interpretation of underspedfied verbs.
3. Concluding Remarks
The argument developed in this thesis is embedded in a model of utterance 
interpretation. Utterance interpretation involves different aspects of cognitive 
activity; the ability to relate a physical signal to lexical units, the ability to build 
structured representations from lexical instructions, and the ability to construct 
mental concepts from the information provided by words and contextual 
assumptions. The analysis developed in this thesis shows that these different
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abilities interact freely, and that, at least for the analysis of verb phrase 
interpretation, all aspects have to be taken into account. One result of this 
thesis is thus that the model of utterance interpretation outlined in the first 
chapter is a viable conception of the mental activity involved in assigning 
meaning to strings of words.
The thesis provides, in addition, an analysis of adjunction for LDSNL, an 
area of language structure which has not received much attention in the 
model previously. The ideas proposed here, that type values may be 
underspecified, and that verbs are unfixed until all Ty(e) expressions are 
introduced into the tree, may be developed further and may help to broaden 
the model's empirical coverage. Another problem which has been addressed in  
Chapter 3, and which has implications for the overall system, is the formal 
power of the rule Introduction, which I believe should be restricted in the 
manner outlined here to license only the building of subject nodes.
However, there are a number of unresolved issues with respect to the 
formalization proposed here. In particular, the solution for optional objects 
offered here, namely to postulate lexical ambiguity, is not optimal. Given the 
formulation of e*, it would be expected that optional NPs, in addition to PPs, 
are covered by the analysis in a more principled fashion. The problem with 
optional objects is that the analysis as currently formulated postulates that 
additional Ty(e) nodes are built by prepositions, a solution which is necessary 
to restrict the formal power of e* and to prevent rather large-scale 
overgeneration. Yet this aspect of the analysis prevents an elegant 
characterization of the phenomenon of optional objects. The relevant line of 
inquiry here, and also more generally is to investigate more thoroughly the 
structure of lexical entries, and to devise means to express the underspedfied 
nature of verbs by lexical actions. More generally, it seems to me that the role 
of the lexicon in the LDSNL model currently is possibly too central. Although 
it is true that hearers build trees from lexical information, the current 
formalization threatens to be too powerful since lexical instructions can freely 
be added. I think that both restrictions on lexical actions, and the context 
sensitivity of lexical information are questions which should be addressed.
The thesis, then, provides a contribution to LDSNL and the study of 
utterance in terpretation  more generally. It explores the nature of 
underspedfication inherent in natural language verbs and verb phrases and 
presents an argument for the view that natural language interpretation is a 
process in which phonological, syntactic, and pragmatic information is freely 
exploited in the overall goal to assign meaning to a wave of sound.
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